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One of the aims of social insurance programs is to provide a financial safety 
net to households when encountering adverse circumstances. However, 
apart from offering mere protection, a system of social insurance can also 
be designed with the aim to increase overall welfare. In order to make the 
appropriate design decisions one needs to understand how individuals react 
to both negative shocks, such as health and wealth shocks, and the system 
put in place to protect them from these shocks. For example, in order to 
determine appropriate levels of contributions and benefits in social insurance 
contracts, one needs to understand how individuals prefer to move resources 
between different potential life outcomes and how consumption patterns 
are affected by negative shocks such as illness. Moreover, one needs to 
understand which (negative) behavior can be provoked by income protection 
and how such moral hazard can be counteracted by complementary efforts to 
income support. To gain understanding on such behavioral effects, access to 
high quality microdata is crucial.
This thesis contains four essays aiming to generate empirical insights to 
facilitate the design of social insurance program. It focusses on changes in 
consumption preferences in reaction to health and wealth shocks, the 
effectivity of complementary efforts to sickness benefits programs, and 
methods to construct the surveys needed to gain these empirical insights.
This is a volume in the series of the Meijers Research Institute and Graduate 
School of the Leiden Law School of Leiden University. This study is part of 
the Law School’s research program on ‘Reform of Social Legislation’.
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One of the aims of social insurance programs is to provide a financial
safety net to households when encountering adverse circumstances. How-
ever, apart from offering mere protection, a system of social insurance can
also be designed with the aim to increase overall welfare. In order to make
the appropriate design decisions one needs to understand how individuals
react to both negative shocks, such as health and wealth shocks, and the
system put in place to protect them from these shocks. For example,
in order to determine appropriate levels of contributions and benefits
in social insurance contracts, one needs to understand how individuals
prefer to move resources between different potential life outcomes and
how consumption patterns are affected by negative shocks such as ill-
ness. Moreover, one needs to understand which (negative) behavior can
be provoked by income protection and how such moral hazard can be
counteracted by complementary efforts to income support. To gain under-
standing on such behavioral effects, access to high quality microdata is
crucial. Innovations in data collection methods are thus key to a better
understanding of the workings of social insurance systems.
This thesis contains four essays. The first two essays are aimed at
gaining a better understanding of optimal levels of old-age income protec-
tion, by first providing insight in how individuals spread negative wealth
shocks over the life course and second estimating how consumption pat-
terns are affected by health declines. The third essay aims to measure
the effects of a complementary intervention to sickness benefits, aimed
to avoid unnecessary inflow into disability insurance leading up to long-
term income losses. The fourth essay evaluates alternative survey data
524582-L-sub01-bw-Kools
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2 Introduction Chapter 1
collection methods, aimed at generating high quality individual-level data
for countries that do not have an up-to-date Personal Records Database
to sample from. The essays can be read independently and all contain an
extensive introduction. This introductory chapter aims to summarize the
motivations, research questions, and outcomes of the four essays.
1.1 Spreading wealth shocks over the life course
In the recent years the pension system in the Netherlands has been subject
to many changes. In order to counteract the rise in government debt due
to an increasing dependency ratio, possibilities for tax-advanced pension
savings have been decreased and the statutory retirement age has been
increased. At the same time pension funds got into financial problems.
Life expentancy increased faster than anticipated, leading to increases in
liabilities, and interest rates decreased. Moreover, increases in the old-age
dependency ratio limited the possibility of counteracting disappointing
stock market returns with increases in pension contributions. In the recent
financial crisis pension funds had no choice but to forgo on inflation
corrections on pension benefits or even cut pension benefits in nominal
terms. At the same time, house prices fell sharply. These developments
have raised concerns about pension adequacy: Do households still have
sufficient funds to finance their future retirement?
The adequacy of post-retirement income is often assessed in a rather
pragmatic way, by holding post-retirement gross income against the bench-
mark of 70% of average pre-retirement gross income. The idea behind
the 70%-benchmark is that retirees no longer need to save, no longer have
work-related expenses, and have more time to engage in home-production,
thereby reducing their expenses. However, optimal replacement rates may
change over time. According to the optimal life cycle model unexpected
wealth losses should reduce consumption today ánd in the future. In that
sense, individuals may cushion the effects of a shock in future pension




Introduction Chapter 1 3
Chapter 2 of this thesis aims to answer the question: "What is the effect
of declines in Dutch pension annuities over the period 2008 - 2014 on retirement
expenditure goals?" By answering this question we hope to provide insight
into both the extent to which individuals spread wealth losses over the life
cycle and how pension adequacy has been affected by the Great Recession.
The Dutch institutional framework offers the ideal context to answer such
a question, because individuals can exert no influence on how much
they contribute to their pension plan, nor how the money is invested.
Moreover, the declines in pension annuities came completely unexpected.
We make use of linked survey and administrative data, providing us with
information on wealth, income, and consumption goals on an individual
level.
The results show that indeed individuals react to a drop in pension
annuities by lowering their planned post-retirement consumption. How-
ever, they also react to a general change in sentiment. The young mainly
react to drops in housing wealth, while older individuals react stronger to
reductions in pension wealth. Moreover, individuals with high incomes
tend to change their planned consumption more than individuals with
low incomes. Simulations predict that if individuals would not have low-
ered their planned expenditures, pension adequacy would have dropped
substantially. However, by adapting their goals, individuals counteracted
this drop at large part. This implies that individuals did anticipate the
future drops in pension income to some extent and are unlikely to en-
counter unexpected income losses at retirement. However, the drop in
(pension) wealth has left them in a worse situation, thereby decreasing
overall welfare.
The relationship between health and consumption 1.2
The optimal life cycle framework is a useful tool for evaluating welfare
effects of programs such as health insurance and pensions. According to
the life cycle model an individual’s lifetime utility is maximized if the ex-
pected marginal utility of consumption is kept constant over the life cycle,
while taking into account factors such as impatience and risk aversion.
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The expected marginal utility depends on the likelihood of life events
such as job loss or family formation, which either affect future income
streams (in the case of job loss) or the utility received from spending an
extra euro (in the case of family formation), both altering the optimal level
of contributions and benefits in social insurance schemes.
Also ones health status may be included in the model, not only because
a health decline affects ones potential earnings capacity, but also because
the marginal utility of consumption may depend on health. For example,
the utility gained from spending on adventurous holidays may decrease in
bad health, whereas the utility gained from spending money on a cleaner
may increase. Whether this on average results in an increase or decrease
of marginal utility cannot be theoretically determined and may depend on
factors such as age, country of residence, and type of health problems. The
body of empirical work on this subject has to date not led to conclusive
results and is solely focused on the US context. Therefore, chapter 3 of this
thesis aims to answer the following question: "What is the effect of health on
the marginal utility of consumption for elderly in Europe?"
In order to answer this question we develop a methodological frame-
work which relates subjective statements on income adequacy to an in-
tertemporal utility model. The question that we use is common in many
different household surveys. The advantage of this framework over closely
related methods, is that precise results can be achieved even with relatively
short panel data sets. This is especially relevant in the European context,
where harmonized panel data sets can still be considered a novelty.
The empirical results indicate that a decrease in physical health posi-
tively affects the marginal utility of consumption for the average European.
This implies that welfare can be increased by transferring income from
periods in good health to periods in bad health. However, a worsening of
cognitive health leads to a decrease in the marginal utility of consumption,
possibly due to a decrease in the ability to plan and take initiative.
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Counteracting moral hazard problems 1.3
Up to 2004 all employees in the Netherlands were covered by Disability
Insurance (DI), which would compensate for 70% of the income foregone
due to disability. That systems of income protection can be prone to
moral hazard was demonstrated by the incredibly high DI enrollment
rates in the Netherlands during the 1980s and 1990s, also known as ‘the
Dutch disease’. The system turned out to offer an attractive alternative
for regular dismissals, so that many of the DI beneficiaries actually did
not have a work impairment. The trend of increasing DI enrollment rates
has been curbed by a system of gate keeping and increased employer
responsibilities. Employers are now obliged to continue wage payments
during the first two years of sickness. At the same time, both employer and
employee are obliged to make efforts towards reintegrating the employee
into the workplace. If an employee cannot return to work within two years,
he or she enters a DI program with lower levels of income protection.
An example of the efforts undertaken by employer and employee to
prevent long term dependency on DI is graded return-to-work. Engaging
in (adapted) work during a fraction of the regular working hours may
prevent loss of human capital and may even facilitate a quicker recovery
of injuries. However, there is also the risk of working too much, leading to
stress and strain on the body and thereby slowing down the rehabilitation
process. The overall picture derived from the academic literature is that
graded return-to-work is an effective measure for shortening sick spells
and avoiding permanent work disabilities. However, little is known about
how these graded return-to-work trajectories should be set up. Therefore,
chapter 4 of this thesis aims to answer the question: "Does the effectiveness
of graded return-to-work depend on (1) weeks waited until start of graded return-
to-work; (2) intensity of graded return-to-work; (3) type of work disability?"
We aim to answer this question using registry data from a Dutch
private workplace reintegration provider. This provider helps firms with
executing the obligations of the gatekeeper protocol and setting up return-
to-work plans for their sick employees. Whether and when sick employees
start a graded return-to-work trajectory partly depends on their probability
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of recovery, so that ordinary regression results are likely to be biased. The
case managers have ample freedom in setting up their treatment plans
and some may be more in favor of starting graded return-to-work early,
while other prefer to wait. We construct instrumental variables measuring
the preference of case managers to start graded return-to-work, to start
graded return-to-work early, or to start graded return-to-work at a high
intensity and use these to correct for the selection bias.
Graded return-to-work turns out to be even more effective when it
is started early on in a sick spell and when it encompasses a substan-
tial amount of hours. Possibly this provides more opportunities for the
employee to engage in work processes and to be treated as a ‘regular’
employee. Graded return-to-work is a less effective tool for individuals
who suffer from psychological or psychiatric problems. In those cases
it is better to wait a bit longer with starting the graded return-to-work
trajectory. In these types of circumstances a presence at the workplace
may induce stress, thereby hampering the recovery process. Contrary to
earlier literature the results show that even though graded return-to-work
is an effective tool to speed up the rehabilitation of sick-listed workers, it
does not improve the long-run probability to return to work. This may
be because the circumstances for the ‘control group’ are quite different in
the Netherlands than in other countries. Regardless of their participation
in graded return-to-work arrangements employees and employers need
to stay in contact and agree on ways to return to the workplace. If there
is a possibility of recovery this is also likely to be achieved in absence of
graded return-to-work.
1.4 Innovations in data collection methods
To evaluate or compare the effectiveness of social insurance programs, com-
parable and statistically accurate information on unemployment, income
inequality, poverty, and health is necessary. Preferably this information is
updated on a regular basis. Although in the Netherlands there is a sub-
stantial amount of administrative data and large scale surveys, it is harder
to obtain such data in low and (some) middle income countries. In these
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contexts one is dependent on information from face-to-face household
surveys executed once every couple of years. Fielding such surveys is a
time-consuming and costly task, such that innovations in data collection
methods are essential to facilitate the analysis of social policy in these
countries.
The most commonly used method for face-to-face household surveys at
this moment is two-stage cluster sampling. When using this method first
a number of random geographical areas are selected and next a number
of random households within these areas are selected. This second step is
necessary, because the defined regions are often too large to canvas the
whole area within a day. By using two-stage cluster sampling field work
can be concentrated in relatively small regions, however it requires several
revisits to the region, thereby increasing both the costs of fieldwork and
the risk of missing mobile and non-standard populations. Novel sampling
methods such as gridded sampling allow for the definition of smaller
geographical areas, such that it becomes possible to enroll all households
within the selected areas in the sample. This method, called one-stage
cluster sampling, may lead to substantial cost savings, since listing and
survey phases can be combined in one day and the region to cover is much
smaller. Moreover, non-standard and mobile households are less likely
to be excluded from the sample. However, if households with similar
characteristics tend to live close together, it may require increasing the
total sample size, thereby increasing costs.
In chapter 5 of this thesis we aim to answer the question: "How many
more clusters should be sampled when using one-stage cluster sampling com-
pared to two-stage cluster sampling?" To answer this question we first de-
velop a synthetic geo-coded micro-dataset covering all households in Os-
hikoto (Namibia), based on information from recent surveys, census, and
spatial covariates. This information is combined using both model-based
population generation methods, and clustering and prediction methods.
The resulting data have the same statistical properties as the real popula-
tion, however, real-world geo-coded datasets are rarely publicly released
because of the risks of disclosing personal information of households.
Based on simulated outcomes of the two survey sampling methods ap-
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plied to these data, we determine the required number of clusters for both
one-stage and two-stage cluster sampling under different scenario’s for
clustering of characteristics in the population.
Based on the results of the analysis we conclude that one-stage cluster
sampling does not necessarily require increased sample sizes, unless we
are in a situation where there is complete socio-spatial segregation for
one of the characteristics of interest to the survey. When we do encounter
this type of situation, sample sizes may increase by up to thirteen times.
However, in most cases the increases are only moderate, with increases of
about 1.3 times compared to two-stage cluster sampling, so that one-stage
cluster sampling can be a viable alternative to two-stage cluster sampling.
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2 Cutting One’s Coat According to
One’s Cloth - How did the Great
Recession affect retirement
resources and expenditure goals?
Abstract
Pension and housing wealth fell substantially during the Great Recession
in many industrialized countries. This raised questions about the devel-
opment of retirement savings adequacy. Using a unique combination of
survey and administrative panel data from before and after the Great Re-
cession in the Netherlands, we investigate co-movements between wealth
and retirement expenditure goals. We separate ‘pure’ wealth effects from
common factors such as general pessimism. The estimates show that a
shock in annuitized pension wealth of 100 euros reduced retirement expen-
diture goals with 23-33 euros. Whereas pensions drive the revision of goals
for older individuals, the results indicate that individuals between the ages
of 25 and 49 are more sensitive to housing wealth. Furthermore, while
other studies find that the reaction of current consumption to financial
shocks is relatively strong for low-income households, we document that
long term expenditure goals are adjusted more by high-income households.
Simulations show that the fraction of individuals falling short with regard
to their own retirement expenditure goal would almost have doubled
during the Great Recession if individuals would not have adjusted their
retirement expenditure goals downward.
A working paper version of this chapter is published as De Bresser et al. (2018) and
is currently under review. The chapter is co-authored by Jochem de Bresser and Marike
Knoef. The authors thank Rob Alessie, Nicole Jonker, Arthur van Soest, and participants
of the Netspar Pension Day 2016, the “Future well-being of the elderly" conference in
Montreal, IIPF doctoral school 2016, EALE conference 2017, and the HSZ lunch seminar
series at Leiden University Department of Economics.
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2.1 Introduction
The recent Great Recession had a detrimental impact on household wealth
in Western countries. Disappointing stock market returns had a negative
effect on wealth accumulated in funded pension plans and austerity mea-
sures increased public pension eligibility ages. Moreover, during the crisis
residential property prices declined sharply. The rapid decline of wealth
during the crisis raised a host of questions for economic analysis, such as:
what is the effect of a wealth shock on consumption, on labor supply, and
on retirement behavior? Since household portfolios in Western countries
are dominated by pension and housing wealth, concerns have also been
expressed about the adequacy of retirement resources.
The life cycle model of household spending, developed by Modigliani
and Ando (1960) and Ando and Modigliani (1963), predicts that indi-
viduals smooth exogenous wealth shocks over their remaining lifetime.
Furthermore, the original life cycle model predicts that the effects of wealth
shocks are the same for all asset types. Modern models, however, differ-
entiate between asset classes, since pension and housing wealth differ in
many dimensions. For example, there may be transaction costs related to
borrowing against illiquid assets such as housing equity. Households may
also develop ‘mental accounts’ that dictate that certain assets are more
appropriate to use for current expenditure and others for long-term saving
(Thaler 1990).
There is a large body of literature on the effect of wealth shocks on
consumption. Several studies find evidence for a substantial causal effect
of wealth on consumption,1 while others find only small effects (e.g.
Disney et al. 2010), or conclude that co-movements in consumption and
wealth are not generated by a causal relationship, but by common factors
such as general optimism or pessimism (Attanatio et al. 2009). Christelis
et al. (2015) find that for every loss of 10% in housing and financial wealth,
current household expenditures drop by about 0.6% and 0.9%, respectively.
Such order of magnitude was also found by Mian et al. (2013) and by
Angrisani et al. (2015), and is in line with the prediction of a life-cycle
1Paiella (2009) provides an overview of the literature.
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model (Poterba 2000). Most studies examining the effect of wealth on
retirement behavior find little or no evidence that wealth shocks have a
causal effect on the (planned) timing of retirement (e.g. Coile and Levine
2006; Hurd et al. 2009; Goda et al. 2011; Goda et al. 2012 and Crawford
2013).
This chapter contributes to our understanding of wealth effects on
household behavior. Instead of investigating the effect of wealth shocks
on current consumption or on the (planned) retirement age, we examine
the effect of wealth shocks on self-reported minimal retirement expendi-
ture goals. Such goals are important determinants of retirement savings
adequacy, which we measure as the difference between annuitized wealth
at retirement and retirement expenditure goals on the individual level
(De Bresser and Knoef 2015). Because of the aging society, understanding
the relationship between wealth and retirement expenditure goals be-
comes even more crucial, as the generosity of public pensions declines and
households become more dependent on financial markets and housing
wealth.
This study estimates the ‘pure’ wealth effect that is the response of
retirement expenditure goals to unanticipated wealth shocks. This ‘pure’
effect is the causal effect that is of interest in most of the literature (Paiella
and Pistaferri 2017) and that can, in the context of retirement expenditure
goals, mitigate the negative effect of a crisis on retirement savings adequacy.
We separate this ‘pure’ effect from the effects of common macro factors that
may be correlated with negative wealth shocks, such as general pessimism
and negative expectations about future labor market conditions. The last
part of this chapter shows the degree to which co-movements between
wealth and retirement expenditure goals were able to compensate a decline
in retirement savings adequacy brought about by the Great Recession.
We estimate the effects of shocks to both pension wealth and housing
wealth by regressing first differences in retirement expenditure goals on
differences in annuitized wealth from before and after the Great Recession.
In the Netherlands shocks to pensions are exogenous, since workers cannot
choose which pension fund to contribute to, how much to contribute,
or which investment strategy to follow. All aspects of participation in
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industry-wide funds are outside the control of participants – occupational
pensions are a fixed aspect of work in a given industry. The variation
in shocks to pension annuities is driven by past investment decisions of
pension funds. Moreover, the pension cuts came unexpected, as almost
all funds appeared financially fit before the crisis. While the institutional
framework renders changes to pension annuities exogenous, home owners
could react to the decline in house prices by increasing their mortgage
down payments. Therefore, we instrument shocks to net housing wealth,
which may be influenced by endogenous mortgage down payments, with
shocks in gross housing wealth. Finally, simulations based on a seemingly
unrelated regression (SUR) model are used to evaluate retirement savings
adequacy with and without co-variation between expenditure goals and
resources.
We bring the model to the data using matched administrative and
survey data. The survey data contain self-reported retirement expenditure
goals for a representative sample of the Dutch population, collected in
January 2008 at the eve of the downturn in the financial markets and
in December 2014, after some years of recession. A unique feature of
these data is that individual panel members can be linked to tax records
and administrative data from pension funds and banks. This allows us
to construct a complete and precise measure of the financial resources
available to households.
The contribution of this chapter to the literature is twofold. First, as
far as we know we are the first to investigate the effect of unanticipated
wealth shocks on retirement expenditure goals. Although effects of wealth
shocks on (short term) consumption are often studied, analyses about the
long term are scarce. However, the long term relation is highly important
for the development of retirement savings adequacy. The analysis relies
on administrative individual-level data on unanticipated wealth shocks,
instead of aggregate measures of house and stock price changes that are
often used in the literature. Second, this chapter studies to what extent
co-movements in wealth and retirement expenditure goals during the
Great Recession affected the development of retirement savings adequacy.
Retirement savings adequacy is defined by the difference between individ-
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ual retirement expenditure goals and annuitized wealth. It is common to
measure readiness against a single universal threshold, e.g. a poverty line
or a replacement rate of 70% of prior income or expenditures, or using a
life-cycle model.2 However, universal thresholds fail to capture relevant
differences in coping strategies, which may have changed after some years
of recession. Benchmarks based on the life cycle model are able to take into
account differences between households, but have difficulty to accurately
reflect heterogeneous preferences without excessive computational burden.
This makes an alternative and complementary analysis useful.3
The estimation results show that a decrease of 100 euros per month in
pension annuities reduced retirement expenditure goals by 23-33 euros.
Splitting the sample by age, the estimation results suggest that expenditure
goals of older individuals were primarily affected by pensions, while for
younger individuals real estate played a more important role. Older
individuals may be more likely to see their house as a bequest. For them,
a higher house price may simply be a compensation for a higher implicit
rental cost of living in the house, but has no real wealth effect (Sinai and
Souleles 2005, and Campbell and Cocco 2007). Pensions, on the other hand,
may not be salient to young individuals who have yet to accumulate a large
part of their pension wealth. Another split, based on the median household
income in 2008, reveals that individuals in high-income households adjust
their expenditure goals more after a shock to pension wealth than do those
with lower incomes. This suggests that while literature on the marginal
propensity to consume shows that current consumption of low income
individuals is more sensitive to shocks than current consumption of high
income individuals, we find that in the long run low income individuals
may prefer to use different margins to adapt to changing circumstances.
They may, for instance, choose to work longer rather than cut their desired
spending (which is in line with the results of Lindeboom and Montizaan
2For examples of universal standards of sufficiency see Haveman et al. (2007), Mitchell
and Moore (1998) and Skinner (2007). Engen et al. (2005) and Scholz et al. (2006) use
life-cycle models to assess preparedness.
3Our focus on attaining retirement expenditure goals after retirement means that we
do not take into account other reasons to save, such as precautionary or bequest motives.
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(2018), on planned retirement dates). Comparisons between log-log and
level-level estimates suggest that only large drops in annuities resulted in a
‘pure’ wealth effect. As noted by Browning and Collado (2001), consumers
may be less likely to smooth consumption when changes are small and
the cost of adjusting consumption is not trivial.
Simulation results indicate that co-movements between wealth and
retirement expenditure goals tempered the adverse effect of the Great
Recession on retirement savings adequacy considerably. The fraction of
individuals who are expected not to be able to afford their minimum retire-
ment expenditure goal increased from 27% to 32%, if we only take pension
wealth into account. In case individuals would not have revised their
goals, around 50% would not have been able to finance their retirement
expenditure goals, based on pensions alone.4
The remainder of this chapter is set up as follows. Section 2.2 explains
the Dutch pension system and the ways it changed between January 2008
and December 2014. Section 2.3 provides the theoretical underpinning
for our empirical analysis. In section 2.4 we present the data used for the
analysis, followed by a description of our empirical strategy in section 2.5.
Section 2.6 contains the results and section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Pension reforms and the crisis
The Dutch pension system consists of four pillars: (1) public pension, (2)
mandatory occupational pensions, (3) voluntary private pension products
such as life annuities, and (4) all other (voluntary) assets such as private
savings and housing wealth. In this section we describe these pillars and
their developments between January 2008 and December 2014 (the months
in which the survey data were collected). In the calculations of projected
pension annuities we take these developments into account.
4Note that, even though an appropriate decrease in retirement expenditure goals does
result in better pension savings adequacy relative to those goals, it still implies that the
individual endures a welfare loss. This means that there is less need to worry about
individuals adapting their plans appropriately to their new situation. It however does
not imply that retirement incomes can decrease without any costs to the individual.
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Public pension 2.2.1
The first pillar consists of a flat rate public old age pension, financed
through a pay-as-you-go system. For every year that individuals live in
the Netherlands, they build up rights to 2% of the full public pension.
Individuals who lived in the Netherlands during all 50 years before the
statutory retirement age receive a full public pension (50% of the minimum
wage for individuals living in a couple and 70% of the minimum wage
for singles). For retirees with less than full public pension rights as a
consequence of living abroad, and insufficient other resources, the first
pillar is topped up with social assistance to guarantee a social minimum.
In 2008 the public pension eligibility age was 65. In 2012 an amendment
passed that stipulated a stepwise increase of the public pension eligibility
age to 67 in 2023, after which it would be linked to life expectancy. In 2014
legislation was proposed to speed up the increase such that the public
pension eligibility age will reach 67 in 2021. If individuals work longer,
they will also build up more pension wealth as a consequence of this act.5
Since there was a lot of media attention for the increase in the statutory
retirement age, in our calculations we take the accelerated increase of the
retirement age into account (which became an Act of Parliament in 2015).
Occupational pensions 2.2.2
The Dutch save massively for their retirement via occupational pensions.
90% of all employees in the Netherlands have a mandatory pension scheme
with their employer (Bovenberg and Meijdam 2001) and for many house-
holds pension savings are by far their largest financial assets. About 1344
billion euros is accumulated in Dutch pension funds (end 2017), i.e. on
average nearly 175,000 euros per household. Employees cannot choose to
which pension fund they want to contribute, but are mostly assigned to a
sector-specific fund. Changing pension funds would thus often require to
change to a job in a different industry.
5Mastrobuoni (2009) and Staubli and Zweimüller (2013) indicate that an in increase in
the statutory retirement age is likely to result in an increase in the actual retirement age.
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Most occupational pension schemes are defined-benefit plans and for
many years people did not worry about their pension. Pension funds had
large reserves and participants were not aware of the fact that indexation
was conditional on the financial situation of their fund. This changed
dramatically in 2008. Whereas in 2007 the average funding ratio was 144%
and only 7 pension funds had a reserve deficit, by the end of 2008 300
pension funds had a reserve deficit and the average funding ratio6 was 96%
(source: Dutch Central Bank). Most pension entitlements were no longer
indexed for inflation and some entitlements were even cut in nominal
terms. For example, large funds for metal electro, metal technologies, and
tooth technologies had to cut nominal pensions in 2013 with 5.2%, 6.3%
and 7.0%, respectively. The biggest pension fund in the Netherlands (ABP),
covering about 2.8 million individuals, has not been able to index pension
entitlements and pension benefits since 2010 and on top of that had to cut
pensions by 0.5% in 2013. In total the forgone indexation between 2008
and 2014 amounts to 9.93% (source: website ABP).
There are vast differences in funding ratio trends between funds: figure
A1 in Appendix 2.A shows that the relative decline in funding ratio during
2008 is spread between 0 and -60%. Such variation is explained by (a) the
pursued interest rate hedging policy, (b) the asset mix of the investment
portfolio, (c) contributions to the fund, and (d) sensitivity to increased life
expectancy (which is higher for funds with a relatively large proportion
of young participants) (DNB 2014). Because of these different trends,
households are confronted with different shocks to pension wealth. These
shocks were unanticipated and are exogenous. Exogeneity is embedded
in the system, because individual participants in Dutch pension funds
have no influence on their contribution and investment strategy. Moreover,
it is difficult to change funds, since funds often cover entire industries
(for instance, there is one single fund for all government employees and
6The funding ratio is the main measure of financial health of pension funds. The
legally required funding ratio in accordance with the European pension fund guidelines
is 104.2% (IORP Directive, PbEG 2003/41/EG). Pension funds need to hand over a
recovery plan to the Dutch Central Bank if their funding ratio is below 104.2% and need
to cut pensions when their funding ratio is below 104.2% in five consecutive years. A
fund is allowed to index pensions for price inflation when their funding ratio exceeds
130%. Between 110% and 130% partial indexation is possible (DNB 2016).
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another one for all of dentistry). However, they were aware of the develop-
ments, since the 2008 Pension Act obliged all pension providers to provide
a standardized yearly overview of current and projected entitlements (the
Uniform Pension Overview, UPO). The fact that shocks to pension wealth
were exogenous and salient makes them interesting to investigate.
Pension reforms took place in the aftermath of the financial crisis. In
2014 annual tax-favored pension accruals have been reduced from 2.25%
to 2.15%, and it was decided to reduce them further to 1.875% in 2015.
This means that the percentage by which pensions are built up each year is
reduced. Moreover, as of 2014 the age that forms the basis for the accrued
pension rights increased from 65 to 67. This means that occupational
pensions will be less generous for future retirees.
Voluntary private savings 2.2.3
The third pillar plays a relatively minor role in the Netherlands. It is
formed by voluntary individual pension products, such as life annuities.
The self-employed and individuals with a gap in their pension entitlements
are allowed to buy life annuities on fiscally attractive terms. Voluntary
retirement savings in savings accounts, stocks and/or bonds are not very
common in the Netherlands because of the fiscally attractive and high
accumulation of wealth in occupational pension plans. For example, in
2014 the median household in the fifth decile owned only 8,300 euros of
financial wealth (source: Statistics Netherlands). Such small amounts are
probably precautionary savings rather than aimed for retirement. Finally,
households may accumulate housing wealth (the fourth pillar). After a
long period of steady increases, house prices have taken a hit between
2008 and 2014, decreasing by 20% on average.
Theory 2.3
How do we expect individuals’ retirement expenditure goals to respond to
shocks in pension entitlements and housing wealth? We start by explaining
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the effect of a shock in pension entitlements on planned consumption
during retirement (conditional on housing wealth). Consider the standard
problem of a consumer who lives for many periods and chooses optimal
consumption to maximize the expected value of a lifetime time-separable
utility function. We assume that there are perfect capital markets and that
























with ct real consumption in period t, L the final period in the life cycle,
u(·) a utility function, ρ the rate of time preferences, r the real interest
rate, At real net worth at the end of period t, and yt real income in period
t. The optimal solution to this maximization problem is (c∗t , c∗t+1, ..., c
∗
L).
When we assume quadratic preferences or CARA (to obtain a closed
form solution) and assume ρ = r, the Euler equation becomes ct =
Et[cτ], τ = t + 1, . . . , L. Substitution of this Euler equation into the ex-
pected lifetime budget constraint and re-arranging yields the following
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Using (2.4) the difference between planned retirement consumption (cR)

























with R the period of retirement. The first part between the square brackets
of this equation shows the difference in expected and observed income
between t and t + s, the second part reflects adjustments in expected
income until retirement, and the third part reflects the change in expected
pension entitlements. In this paper t is January 2008, just before the
crisis and t + s is December 2014. Equation (2.5) shows us that a decline
in pension entitlements due to the crisis will have a negative effect on
planned consumption during retirement. Furthermore, this equation gives
reason to expect that planned retirement consumption of older household
is more sensitive to shocks in pension entitlements than that of young
households, because pension entitlements constitute a larger part of future
income which will be spread out over fewer years.
With regard to shocks in housing wealth it is more difficult to predict
theoretically the effect on planned consumption during retirement (as is
also explained by Campbell and Cocco (2007) and Attanatio et al. (2011)).
On the one hand housing is an asset. Thus, increases in house prices
lead to an increase in one’s wealth and this may increase current as well
as future consumption (the wealth effect). On the other hand, houses
provide housing services. For homeowners who expect to live in their
current house for a very long time, a higher house price has no real
wealth effect. For young households, who plan to increase house size
later in life, an increase in housing prices leads to an increase in the
price of future additional housing services and this may affect current
and future consumption negatively. Furthermore, houses can be used as
collateral in a loan. An increase in house prices may lead to an increase
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in consumption because it allows borrowing constrained homeowners
to smooth consumption over the life cycle. In the presence of reverse
mortgages, homeowners who expect to live in their current house for
a very long time would be able to increase consumption. In practice,
however, reverse mortgages are rare and housing prices are more likely to
affect the next generation via bequests.
2.4 Data
In this study we match survey and administrative data at the individual
level. Section 2.4.1 describes the survey data on retirement expenditure
goals, and section 2.4.2 the administrative data on assets.
2.4.1 Survey data
Survey data are taken from the Longitudinal Internet Study in the Social
Sciences (LISS panel), gathered by CentERdata.7 This panel is recruited
through address-based sampling (no self-selection), and households with-
out a computer and/or internet connection receive an internet connection
and computer for free. This roughly nationally representative household
panel (Van der Laan 2009) receives online questionnaires on different top-
ics each month. When respondents complete a questionnaire they receive
a monthly incentive. A variety of data is available from studies conducted
in the LISS panel.
As a proxy for consumption during retirement (Et[c∗R]), we use a ques-
tion regarding retirement expenditure goals elicited from LISS-respondents
both in a single-wave study in January 2008, constructed by Johannes Bin-
swanger and Daniel Schunk (Binswanger et al. 2013), and in a single-wave
study in December 2014, constructed by the authors.8 In both studies the
7For more information we refer to http://www.lissdata.nl/lissdata/.
8The recession in the Netherlands, defined as a period of two quarters of negative
GDP growth, started in the second quarter of 2008. The last period of recession was
between the third quarter of 2012 and the second quarter of 2013. Appendix 2.B shows
the development of consumer confidence between the two surveys.
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question is placed at the beginning of the survey, after a couple of items
regarding housing costs during retirement. The question is phrased as
follows:
This question refers to the overall level of spending that applies to you
[and your partner/spouse] during retirement. What is the minimal
level of monthly spending that you want during retirement? Please
think of all your expenditures, such as food, clothing, housing, in-
surance etc. Remember, please assume that prices of the things you
spend your money on remain the same in the future as today (i.e., no
inflation).
We find that people provide reasonable answers to this question. As
shown by De Bresser and Knoef (2015) and below, people provide decent
answers compared to their current income level. Furthermore, non-retirees
provide a similar distribution of answers as retirees (who know what it is
to be retired).9 Finally, we asked people whether they found it difficult to
answer this question.10 In our models we control for the fact that answers
given by respondents who indicate they find it difficult to answer could
be systematically higher or lower than others. De Bresser and Knoef (2015)
found no evidence of systematically different answers from individuals
who found it difficult or easy to answer the question.
It is important to understand how respondents interpreted the question.
Therefore, in December 2014 at the end of the questionnaire (after other
questions about health expectations, health care, and pension expectations)
we asked respondents how satisfied they would be with a retirement
income of X euros, where X is their self-reported minimal retirement
expenditure goal from the beginning of the questionnaire. Most people
report a satisfaction level 3 or a 4 on a scale from 1 to 7. In that same survey
we also asked respondents about their preferred retirement expenditure
goal (taking into account that there is a trade of between current and future
expenditures). When asked to rate their preferred retirement income level
on a scale from 1 to 7, most people report a 4 or a 5. Both minimal
9These descriptives can be found in Appendix 2.C.
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and preferred retirement expenditure goals increase with income, and
the difference between them has the same order of magnitude across
income groups (the relative difference even declines a bit from 14% of
current income for the lowest income quintile to 9% of current income
for the highest income quintile). All of this suggests that respondents did
not interpret the question as subsistence consumption, but rather as the
amount of expenditure they would need to reach a neutral satisfaction
level.
In 2008 it was safe to assume individuals did not take into account
health care expenditures when reporting expenditure goals, since long
term care costs were almost fully covered by the government and manda-
tory insurance at that time. By 2014 this was no longer the case, so we
asked respondents whether they took health care costs into account in their
answer. If so, they were subsequently asked what their minimal expendi-
tures would be without these costs. We analyze minimal expenditures net
of health care costs to safeguard comparability.
The survey was administered to household heads and their spouses as
from the age of 25, with a reported net monthly household income higher
than 800 euros (in this way students are excluded). In 2008 the survey was
administered to a random half of the eligible panel members, in 2014 the
full eligible sample was included. Descriptive statistics of socio-economic
variables can be found in Appendix 2.D.
Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics of self-reported retirement ex-
penditure goals in 2008 and 2014 (both expressed in 2014 euros using the
consumer price index). The median retirement expenditure goal dropped
by 165 euros (10%), from 1625 euros/month in 2008 to 1460 euros/month
in 2014. Both ends of the inter-quartile range (1218 and 2031 euros/month
in 2008) also decreased by approximately 10%, indicating that retirement
expenditure goals decreased across the distribution. Expenditure goals
declined not only in absolute terms, but also relative to current income:
replacement rates dropped from a median of 75% in 2008 to 63% in 2014.
This can also be seen in figure 2.1, which shows how retirement expen-
diture goals are related to current income. Reported goals increase with
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics retirement expenditure goals
N Mean SD p25 Mdn p75
a. Retirement expenditure goals
2008 Monthly expenditures
a 1396 1744 733 1218 1625 2031
Replacement rate (%)b 1396 76 28 57 75 91
2014 Monthly expenditures
a 2755 1495 570 1095 1460 1825
Replacement rate (%)b 2717 67 29 47 63 80
b. Changes in Retirement expenditure goals
Monthly expenditures 456 -267 640 -571 -227 79
Replacement rate (%-points) 452 -11 30 -28 -11 5
a Retirement expenditure goals are standardized to a one-person household and ex-
pressed in 2014 euros.
b Replacement rate is defined as the retirement expenditure goal divided by current
income.
Figure 2.1: Kernel regressions of retirement expenditure goals
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income in both years, but this relationship was flatter in 2014 compared to
2008.
The bottom panel of table 2.1 describes the differences between 2008
and 2014 for those individuals whom we observe twice. Due to panel
attrition the number of individuals who are in the sample in both years is
relatively low: we retain around 450 individuals or one third of the 2008
sample. Among those who do remain in the sample, most revised their
retirement expenditure goal downwards with a median revision of -227
euros/month. The median revision in the replacement rates is -11%-points.
However, there is a lot of variation: a quarter of the individuals reduced
their minimum consumption level by at least 571 euros/month, while
another quarter of individuals increased their retirement expenditure goal
by 79 euros or more. Retirement expenditure goals are fairly strongly
correlated across the years: the correlation coefficient is 0.55 for levels and
0.29 for replacement rates.
2.4.2 Administrative data
Administrative data are taken from the Complete Asset Data of the Nether-
lands 2008 and 2013 (CAD), the Public Pension Entitlements data 2008
and 2012 (PPE), the Public Pension Benefits data 2008 and 2012 (PUBLB),
the Occupational Pension Entitlements data 2008 and 2012 (OPE), and
the Private Pension Benefits data 2008 and 2013 (PRIVB), all gathered by
Statistics Netherlands.
The CAD consists of all households in the Netherlands and contains
data on savings accounts, stocks, securities, property, business wealth, and
debt. Debt is categorized in mortgage and other debt. Although most of
these data are derived from tax records, banks also provide information
about bank accounts. Banks have to report accounts with a balance of 500
euros or more (or 15 euros in interest payments), which means that we
only miss small amounts of money held in bank accounts.
PPE and OPE contain data on public and occupational pension enti-
tlements for the entire Dutch population between the ages of 21 and 64.
PUBLB and PRIVB contain data on public and private pension benefits
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received by all retirees (based on tax records). Third pillar pensions (e.g.
life annuities) are, unfortunately, only observed in administrative data
once they are claimed, because they are subject to taxation only in the
payout phase. Therefore, the LISS Assets Survey is used to supplement the
administrative data of pre-retirees with survey data on third pillar pension
entitlements. We use the administrative records from 2008 to match the
survey answers provided in 2008. To match the survey answers provided
in 2014 we use the most recent administrative data available and adjust
for aggregate changes between the time of measurement and 2014.
Panel a. of table 2.2 summarizes the monthly annuities from pen-
sions and wealth (more details about the wealth data can be found in
Appendix 2.E). We use three definitions of after-tax pension annuities: (1)
annuities based on public and private pensions, (2) annuities based on
pensions plus private wealth other than real estate, and (3) annuities based
on all wealth (including real estate). The assumptions used to annuitize
wealth can be found in Appendix 2.F.11 The median projected annuity
based on public and occupational pensions declined by around 400 euros,
or 20%, from 2146 to 1723 euros/month between 2008 and 2014.12 We
observe similar declines of 15-20% (300-400 euros) for the 25th and 75th
percentiles of the distribution, respectively. The smaller absolute decline
for the 25th percentile compared to the median and the 75th percentile can
be explained by the fact that the flat rate public pension makes up a large
share of entitlements for pension-poor households. This public pension
tracks the minimum wage and has been adjusted for inflation during the
period spanned by our sample (and, according to our assumptions, will
be indexed for inflation in the future). Pension-rich households, on the
other hand, rely more on occupational pensions, many of which have not
been indexed fully for inflation or have even been cut in nominal terms.
11The 2008 figures differ slightly from the numbers in De Bresser and Knoef (2015). In
that paper the 2008 figures were adjusted to reflect the situation at that time (2014) as
closely as possible. In this chapter however, we aim to produce figures as close to the
2008 situation as possible.
12The descriptives in table 2.2 refer to the baseline scenario regarding future indexation
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Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics of assets, debt and annuities
N Mean SD p25 Mdn p75
a. Annuities
2008
Pensions 900 2170 729 1673 2146 2537
Percentage of total 890 72 18 61 71 83
Pensions + wealth 890 2401 959 1811 2271 2767
Percentage of total 890 78 16 68 76 92
Pensions + wealth + housing 890 3275 1650 2306 3104 3900
2014
Pensions 3646 1789 768 1352 1723 2135
Percentage of total 3426 73 33 61 74 93
Pensions + wealth 3429 2103 1447 1479 1890 2409
Percentage of total 3429 81 20 70 80 100
Pensions + wealth + housing 3429 2781 1947 1734 2469 3277
b. Changes in annuities between 2008 and 2014
2008
Pensions 630 -355 502 -515 -284 -84
Pensions + wealth 597 -298 809 -514 -256 -37
Pensions + wealth + housing 597 -507 1441 -806 -449 -114
2014
Pensions 630 -13 19 -22 -12 -5
Pensions + wealth 597 -10 26 -20 -11 -2
Pensions + wealth + housing 597 -13 26 -24 -15 -4
Monthly standardized annuities in 2014 euros.
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Taking non-housing wealth into account does not change the pattern,
which suggests that accumulation of discretionary wealth did not com-
pensate much of the decline in pensions across the annuity distribution.
The last definition, based on all wealth components, shows the remark-
able decline in the value of real estate. The median monthly annuity
according to this definition declined by 635 euros (20%), from 3104 to 2469
euros/month. In relative terms the decline is more pronounced for the
25th percentile (572 euros or 25%) than for the 75th percentile (623 euros
or 16%).
The bottom panel of table 2.2 describes the distribution of changes in
annuities between 2008 and 2014 for those households that we observe
twice and can be matched to administrative data in both waves. A similar
picture emerges: the crisis and subsequent pension reforms substantially
reduced the financial resources available during retirement. The median
attainable pension (public plus private), dropped by around 20% due
to reductions in real occupational pension entitlements. Furthermore,
annuities based on all wealth declined by a similar percentage as a result
of the decline in house prices.
Empirical strategy 2.5
Our empirical strategy follows two steps. First, we use the subsample
of individuals whom we observe before and after the Great Recession
to investigate the size and nature of co-movements between pension
wealth, housing wealth and retirement expenditure goals (described in
section 2.5.1). Second, we simulate to what extent co-movements be-
tween wealth and retirement expenditure goals mitigated adverse effects
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2.5.1 Size and nature of co-movements between wealth and retire-
ment expenditure goals
In the first step, we investigate the relationship between wealth shocks
and retirement expenditure goals. Based on the equation (2.5), we regress
changes in retirement expenditure goals on changes in wealth, control-
ling for common factors and demographic variables. More precisely, we
estimate13
ΔRi = β0 + β1ΔPAi + β2ΔHAi + Δxiβ3 + εi (2.6)
ΔHAi = γ0 + γ1ΔHPi + γ2ΔPAi + Δxiγ3 + νi (2.7)
In (2.6) ΔRi is the change in retirement expenditure goals between 2008
and 2014 for individual i, PAi is the pension annuity, HAi is the annuity
from net housing wealth,14 and εi an error term. xi contains individual-
level covariates such as income, education, marital status and primary
activity.
In addition to estimation of equation (2.6) by OLS, we use 2SLS to dis-
entangle exogenous variation in housing wealth from individual decisions
(e.g. extra mortgage down payments). Similar to Angrisani et al. (2015) we
instrument shocks in net housing wealth with shocks in house prices (HPi
in equation (2.7)). However, Angrisani et al. (2015) and most of the litera-
ture use regional variation in the development of house prices to identify
the causal link between shocks in housing wealth and current spending,
because reliable data on housing wealth at the household level are rare.
Our administrative data do allow us to exploit shocks in house prices
at the household level. In this way we can also exploit the idiosyncratic
component of house price risk specific to each dwelling (e.g. variation
across neighborhoods and types of buildings) to identify the causal effect
of housing wealth shocks on changes in retirement expenditure goals (β2).
13This framework is comparable to the framework used by others, such as Parker
(1999), Johnson et al. (2006), Agarwal et al. (2007), Disney et al. (2010), and Christelis et al.
(2015).
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Causal effects of changes in wealth are called ‘pure’ or direct wealth
effects. Another possibility is that there are common macro-economic
factors that affect both consumption and wealth. For example, future
income prospects or general optimism or pessimism may influence both
asset prices, house prices, and retirement expenditure goals. Distinguish-
ing ‘pure’ wealth effects from common factors is important as they have
a different impact on the development of retirement savings adequacy
after a wealth shock. Pure wealth effects diminish the negative effect of
a recession on retirement savings adequacy (measured by the difference
between expenditure goals and resources). Common factors can also
contribute to mitigate this negative effect on retirement savings adequacy,
but to a lesser extent. By definition common factors affect all individuals
regardless of the size of their change in wealth. Unlike ‘pure’ wealth
effects, such aggregate adjustments of goals are not concentrated among
those individuals who experience large shocks.
To identify the ‘pure’ effect of pension wealth, we exploit variation
across households in pension wealth shocks (ΔPA) brought about by the
Great Recession. As explained in section 2.2.2, pension contributions
are mandatory in the Netherlands. Participants cannot choose their own
pension fund, set their level of contributions, or influence the investment
strategy. This implies that changes to pension wealth are plausibly exoge-
nous and we can interpret β1 as the ‘pure’ effect of pension wealth.
It could be argued that common macroeconomic factors, such as op-
timism, pessimism, and risk aversion, affect both asset prices (Campbell
1991) and retirement expenditure goals. In this way, macroeconomic fac-
tors could be a third factor influencing both pension wealth shocks and
retirement expenditure goals. However, this would not impede us from
identifying a ‘pure’ effect of pension wealth shocks, because the identifica-
tion relies on variation between pension funds. This variation is caused
by differences in the pursued interest rate hedging policy of the fund,
the asset mix of the investment portfolio, contributions, and the average
age of the participants in a fund. These factors cannot be influenced by
individual households. Common macroeconomic factors such as general
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pessimism are captured by β0. β0 also contains age effects, as age and
period effects can not be distinguished in our model.
Finally, one could argue that during the crisis households may have
observed reduced rates of return on retirement saving. This could lead
to lower voluntary retirement saving, through a substitution effect, and
hence cause lower retirement expenditure goals. However, as explained
in section 2.2.3 retirement savings in voluntary private saving accounts
are rather low in the Netherlands. Even if households would halve their
private retirement savings, this would be inconsequential compared to
the accumulated wealth in pension funds. Moreover, table 2.2 shows that
although the perceived profitability of savings may have reduced, private
savings on average increased between 2008 and 2014, probably because of
increased precautionary savings.15
2.5.2 Co-movements and the development of retirement savings
adequacy
The last part of this chapter analyzes to what extent co-movements between
wealth and retirement expenditure goals mitigated the negative effect of
the Great Recession on retirement savings adequacy. To this end, we
compare the simulated preparedness based on a SUR model describing
changes in wealth and retirement expenditure goals with a counterfactual
scenario in which goals are kept constant at their 2008 level. In this way
we isolate the impact of revisions in expenditure goals on the development
of the adequacy of retirement resources.
We estimate SUR models to analyze how wealth and retirement ex-
penditure goals of different socio-economic groups changed during the
crisis. In these models we utilize data on all individuals (also those whom
we observe only in 2008 or 2014). Separate equations for annuities and
expenditures in 2008 and 2014 allow the relationships between goals and
resources on the one hand and individual and household characteristics on
the other to be different in 2014 compared to 2008. Hence, socio-economic
15Table 2.2a shows that the average annuity from private savings (excluding housing
wealth) increased 83 euros ((2103-1789)-(2401-2170)) and table 2.2b shows that for those
individuals whom we observe twice private savings increased 57 euros (-298-(-355)).
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groups are allowed to be affected differently by the recession (or, alterna-
tively, the composition of subgroups may have changed). Moreover, we
allow the error terms of the equations for expenditure goals and annuities
to be correlated between individuals in a given household and across the
waves in which the household participates.






















where Mti is the log of the retirement expenditure goal reported by the
man in household i in wave t ∈ {2008, 2014} and Nti is the log of the
retirement expenditure goal reported by the woman in household i and
wave t. For singles, only one of the equations for minimal expenditures
is relevant for each year (depending on gender). Wti is log annuitized
household wealth, and x is a vector containing individual and household
characteristics. We assume that the error terms follow a 6-variate normal
distribution with mean zero and covariance matrix Σ and estimate the
SUR model by maximum likelihood (see Roodman 2011, for details on the
CMP command that we used to estimate the model in Stata). Differences
between the estimated coefficients for 2008 and 2014 reveal how the crisis
(and the subsequent reforms) affected retirement goals and wealth for
different socio-economic groups.
To assess the effect of co-movements between wealth and retirement
expenditure goals on retirement savings adequacy, we use the SUR esti-
mates to simulate preparedness in 2008, in 2014 and for the counterfactual
scenario with annuities at their 2014 level and retirement expenditure goals
at their 2008 level. We simulate goals and annuities for all individuals
in the sample, regardless of whether they are actually observed in the
data (to safeguard representativeness for the Dutch population). Since
the dependent variables are missing at random conditional on covariates,
the model estimates allow us to simulate preparedness in a way that is
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representative for the Dutch population.16 Simulations are based on an ex-
panded sample in which we replicate each observation 50 times (replicated
observations have the same values of covariates but different error terms).
From this expanded sample we calculate descriptive statistics of the dis-
tribution of the difference between annuities and retirement expenditure
goals. Confidence intervals are obtained by means of parametric boot-
strap consisting of 500 draws of parameter vectors from their estimated
asymptotic distribution. We control for perceived question difficulty by
setting the difficulty of imagining how much one would need to spend in
retirement to the lowest value.
2.6 Results
2.6.1 Results on size and nature of co-movements
Table 2.3 presents estimation results for the model described in equations
(2.6) and (2.7). The baseline estimates reported in column (1) show that a
1 euro drop in the pension annuity reduced retirement expenditure goals
with 33 cents on average. So, one third of the drop in pension wealth is
compensated by lower retirement expenditure goals (the remainder could
be compensated by working longer, saving more or reducing bequests).
The coefficient on real estate is 0.06 and not statistically significant. The
constant, which captures aggregate common factors like pessimistic future
income prospects, is large though insignificant.
To establish that results are not driven by outliers, we rerun the model
after winsorizing changes in both goals and annuities. The results in
column (2) show that the effect of the change in pension annuities on
expenditure goals becomes smaller, but remains economically and statisti-
16The sub-sample for which we observe both wealth and retirement expenditure goals
is not representative for the population. That is caused by substantial non-response to
the expenditure question and incomplete linkage with administrative data for both years
in our sample. De Bresser and Knoef (2015) show that non-response and failure to match
administrative records are correlated with observed characteristics that are related to
goals and resources, such as income. However, they also show that selection into the
sample is exogenous once we condition on those observed characteristics.
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Table 2.3: Shocks to annuities and changes in expenditure goals
Dependent variable: Δ retirement expenditure goal
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
Δ Pension (β1) 0.332** 0.229** 0.332** 0.0672
(0.141) (0.0983) (0.134) (0.0988)
Δ Real estate (β2) 0.0591 0.152 0.0599 -0.0398
(0.108) (0.120) (0.117) (0.0327)
Constant (β0) -103.3 -132.3*** -103.1 -0.153***
(71.4) (44.9) (68.0) (0.0278)
Wealth expressed as annuity winsorized annuitya annuity log(annuity)b
First stage F(1, n-1) – – 116.1*** 21.4***
Endogeneity Δ real estate F(1, n-1) – – 2.07e-04 5.77**
n (number HHs) 282 282 282 272
N (total obs.) 307 307 307 296
a Δ Annuities and Δ expenditures are winsorized at p5 and p95. Winsorizing at p1-p99, or
p2.5-p97.5 leads to similar results.
b This column regresses Δ log (goals) on Δ log (annuities).
The models also control for the individual-level covariates listed in Appendix 2.D (with the
exception of gender, age, education and degree of urbanization, since those variables display
little or no variation within individuals). Annuities and expenditures are standardized to a
one-person household. Standard errors clustered at the household level, in parentheses. *
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
cally significant at 0.23. Moreover, the size and especially the precision of
the constant increases, providing stronger evidence for the role of common
factors. On average expenditure goals declined by 132 euros in 2014 rela-
tive to 2008, keeping pension and real estate annuities constant. The 2SLS
estimates in column (3) are virtually identical to the OLS results in column
(1), which is confirmed by failure to reject the null of the endogeneity test
for the annuity from real estate. Finally, when we express both annuities
and goals in logs rather than levels, we find no evidence for an effect of
either annuity on the retirement expenditure goals (column (4)). However,
we do find a significant overall reduction in average goals of 15%.
The differences between models in logs and levels may indicate that
our results are mainly driven by individuals that experienced substantial
wealth shocks. Though the estimates do not depend on those in the lower
or upper five percent of the distributions of changes in annuities and goals,
it appears that only larger reductions in wealth lead to downward revisions
in retirement expenditure goals. This could be explained by bounded
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rationality, mental accounting or inattention underlying the ‘magnitude
hypothesis’.17 This hypothesis states that individuals do smooth large
income shocks, but that they will not bother to adjust optimally to small
income changes.
Panels a. and b. of table 2.4 report estimates for subsamples based on
age. All models in levels, columns (1)-(3), tell a similar story: expenditure
goals of people younger than 50 are affected by changes in the annuity
from real estate, while the goals of older individuals are influenced more
strongly by pension annuities. For the younger group the estimates based
on winsorized data show that a decrease of 1 euro in the expected monthly
annuity from real estate reduced expenditure goals significantly with 37
cents. A similar decline in the expected annuity from pensions reduced
goals insignificantly with 2 cents. For older individuals the pattern is
reversed: the coefficient on the real estate annuity is 0.03 (insignificant),
while the coefficient on pensions is 0.34 (significant).18 The 2SLS model in
column (3) does not indicate endogeneity for the annuity from real estate
in either sample. Panel c. shows that the differences between coefficients
for the two samples are marginally significant for non-winsorized data,
but only the difference in the effect of pensions remains significant once
we winsorize. Furthermore, the effect of common factors, estimated
on winsorized data in table 2.3, seems to be driven primarily by older
individuals for whom expenditure goals declined by 172 euros on average
(conditional on wealth shocks). Finally, column (4) shows that these
results are not robust to taking logs of annuities and goals (elasticities).
The models in logs do not provide sufficient evidence to conclude that
either annuity affects expenditure goals in either subsample. As described
above, this may be explained by the magnitude hypothesis. We do find
significant overall declines for both samples: goals were reduced by 10%
for the young and by 21% for the older age group.
17Evidence supporting the magnitude hypothesis can be found in Browning and
Collado (2001), Hsieh (2003), Coulibaly and Li (2006) and Scholnick (2013).
18Similar conclusions can be drawn from the quantile models in Appendix 2.G. Follow-
ing Christelis et al. (2015), Appendix 2.H shows that these results are largely confirmed
in models that only control for household composition. Hence, they are not driven by
the potential endogeneity of some of our control variables.
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Table 2.4: Shocks to annuities and changes in expenditure goals - heterogeneity
by age group
Dependent variable: Δ retirement expenditure goal
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
a. Age 25-49c
Δ Pension (β1) 0.0625 0.0161 0.0618 -0.0133
(0.114) (0.151) (0.115) (0.166)
Δ Real estate (β2) 0.229*** 0.371** 0.219** -0.0304
(0.0640) (0.181) (0.0875) (0.0343)
Constant (β0) -86.2 -81.7 -87.9 -0.100**
(63.9) (75.7) (66.2) (0.0437)
Wealth expressed as annuity winsorized annuitya annuity log(annuity)b
First stage F(1, 117) – – 34.2*** 670.1***
Endogeneity Δ real estate F(1, 117) – – 0.020 9.2***
n (number HHs) 118 118 118 118
N (total obs.) 129 129 129 129
b. Age 50+c
Δ Pension (β1) 0.419** 0.341*** 0.419** 0.0741
(0.182) (0.115) (0.182) (0.125)
Δ Real estate (β2) -0.0455 0.0257 -0.0286 -0.111
(0.144) (0.141) (0.156) (0.150)
Constant (β0) -142.5 -171.5*** -137.9 -0.205***
(105.4) (57.5) (104.6) (0.0592)
Wealth expressed as annuity winsorized annuitya annuity log(annuity)b
First stage F(1, n-1) – – 134.1*** 7.2***
Endogeneity Δ real estate F(1, n-1) – – 0.047 1.30
n (number HHs) 168 168 168 158
N (total obs.) 178 178 178 167
c. Difference between ages 25-49 and 50+
(H0: equal coefficients; statistics follow χ2 (1) distribution)
Δ Pension (β1) 2.75* 2.95* – –
Δ Real estate (β2) 3.03* 2.28 – –
Constant (β0) 0.21 0.91 – –
a Δ Annuities and Δ expenditures are winsorized at p5 and p95. Winsorizing at p1-p99, or
p2.5-p97.5 leads to similar results.
b This column regresses Δ log (goals) on Δ log (annuities).
c OLS models on age sub-samples are estimated jointly.
The models also control for the individual-level covariates listed in Appendix 2.D (with the
exception of gender, age, education and degree of urbanization, since those variables display
little or no variation within individuals). Annuities and expenditures are standardized to a
one-person household. Standard errors clustered at the household level, in parentheses. *
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 2.5: Shocks to annuities and changes in expenditure goals – heterogeneity
by income
Dependent variable: Δ retirement expenditure goal
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
a. Low net household income in 2008c
Δ pension -0.0192 -0.00951 -0.0200 0.00246
(0.0902) (0.134) (0.0894) (0.135)
Δ real estate 0.0330 0.152 0.112 0.0228
(0.115) (0.190) (0.230) (0.0292)
Constant -99.6* -100.1* -86.0 -0.1010***
(51.8) (52.6) (60.4) (0.0366)
wealth expressed as annuity winsorized annuitya annuity log(annuity)b
First stage F(1, n-1) – – 41.7*** 15.5***
Endogeneity Δ real estate F(1, n-1) – – 0.18 0.24
n (number HHs) 137 137 137 134
N (total obs.) 149 149 149 146
b. High net household income in 2008c
Δ pension 0.484** 0.314** 0.487** 0.130
(0.200) (0.133) (0.199) (0.135)
Δ real estate 0.0273 0.0518 0.0498 0.134
(0.127) (0.140) (0.134) (0.0922)
Constant -109.7 -204.5** -102.0 -0.1360***
(13.9) (83.0) (137.7) (0.0506)
wealth expressed as annuity winsorized annuitya annuity log(annuity)b
First stage F(1, n-1) – – 86.2*** 110.8***
Endogeneity Δ real estate F(1, n-1) – – 0.14 1.84
n (number HHs) 145 145 145 138
N (total obs.) 158 158 158 150
c. Difference between low and high income groups
(H0: equal coefficients; statistics follow χ2 (1) distribution)
Δ pension 5.27** 2.95* – –
Δ real estate 0.00 0.18 – –
Constant 0.00 1.13 – –
a Δ annuities and Δ expenditures are winsorized at p5 and p95. Winsorizing at p1-p99, or
p2.5-p97.5 leads to similar results.
b This column regresses Δ log (goals) on Δ log (annuities).
c OLS models on income sub-samples are estimated jointly. Cutoff between low and high
income group is chosen to include about half of the respondents in each group. The models
also control for the individual-level covariates listed in Appendix 2.D (with the exception of
gender, age, education and degree of urbanization, since those variables display little or no
variation within individuals). Annuities and expenditures are standardized to a one-person
household. Standard errors clustered at the household level, in parentheses. * significant at
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
524582-L-sub01-bw-Kools
Processed on: 20-9-2018
Cutting One’s Coat According to One’s Cloth Chapter 2 37
The data point towards heterogeneous effects of shocks to different
components of wealth. Moreover, sensitivities of goals to wealth compo-
nents vary across age groups. This might reflect age variation in mental
accounts: the young may be more likely to see real estate as a means to
finance retirement, while older individuals may see their house as a be-
quest more often. There is some suggestive evidence for this, since 51% of
the older respondents indicate they are not willing to move house in order
to free resources in retirement, compared to 34% of the younger group.
For those who want to live in their current house as long as possible, a
higher house price has no real wealth effect. Alternatively, housing may
be more salient to the young while pensions are more salient to older
people. Yet another interpretation is that different age groups interpret
shocks differently, with younger individuals more likely to see shocks to
pension entitlements as transitory.
Table 2.5 shows that the results are mainly driven by households with
a relatively high income level. Thus, although the marginal propensity
to consume out of shocks is found to be larger for households with a
low amount of resources (McCarthy 1995, Dynan et al. 2004, and Johnson
et al. 2006), we find that low-income households adjust their long run
consumption less after a wealth shock. This could be due to low income
households having fewer possibilities to adjust their retirement expendi-
ture goals downward, as they have relatively more essential spending. In
the long run low income households may prefer to retire later, rather than
to lower their retirement expenditure goals (this is in line with results on
planned retirement dates studied by Lindeboom and Montizaan 2018).
Unfortunately, there is little overlap between the samples for 2008 and
2014 and this reduces our sample size. Though the clean, individual-
level measurement of wealth shocks from administrative data and the
innovative outcome variable are contributions to the literature, we should
view the results with caution.
524582-L-sub01-bw-Kools
Processed on: 20-9-2018
38 Cutting One’s Coat According to One’s Cloth Chapter 2
Figure 2.2: Simulated preparedness for retirement: fraction that
cannot afford retirement expenditure goals (spikes
are 90% CIs)




Pensions + wealth + housing
2008
Median goal (2014 euro) 1565 1560 1561
(1494; 1648) (1492; 1645) (1491; 1645)
Median annuity (2014 euro) 1989 2146 2795
(1964; 2013) (2119; 2179) (2758; 2838)
Median difference (%) 24 32 57
(19; 29) (27; 37) (52; 61)
2014
Median goal (2014 euro) 1371 1375 1376
(1310; 1437) (1313; 1442) (1315; 1444)
Median annuity (2014 euro) 1656 1846 2314
(1644; 1670) (1829; 1866) (2290; 2338)
Median difference (%) 20 31 53
(15; 25) (26; 35) (48; 58)
90% confidence intervals in parentheses. CIs are obtained by parametric bootstrap
over the asymptotic distribution of the ML estimator (500 iterations). In each iteration
we replicate the sample 50 times.
Simulations are corrected for over-representation of homeowners in the LISS panel.
Understanding of items measuring consumption goals is controlled for by setting it
to the highest level.
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Simulation results on retirement savings adequacy 2.6.2
To investigate the extent to which co-movements between wealth and
retirement expenditure goals tempered the negative effect of the crisis on
retirement savings adequacy, we simulate retirement savings adequacy
using the SUR estimates presented in Appendix 2.I. Figure 2.2 and ta-
ble 2.6 summarize the simulation results (a more detailed description
can be found in Appendix 2.J). We find that between 2008 and 2014 the
fraction of individuals who do not accumulate a sufficiently generous
pension entitlement to afford their self-reported retirement expenditure
goal increased from 27% to 32%. Furthermore, the median difference
between pension annuities and retirement expenditure goals decreased
from 24% in 2008 to 20% in 2014. Hence, based on pensions alone the
aggregate preparedness for retirement of the Dutch population declined
only slightly during the period of the financial crisis and the subsequent
recession. A similar picture of modest decline in preparedness emerges
if we include discretionary wealth and/or housing wealth: the fraction
for whom the annuity will fall short of their consumption goal increased
by a similar amount and the median excess annuity declined by less than
5%-points. In particular, while 11% of the population was predicted to fall
short of their retirement expenditure goal in 2008 even if they would draw
down housing wealth, this fraction had risen to 17% by 2014.
In order to separate changes in goals and resources we simulate the
fraction that would have failed to meet their expenditure goals had the
relationship between goals and covariates remained the same in 2014 as it
was in 2008 (so that goals are fixed for a given level of covariates). In this
counterfactual scenario the fraction with insufficient resources to afford
their retirement expenditure goals would have almost doubled from 27%
to 50% (if we only take pensions into account). Adjusting goals reduced
the fraction of insufficiently prepared by 18%-points. Based on all wealth
components, co-movements between wealth and retirement expenditure
goals mitigated the fraction falling short from about a quarter to 17%.
So, the results show that co-movements between wealth and retirement
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Results are very similar if we do not control for question difficulty. In
that case expenditure goals are slightly lower in both years so that the
median difference and the fraction that falls short respectively increase
and decrease with 3%-points across the board. Hence, our simulations are
not driven by the adjustment of expenditure goals for question difficulty.
Moreover, robustness checks with different indexation scenarios for occu-
pational pensions in 2014 indicate that annuities are robust with regard to
reasonable variation in the assumptions under which they are computed.
Robustness checks of the simulations are available on request.
2.7 Conclusion
This chapter investigates co-movements between wealth and retirement
expenditure goals using variation brought about by the Great Recession.
These co-movements have important implications for retirement savings
adequacy, and become increasingly important as the generosity of public
pensions declines and people depend more on financial markets and hous-
ing wealth. We quantify co-movements and separate ‘pure’ wealth effects
from common factors that influence both wealth and retirement expen-
diture goals. Furthermore, we examine how adjustments to expenditure
goals mitigated the negative effect of the Great Recession on retirement
savings adequacy, defined by the difference between individual retirement
expenditure goals and annuitized wealth.
The setting of the Netherlands during the aftermath of the crisis is
particularly interesting for this study, because it constituted an exogenous
shock to a system that enrolls individuals into mandatory public and
occupational pension schemes. Participants cannot choose their own pen-
sion fund, their contribution level, and their investment strategy. Hence,
variation across funds in shocks to pension wealth, the most important
source of income in retirement, is exogenous to workers. Moreover, house
prices decreased by 20% on average between 2008 and 2013, eating into
the most important category of discretionary wealth. This context of large
and exogenous changes to wealth provides a unique opportunity to study
the updating of expenditure goals.
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For this study we match individual level administrative data on pen-
sion wealth, real estate and other forms of wealth with survey data on
expenditure goals in retirement. Goals and resources are observed in 2008
and 2014. The combination of administrative data and surveys before and
during the Great Recession is unique. However, since a limited number of
individuals can be observed twice, some caution is needed when drawing
conclusions.
The results show that between January 2008 and December 2014 both
‘pure’ wealth effects and common factors played a role in co-movements
between wealth and retirement expenditure goals. At the level of the
individual, we find suggestive evidence for heterogeneous effects of shocks
to pensions and real estate wealth. Shocks to pensions exert the stronger
effect overall, with a reduction in goals of 23-33 cents on average for a 1
euro decrease in the pension annuity. Moreover, the relative importance
of shocks in wealth components varies with age: individuals younger
than 50 adjusted goals more strongly after a shock to housing wealth,
while the goals of older people were most affected by shocks to pensions.
One possible explanation is that mental accounts change as people age.
We do observe that the young are more likely to report a willingness to
move and use their home to finance retirement if necessary than older
individuals. Interestingly, while in the short run consumption of low
income households is found to be more sensitive to wealth shocks (they
have a relatively high marginal propensity to consume), we find that they
adjust their retirement expenditure goals less after a wealth shock. Since
low income households have relatively high essential spending, in the
long run they may prefer to work more or retire later instead of adjusting
their retirement expenditure goals downward. The fact that all effects of
annuities disappear in log-log specifications suggests that only substantial
changes to wealth induce updates of spending targets. We believe that
these results warrant further attention.
Comparison of the two cross-sectional waves shows that in case people
would not have adjusted their goals, the percentage falling short with
respect to their own retirement expenditure goals would have risen from
11% in 2008 to 26% in 2014 if we take all wealth components into account.
524582-L-sub01-bw-Kools
Processed on: 20-9-2018
42 Cutting One’s Coat According to One’s Cloth Chapter 2
Instead, people adjusted their goals downwards and the fraction who
was ill-prepared increased only to 17% (based on all wealth components).
The results underline the importance of co-movements between wealth
and retirement expenditure goals, and that a static benchmark for the
assessment of savings sufficiency not only misses cross-sectional differ-
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Funding ratios 2.A
The y-axis of figure 2.3 shows the relative decline in funding ratios of
Dutch pension funds during 2008. The figure shows that there are vast
differences across funds in the relative decline in funding ratios. In the
first quarter of 2008 only 7 funds had a funding ratio below 105%, 256
funds had a funding ratio between 105% and 130% and 166 funds had a
funding ratio above 130%. In the first quarter of 2009 the number of funds
with a funding ratio below 105% increased to 314, 65 funds had a funding
ratio between 105 − 130%, and only 20 funds had a funding ratio above
130%.
Pension funds with a low funding ratio were forced to draw up recovery
plans in early 2009 in order to bring their funding ratios back to the
required levels within five years. These plans ended in late 2013. DNB
(2014) reports that funding ratios recovered primarily as a results of rising
equity prices, but as interest rates fell further and life expectancy rose, the
recovery remained relatively limited. All in all, about 25% of the original
decline in funding ratios since the credit crisis was recovered at the end of
2013 (with vast differences between individual funds).
Figure 2.3: Relationship between regulatory solvency and rela-
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2.B Development consumer confidence
Figure 2.4 shows the development of a subquestion of consumer confi-
dence, namely people’s confidence in their financial situation in the next
12 months. The vertical axes shows the balance between positive and neg-
ative answers, normalized to 0 in the first quarter of 2008 for low, middle
and high education levels. While the levels of confidence are higher for
high education groups than for low education groups, the development is
almost the same in both groups.
Figure 2.4: Development of people’s confidence in their finan-
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Thinking about retirement and difficulty of the ques-
tions
2.C
Respondents find questions on expenditure goals during retirement chal-
lenging. This appendix first compares the distribution of retirement
expenditure goals between retirees and non-retirees. Secondly, we provide
descriptive statistics on the extent to which respondents have thought
about retirement and how they evaluated the difficulty of the questions.
Comparison retirees and non-retirees
Table 2.7 shows that retirees reported higher expenditure goals than non-
retirees across the distribution, especially in 2008. The mean and the
first and third quartiles were 100-200 euros higher among retirees. Such
differences cannot be explained by current incomes, as illustrated by
replacement rates that were also around 10pp higher among retirees.
However, the differences in levels are modest compared to the standard
deviations in excess of 700 euros for both sub-samples. Differences were
Table 2.7: Descriptive statistics of minimum expenditures during retire-
ment
N Mean SD p25 Mdn p75
a. Non-retired
2008 Min. monthly expenditures
a 1142 1716 721 1218 1625 2031
Min. replacement rate (%)b 1142 74 28 56 73 88
2014 Min. monthly expenditures
a 1918 1471 567 1095 1460 1825
Min. replacement rate (%)b 1891 67 31 46 63 81
b. Retired
2008 Min. monthly expenditures
a 254 1871 772 1335 1625 2226
Min. replacement rate (%)b 254 83 26 67 81 98
2014 Min. monthly expenditures
a 837 1549 576 1168 1460 1825
Min. replacement rate (%)b 826 65 24 49 63 77
a Monthly retirement expenditure goals are standardized to a one-person household
and denoted in 2014 euros.
b Replacement rate := monthly expenditure goal/current income
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smaller in 2014: less than 100 euros or 5pp in replacement rates. Hence,
though we do find that retirees had more ambitious goals than those
not yet retired, the order of magnitude was the same for both groups.
Furthermore, the variation within groups far exceeds that between groups.
Difficulty of the questions
Table 2.8 summarizes items that are related to perceived difficulty of the
questions. These questions allow us to investigate whether those who do
not understand the questionnaire give systematically different answers.
When asked whether individuals find the question difficult to answer, in
2014 more individuals said they fully agree to the statement than in 2008.
This holds especially for individuals under 54.
Table 2.9 summarizes the retirement expenditure goals by level of
question difficulty. Individuals who find the question more difficult
on average report lower retirement expenditure goals. However, when
retirement expenditure goals are measured relative to current household
income this is no longer the case, suggesting that question difficulty
correlates with current household income.
Table 2.8: Descriptives of self-reported question difficulty
Mean Age 25-39 Age 40-54 Age 55+
I find it very difficult to imagine how much money I would want to have during retirement.
2008
Fully disagree 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.15
Somewhat disagree 0.09 0.07 0.10 0.11
Somewhat agree 0.42 0.43 0.42 0.41
Fully agree 0.41 0.47 0.41 0.33
N 1610 502 728 380
2014
Fully disagree 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.11
Somewhat disagree 0.09 0.06 0.08 0.12
Somewhat agree 0.38 0.31 0.39 0.41
Fully agree 0.48 0.60 0.51 0.36
N 3272 851 1257 1164
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Table 2.9: Descriptives of retirement expenditure goals by level of question
difficulty
N Mean Median SD
I find it very difficult to imagine goals...
a. Consumption goals: levels
2008
...fully disagree 109 1913 1669 913
...somewhat disagree 133 1918 1787 797
...somewhat agree 530 1695 1625 677
...fully agree 399 1639 1625 674
...difficult to imagine: missing 266 1904 1669 856
2014
...fully disagree 139 1633 1460 735
...somewhat disagree 212 1449 1430 518
...somewhat agree 806 1482 1460 572
...fully agree 804 1434 1400 532
...difficult to imagine: missing 865 1546 1460 577
b. Consumption goals: replacement rates (in %, relative to current household income)
2008
...fully disagree 109 74 75 22
...somewhat disagree 133 80 77 37
...somewhat agree 530 74 71 28
...fully agree 399 71 71 27
...difficult to imagine: missing 266 83 82 26
2014
...fully disagree 137 67 63 26
...somewhat disagree 208 64 58 30
...somewhat agree 790 67 63 31
...fully agree 789 69 66 31
...difficult to imagine: missing 852 65 63 24
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2.D Descriptives socio-economic variables
Table 2.10: Descriptives of socio-economic vari-
ables: individual-level variables
2008 2014
Mean SD Mean SD
Single 0.16 0.37 0.29 0.45
Female 0.52 0.5 0.53 0.5
Age 49 13 53 15
HH head 0.59 0.49 0.64 0.48
Any kids 0.48 0.5 0.37 0.48
Number of kids 0.92 1.11 0.72 1.06
Homeowner 0.77 0.42 0.73 0.45
Education:
- Primary 0.09 0.29 0.07 0.25
- Intermediate secondary 0.26 0.44 0.22 0.42
- Higher secondary 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.28
- Intermediate vocational 0.25 0.43 0.26 0.44
- Higher vocational 0.23 0.42 0.26 0.44
- University 0.08 0.28 0.12 0.32
Primary activity:
- Salary worker 0.58 0.49 0.5 0.5
- Self-employed 0.08 0.28 0.07 0.25
- Family business 0.02 0.13 0.01 0.11
- ZZP 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.23
- HH work 0.12 0.32 0.08 0.27
- Retired 0.15 0.36 0.24 0.43
- Disabled 0.03 0.17 0.04 0.2
- Other 0.04 0.2 0.08 0.27
Marital status:
- Married 0.71 0.45 0.59 0.49
- Separated/divorced 0.08 0.28 0.11 0.32
- Widowed 0.03 0.17 0.06 0.24
- Never married 0.18 0.38 0.23 0.42
Urbanization:
- Extremely urban 0.12 0.33 0.15 0.36
- Very urban 0.27 0.44 0.26 0.44
- Moderately urban 0.22 0.42 0.23 0.42
- Slightly urban 0.23 0.42 0.21 0.41
- Not urban 0.15 0.36 0.14 0.35
Net personal income 2025 7812 1796 4580
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Table 2.11: Descriptives of socio-economic vari-
ables: household-level variables
2008 2014
Mean SD Mean SD
Single 0.2 0.4 0.38 0.48
Female × single 0.12 0.32 0.21 0.41
Age HH head 50 13 53 16
Any kids 0.47 0.5 0.34 0.48
Number of kids 0.88 1.1 0.66 1.03
Homeowner 0.76 0.43 0.69 0.46
Education:
- Primary 0.04 0.2 0.05 0.21
- Intermediate secondary 0.18 0.39 0.16 0.36
- Higher secondary 0.08 0.27 0.07 0.25
- Intermediate vocational 0.27 0.44 0.26 0.44
- Higher vocational 0.31 0.46 0.31 0.46
- University 0.12 0.33 0.16 0.37
Primary activity
- 1 salary worker 0.7 0.46 0.6 0.49
- all salary workers 0.45 0.5 0.41 0.49
- 1 self-employed 0.13 0.34 0.11 0.31
- all self-employed 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.18
- 1 family business 0.02 0.16 0.02 0.13
- all family business 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.07
- 1 zzp 0.11 0.31 0.1 0.3
- all zzp 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.15
- 1 retired 0.2 0.4 0.28 0.45
- all retired 0.1 0.3 0.19 0.4
- 1 disabled 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.24
- all disabled 0.01 0.1 0.02 0.15
Marital status:
- Married 0.68 0.47 0.52 0.5
- Separated/divorced 0.09 0.29 0.14 0.35
- Widowed 0.04 0.19 0.07 0.25
- Never married 0.19 0.39 0.27 0.44
Urbanization:
- Extremely urban 0.13 0.33 0.17 0.38
- Very urban 0.27 0.44 0.26 0.44
- Moderately urban 0.22 0.42 0.22 0.42
- Slightly urban 0.23 0.42 0.2 0.4
- Not urban 0.15 0.36 0.14 0.35
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2.E Descriptive statistics assets and debts
Table 2.12 presents descriptive statistics of various categories of assets
and debt. The most important types of assets in both years are saving
accounts and owner-occupied real estate. On average saving accounts
made up 27% of total assets in 2008 with a median value of 19.5 thousand
euros. Residential real estate made up close to two thirds of the 2008 assets
portfolio on average and the median value was 246 thousand euros. By
2014 the median value of residential real estate declined to 170 thousand
euros and the average share in the assets portfolio declined to 58%. Con-
sequently, the relative importance of saving accounts increased to 36% of
the portfolio, despite a decrease in median savings to 14.2 thousand euros.
Each of the other asset classes make up less than 5% of the asset portfolio
in both years. As for debt, mortgage debt is by far the most important
among the two types of debt that we observe: it accounts for 95% of total
debt on average in both years. The median mortgage debt declined from
88 to 80 thousand euros between 2008 and 2014.
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Table 2.12: Descriptive statistics of assets and debts
% portfolioa Mean SD p25 Mdn p75
2008
Saving account 27 41.4 59.4 6.3 19.5 47.2
Risky assets 4 24.3 133.0 0.0 0.0 5.9
Residential real estate 65 247.2 222.8 104.7 246.0 335.6
Non-residential real estate 3 17.0 82.7 0.0 0.0 0.0
Business 1 2.4 33.7 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other assets 0 2.0 20.9 0.0 0.0 0.0
Mortgage debt 95 116.5 126.3 0.0 88.3 195.6
Other debt 5 5.2 28.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
N 890
2014
Saving account 36 41.5 76.4 3.5 14.2 45.4
Risky assets 3 22.9 169.7 0.0 0.0 0.1
Residential real estate 58 168.5 149.0 0.0 170.2 242.7
Non-residential real estate 2 16.7 86.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
Business 1 4.4 63.6 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other assets 0 4.4 80.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Mortgage debt 95 111.3 128.7 0.0 80.0 187.9
Other debt 5 7.2 61.8 0.0 0.0 0.0
N 3,429
a Mean share of category in HH portfolio conditional on having non-negative total
asset/debt.
Assets and debt in thousands of 2014 euros.
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2.F Assumptions underlying the annuities
An annuity value is an estimated monthly income from pensions, savings,
and housing at the date of retirement. In order to construct such annuities
we need to make assumptions about the future. The future looked differ-
ent in 2008 and 2014, so that in some cases the assumptions differ between
those years. The scenario for the future from the perspective of 2014
was set up in correspondence with specialists at the Dutch Ministry of
Social Affairs and Employment, the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom
Relations, the Ministry of Finance and the Netherlands Bureau for Eco-
nomic Policy Analysis (CPB). In this section we explain the assumptions
underlying the annuity values. Moreover, we describe how we updated
the private pension data to include policy changes introduced in 2013.
Life course
The level of a public pension depends on the number of years someone
lived in the Netherlands between the ages of 25 and 67, and on one’s mar-
ital status during retirement. We observe the number of years individuals
lived outside the Netherlands up to 2012 and assume that they will not
leave the Netherlands from this moment onwards. Moreover, we assume
that marital status stays the same. That is, we take into account marital
status in our models, but we do not model future divorces, marriages,
or widowhood. Lastly, we assume that individuals stay in the same job
until they reach the statutory retirement age. That is, individuals who
are unemployed remain unemployed and individuals who are employed
will not become unemployed, will have constant wages, and will not retire
early.
Statutory retirement age and private pension target age
In 2008 the age at which one could claim public pensions was 65, which
was also the target age for defined benefit calculations in private pension
plans. At that point there was no indication that this would change in the
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future (Goudswaard 2011). We thus assume a retirement age of 65 when
calculating the 2008 annuities.
The situation was completely different in 2014. In 2012 a law had
been passed ensuring an increase in the statutory retirement age19 and
in 2014 an amendment was proposed that accelerated the process. When
calculating 2014 annuities we assume the situation as in the amendment: a
stepwise increase of the statutory retirement age to 67 in 2021, after which
it will raise in accordance with life expectancy. The target age for the
defined benefit calculations in private pension plans was set at 67 for the
part of the claim built up after 2012. The increase of the target age went
hand in hand with a lowering of the maximum of tax advanced yearly
accrual rates. We assume that in the future any further increases in the
target age will be accompanied with lower accrual rates, such that the
pension level remains roughly unchanged.
Inflation and indexation
We assume an inflation of 2% each year. Both for the 2008 and the 2014
annuities, we assume the level of public pension benefits to be fully
adjusted for inflation.
In 2008, 90% of occupational pension wealth was adjusted for inflation.
During that time the financial position of private pension funds seemed
perfectly in order, and in January 2008 people were optimistic about their
future pensions. For the calculation of 2008 annuities we assume the
situation remains unchanged and all pension entitlements are adjusted for
inflation by 90%.
In the past years, however, occupational pension wealth has rarely
been adjusted for inflation, so the value of pension wealth has declined in
real terms. For the 2014 annuities we assume that pension funds will not
adjust pension entitlements for inflation until 2020, after which indexation
will rise gradually to 90% in 2030 and the years after. The 2008 and 2014
expected indexation patterns and the realizations for the years 2008-2014
are shown in Figure 2.5.
19Wet verhoging AOW- en pensioenrichtleeftijd
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Figure 2.5: Indexation scenario’s and realisations, after Knoef
et al. (2016b)
Development of private savings and housing wealth
We take into account the current level of private savings and assume a real
yearly interest rate of 1% per year. Private savings are annuitized at the
moment of retirement given the most recent mortality tables of the CBS
and a real interest rate of 1%. The annuitization procedure is explained in
detail in Knoef et al. (2016a).
We assume that real housing prices increase with 1% a year. For
individuals with positive net housing wealth we assume that the net
imputed rent (1%) is put in a savings account where it receives an annual
interest of 1%. For individuals who have a mortgage we assume mortgage
payments are made. As of 2013 only individuals holding a mortgage
contract with a pay off scheme of at most thirty years can benefit from
fiscal benefits. We therefore assume individuals born before 1968 will
pay off 25% of the remaining mortgage debt, individuals born between
1968 and 1978 will pay 50%, and individuals born after 1878 will pay 75%.
Housing wealth is annuitized at the moment of retirement, given the most
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recent mortality tables of the CBS and a real interest rate of 1%, similar to
private savings.
The third-pillar pensions (voluntary individual pension products) are
not shown in the administrative data, since they are not subject to taxation
until they are paid out. However, the LISS survey does provide informa-
tion on wealth accumulated in these products. For individuals who are
self-employed and have a third-pillar pension product according to the
survey, we assume that they will contribute 1.875% of their gross wage
until retirement, in line with the contributions of salary workers to their
occupational pension plans.
Updating 2012 occupational pension data
The latest administrative data available on occupational pension entitle-
ments dates from 2012. Between 2012 and the end of 2014 several policy
changes have taken place that will affect pension entitlements. Further-
more, most pension funds have not been able to correct the DB entitlements
for inflation, and some even cut entitlements.
The entitlement data consist of two elements: (1) the accrued rights; (2)
the rights to be accrued assuming income remains unchanged. First, we
correct the accrued rights for the absence of inflation adjustment between
2012 and 2014. Second, we decrease the accrued rights by an amount equal
to the cuts made in the respondent’s pension fund.20 The administrative
data contain information on the amount of pension rights, but not on the
name of the pension fund. Therefore, we provided the survey respondents
in 2014 a list with the biggest pension funds in the Netherlands and asked
them indicate at which of those they had entitlements. Third, maximum
pension contributions declined from 2.25% to 2.15% in 2014, and further
to 1.875% in 2015. The total relative decline is 17%. We assume that the
actual build up percentages decrease to the same extent for all pension
funds, hence we decrease the rights to be accrued until retirement by 17%
20Five major pension funds needed to apply cuts to accrued rights, that is ABP (0.5%
in 2013), PME (5.1% in 2013), PMT (6.3% in 2013), Tandarts(specialisten) (3.2% in 2012
and 2.2% in 2013), Tandtechniek (7.0% in 2013, 2.0% in 2014).
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for all individuals. Finally, the target age used to calculate the DB income
changed from 65 to 67 in 2013. Accrued pension rights are therefore
adjusted to the new statutory retirement age, at a rate of 7.5% per year.
Pension rights that are to be accumulated in the years until retirement are
extrapolated to the new statutory retirement age.
524582-L-sub01-bw-Kools
Processed on: 20-9-2018
Cutting One’s Coat According to One’s Cloth Chapter 2 57
Quantile models of changes in expenditure goals 2.G
Table 2.13: Quantiles of shocks to annuities and changes in expenditure goals –
heterogeneity by age
Dependent variable: Δ retirement expenditure goal (2014 Euros)
p30 p40 p50 p60 p70
a. Complete sample
Δ pension 0.162 0.206** 0.287** 0.263** 0.254**
(-0.042;0.467) (0.026;0.475) (0.053;0.465) (0.068;0.491) (0.095;0.536)
Δ real estate 0.126 0.052 0.008 0.059 0.104
(-0.154;0.357) (-0.114;0.306) (-0.115;0.294) (-0.095;0.267) (-0.210;0.231)
Sample quantiles -469 -324 -206 -125 18
N (total obs.) 307
b. Age 25-49
Δ pension -0.016 0.123 0.194 0.322 0.168
(-0.303;0.597) (-0.180;0.599) (-0.117;0.588) (-0.059;0.581) (-0.058;0.574)
Δ real estate 0.235 0.199 0.150 0.146** 0.170**
(-0.250;0.487) (-0.102;0.501) (-0.090;0.471) (0.008;0.491) (0.016;0.594)
Sample quantiles -430 -311 -206 -82 120
N (total obs.) 129
c. Age 50+
Δ pension 0.284 0.272** 0.262** 0.272** 0.298**
(-0.011;0.601) (0.043;0.544) (0.031;0.528) (0.049;0.547) (0.056;0.685)
Δ real estate 0.154 0.031 -0.010 0.001 -0.185
(-0.212;0.400) (-0.253;0.360) (-0.267;0.324) (-0.343;0.282) (-0.431;0.199)
Sample quantiles -494 -326 -204 -139 -18
N (total obs.) 178
The models also control for the individual-level covariates listed in Appendix 2.D (with the
exception of gender, age, education and degree of urbanization, since those variables display
little or no variation within individuals). Annuities and expenditures are standardized to a
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Table 2.14: Quantiles of shocks to annuities and changes in expenditure goals –
heterogeneity by income
Dependent variable: Δ retirement expenditure goal (2014 Euros)
p30 p40 p50 p60 p70
a. Low net household income in 2008
Δ pension 0.074 0.121 0.079 0.074 0.123
(-0.258;0.335) (-0.212;0.333) (-0.169;0.370) (-0.152;0.392) (-0.205;0.395)
Δ real estate 0.029 -0.024 0.041 -0.014 0.074
(-0.473;0.537) (-0.442;0.472) (-0.368;0.416) (-0.456;0.335) (-0.407;0.400)
Sample quantiles -351 -261 -165 -81 83
N (total obs.) 149
b. High net household income in 2008
Δ pension 0.341 0.234 0.334 0.381** 0.471**
(-0.071;0.627) (-0.080;0.686) (-0.006;0.680) (0.031;0.662) (0.037;0.763)
Δ real estate 0.119 0.088 0.078 0.158 0.188
(-0.320;0.358) (-0.275;0.325) (-0.272;0.294) (-0.280;0.296) (-0.251;0.271)
Sample quantiles -603 -393 -209 -165 -18
N (total obs.) 158
The models also control for the individual-level covariates listed in Appendix 2.D (with the
exception of gender, age, education and degree of urbanization, since those variables display
little or no variation within individuals). Annuities and expenditures are standardized to a
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Models of changes in expenditure goals that only
control for family composition
2.H
Table 2.15: Shocks to annuities and changes in expenditure goals
Dependent variable: Δ retirement expenditure goal
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
Δ Pension (β1) 0.329** 0.235** 0.329*** 0.101
(0.129) (0.0930) (0.128) (0.0969)
Δ Real estate (β2) 0.0618 0.139 0.0836 0.00449
(0.105) (0.114) (0.111) (0.0149)
Constant (β0) -87.4 -111.2*** -83.1 -0.127***
(63.9) (41.4) (62.1) (0.0272)
Wealth expressed as annuity winsorized annuitya annuity log(annuity)b
First stage F(1, n-1) – – 104.9*** 20.0***
Endogeneity Δ real estate F(1, n-1) – – 0.17 1.72
n (number HHs) 282 282 282 272
N (total obs.) 307 307 307 296
a Δ Annuities and Δ expenditures are winsorized at p5 and p95. Winsorizing at p1-p99, or
p2.5-p97.5 leads to similar results.
b This column regresses Δ log (goals) on Δ log (annuities).
The models also control for living with a partner and the number of children in the household.
Annuities and expenditures are standardized to a one-person household. Standard errors
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Table 2.16: Shocks to annuities and changes in expenditure goals – heterogeneity
by age
Dependent variable: Δ retirement expenditure goal
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
a. Age 25-49c
Δ Pension (β1) 0.144 0.140 0.141 0.102
(0.123) (0.142) (0.124) (0.166)
Δ Real estate (β2) 0.154* 0.182 0.113 -0.00580
(0.0832) (0.191) (0.104) (0.0138)
Constant (β0) -110.6* -104.7 -115.8* -0.106**
(66.0) (68.0) (66.0) (0.0441)
Wealth expressed as annuity winsorized annuitya annuity log(annuity)b
First stage F(1, 117) – – 34.2*** 1174.2***
Endogeneity Δ real estate F(1, 117) – – 0.35 3.02*
n (number HHs) 118 118 118 118
N (total obs.) 129 129 129 129
b. Age 50+c
Δ Pension (β1) 0.400** 0.304** 0.398** 0.102
(0.170) (0.119) (0.170) (0.114)
Δ Real estate (β2) -0.00845 0.0857 0.0581 0.0529
(0.155) (0.139) (0.157) (0.106)
Constant (β0) -115.8 -134.3*** -99.0 -0.138***
(91.1) (51.9) (89.9) (0.0427)
Wealth expressed as annuity winsorized annuitya annuity log(annuity)b
First stage F(1, n-1) – – 94.2*** 5.49**
Endogeneity Δ real estate F(1, n-1) – – 0.81 0.00
n (number HHs) 168 168 168 158
N (total obs.) 178 178 178 167
c. Difference between ages 25-49 and 50+
(H0: equal coefficients; statistics follow χ2 (1) distribution)
Δ Pension (β1) 1.49 0.78 – –
Δ Real estate (β2) 0.85 0.17 – –
Constant (β0) 0.00 0.12 – –
a Δ Annuities and Δ expenditures are winsorized at p5 and p95. Winsorizing at p1-p99, or
p2.5-p97.5 leads to similar results.
b This column regresses Δ log (goals) on Δ log (annuities).
c OLS models on age sub-samples are estimated jointly.
The models also control for living with a partner and the number of children in the household.
Annuities and expenditures are standardized to a one-person household. Standard errors
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Table 2.17: Shocks to annuities and changes in expenditure goals– heterogeneity
by income
Dependent variable: Δ retirement expenditure goal
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
a. Low net household income in 2008c
Δ pension 0.0496 0.0674 0.0509 0.123
(0.0840) (0.125) (0.0837) (0.129)
Δ real estate 0.0153 0.0779 -0.0109 -0.00161
(0.0980) (0.186) (0.169) (0.0172)
Constant -125.2*** -121.2*** -128.3*** -0.108***
(43.8) (45.7) (44.9) (0.0344)
wealth expressed as annuity winsorized annuitya annuity log(annuity)b
First stage F(1, n-1) – – 39.9*** 21.8***
Endogeneity Δ real estate F(1, n-1) – – 0.059 1.86
n (number HHs) 137 137 137 134
N (total obs.) 149 149 149 146
b. High net household income in 2008c
Δ pension 0.434** 0.297** 0.435** 0.107
(0.184) (0.137) (0.184) (0.133)
Δ real estate 0.0729 0.118 0.0904 0.124
(0.133) (0.145) (0.139) (0.0949)
Constant -61.9 -120.1 -56.9 -0.104**
(119.6) (79.6) (120.5) (0.0498)
wealth expressed as annuity winsorized annuitya annuity log(annuity)b
First stage F(1, n-1) – – 90.9*** 120.4***
Endogeneity Δ real estate F(1, n-1) – – 0.080 0.91
n (number HHs) 145 145 145 138
N (total obs.) 158 158 158 150
c. Difference between low and high income groups
(H0: equal coefficients; statistics follow χ2 (1) distribution)
Δ pension 3.61* 1.53 – –
Δ real estate 0.12 0.03 – –
Constant 0.25 0.00 – –
a Δ annuities and Δ expenditures are winsorized at p5 and p95. Winsorizing at p1-p99, or
p2.5-p97.5 leads to similar results.
b This column regresses Δ log (goals) on Δ log (annuities).
c OLS models on income sub-samples are estimated jointly. Cutoff between low and high income
group is chosen to include about half of the respondents in each group. The models also
control for living with a partner and the number of children in the household. Annuities and
expenditures are standardized to a one-person household. Standard errors clustered at the
household level, in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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2.I Estimation results SUR model
Retirement expenditures equations
Tables 2.18 and 2.19 present estimation results of the expenditure equations
(2.8) and (2.9). The coefficients for 2008 show that homeowners, highly
educated men and women, self-employed men, and separated/divorced
men had relatively high retirement expenditure goals. Widowers reported
19% lower retirement expenditure goals while widows required 17% higher
expenditures relative to married couples. Furthermore, household income
plays a significant role in explaining retirement expenditure goals, with
an elasticity of 0.48 for both men and women.21
We observe interesting changes between the coefficients of 2008 and
2014. Homeowners reported 6-9% higher retirement expenditure goals
than renters in 2008, but that difference disappeared by 2014 (in line
with the decline in house prices). The income elasticity of the retirement
expenditure goals dropped from 0.48 to 0.35, and highly educated women
reduced their retirement expenditure goals. Finally, self-employed men,
who had relatively high retirement expenditure goals in 2008, did not have
these relatively high goals anymore in 2014.
21The estimates for the retirement expenditure goals for 2008 are mostly similar to
those documented by De Bresser and Knoef (2015). The largest difference is a stronger
relationship between retirement goals reported by men and household income: our
estimates imply that a 10% increase in the income of the husband increases his expected
annuity by 4.8%, compared with 3.3% according to De Bresser and Knoef (2015). More-
over, this correlation is similar for the income of his wife, so that household income is
an important covariate of expenditure goals of both men and women regardless of who
brings it in. Though the differences in average reported retirement expenditure goals
between education groups are smaller than in the earlier paper, they remain large and
highly statistically significant with university graduates reporting 27-28% higher goals
than those with no education beyond primary school.
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Table 2.18: Joint models of annuities and retirement expenditures – expenditure
equations – men
2008 2014 − 2008
Partner -0.023 (0.0425) -0.117** (0.0509)
Age/10 -0.011 (0.0143) 0.016 (0.0177)
HH head 0.008 (0.0470) 0.037 (0.0599)
Any Children -0.063 (0.0518) -0.019 (0.0665)
Number Children 0.009 (0.0233) 0.018 (0.0301)
Homeowner 0.059* (0.0309) -0.055 (0.0376)
log pers. Income 0.010 (0.0167) -0.039* (0.0216)
Log HH income 0.482*** (0.0372) -0.130*** (0.0454)
Has simPC -0.013 (0.0637) -0.065 (0.0757)
Educationa Inter. secondary 0.026 (0.0469) 0.012 (0.0618)
Higher secondary 0.140** (0.0600) -0.039 (0.0752)
Inter. vocational 0.113** (0.0463) -0.053 (0.0612)
Higher vocational 0.132*** (0.0464) -0.005 (0.0612)
University 0.277*** (0.0539) -0.094 (0.0696)
Labor market statusa Family business -0.079 (0.1006) -0.024 (0.1361)
Self-employed 0.147*** (0.0448) -0.131** (0.0570)
Home maker 0.153 (0.1535) 0.135 (0.2097)
Retired 0.145 (0.1493) -0.112 (0.2256)
Disabled 0.046 (0.0728) -0.027 (0.0901)
Other primary act. 0.063 (0.0742) -0.069 (0.0856)
Marital statusa Separated/divorced 0.105** (0.0519) -0.087 (0.0617)
Widow -0.186** (0.0939) 0.153 (0.1034)
Never married -0.001 (0.0391) 0.010 (0.0489)
Thought about retirementa b Thought some -0.052 (0.0513) 0.057 (0.0736)
Thought a little -0.031 (0.0516) 0.008 (0.0734)
Hardly thought -0.031 (0.0622) 0.019 (0.0839)
No answer -0.233 (0.2089) 0.011 (0.2946)
Urbanizationa Extremely urban 0.082* (0.0423) -0.028 (0.0510)
Very urban 0.068** (0.0323) -0.047 (0.0392)
Slightly urban 0.054* (0.0324) -0.038 (0.0393)
Not urban 0.018 (0.0382) -0.042 (0.0464)
Difficult to imagine spendinga b Somewhat disagree 0.069 (0.5469) -0.165** (0.0753)
Somewhat agree 0.003 (0.0473) -0.110* (0.0666)
Totally agree -0.065 (0.0501) -0.025 (0.0697)
No answer 0.235 (0.1449) -0.263 (0.1909)
Constant 3.426*** (0.2980) 1.260*** (0.3630)
Sigma epsilon 0.309*** (0.0081)
Log likelihood -1310.22
N 4,521
a The reference categories are primary education; salary worker; married; thought a lot about retirement;
moderately urban; and totally disagree.
b The full questions read respectively "How much have you though about retirement?" and "I find
it difficult to imagine how much I need to spend in retirement."
Dependent variables are logs of monthly retirement expenditure goals. Expenditures stan-
dardized to a one-person household; equations reported from models of annuity excluding
housing wealth but including other savings. Standard errors in parentheses. *significant at 10%;
**significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
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Table 2.19: Joint models of annuities and retirement expenditures – expenditure
equations – women
2008 2014 − 2008
Partner -0.041 (0.0528) -0.131** (0.0653)
Age/10 0.050*** (0.0152) -0.032* (0.0180)
HH head -0.009 (0.0447) -0.020 (0.0550)
Any Children -0.052 (0.0479) 0.072 (0.0620)
Number Children -0.001 (0.0219) -0.003 (0.0291)
Homeowner 0.091*** (0.0303) -0.096*** (0.0369)
log pers. Income -0.003 (0.0067) 0.000 (0.0082)
Log HH income 0.478*** (0.0374) -0.131*** (0.0444)
Has simPC -0.056 (0.0615) 0.017 (0.0703)
Educationa Inter. secondary 0.045 (0.0464) -0.071 (0.0582)
Higher secondary 0.173*** (0.0585) -0.150** (0.0704)
Inter. vocational 0.160*** (0.0505) -0.153** (0.0626)
Higher vocational 0.181*** (0.0503) -0.132** (0.0622)
University 0.275*** (0.0654) -0.162** (0.0790)
Labor market statusa Family business 0.106 (0.0964) -0.051 (0.1305)
Self-employed -0.036 (0.0542) 0.007 (0.0687)
Home maker -0.026 (0.0418) 0.004 (0.0530)
Retired -0.009 (0.1861) 0.101 (0.2477)
Disabled 0.028 (0.0727) -0.023 (0.0828)
Other primary act. -0.029 (0.0607) 0.041 (0.0693)
Marital statusa Separated/divorced 0.057 (0.0498) -0.072 (0.0613)
Widow 0.167** (0.0786) -0.240*** (0.0889)
Never married 0.079* (0.0418) -0.097* ( 0.051 )
Thought about retirementa b Thought some 0.051 (0.0623) -0.065 (0.0788)
Thought a little 0.034 (0.0598) -0.074 (0.0753)
Hardly thought 0.037 (0.0657) -0.029 (0.0818)
No answer 0.128 (0.2887) -0.201 (0.3481)
Urbanizationa Extremely urban -0.066 (0.0443) 0.111** (0.0518)
Very urban 0.018 (0.0339) 0.036 (0.0404)
Slightly urban 0.014 (0.0351) 0.018 (0.0421)
Not urban -0.041 (0.0400) 0.009 (0.0475)
Difficult to imagine spendinga b Somewhat disagree -0.044 (0.0614) 0.016 (0.0779)
Somewhat agree -0.071 (0.0493) 0.082 (0.0633)
Totally agree -0.083* (0.0505) 0.050 (0.0643)
No answer -0.152 (0.2163) 0.171 (0.2392)
Constant 3.321*** (0.3140) 1.245*** (0.3713)
Sigma epsilon 0.312*** (0.0086)
Log likelihood -1310.22
N 4,521
a The reference categories are primary education; salary worker; married; thought a lot about retirement;
moderately urban; and totally disagree.
b The full questions read respectively "How much have you though about retirement?" and "I find
it difficult to imagine how much I need to spend in retirement."
Dependent variables are logs of monthly retirement expenditure goals. Expenditures stan-
dardized to a one-person household; equations reported from models of annuity excluding
housing wealth but including other savings. Standard errors in parentheses. *significant at 10%;
**significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
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Annuity equations
Tables 2.20 and 2.21 present estimation results of the annuity equation
(2.10), both for annuities from public and occupational pensions and for
annuities from total wealth (including real estate). The estimates for 2008
show that annuities from pensions were relatively high for homeowners,
for households with highly educated heads, and for households that
contain at least one salary worker. On the other hand, those annuities
were relatively low on average for single females, for households with
a family business, and for households with self-employed or a disabled
household member. Furthermore, we estimate the elasticity of annuities
with respect to net household income at 0.3. Taking into account wealth
outside pensions changes some patterns: single men, but not women, now
do better than couples and home-ownership plays a much more prominent
role.22
Comparing the estimated coefficients for 2008 and 2014 in tables 2.20
and 2.21 we find interesting differences. Strikingly, the age gradient of
pension annuities switched from negative to positive. While the average
annuity from pensions in 2008 decreased with 1.5 percent for a 10 year
increase in age, in 2014 this was associated with a 2.0 percent increase in
the average annuity. Moreover, the income elasticity of pension annuities
decreased from 0.3 to 0.2 (in table I1 we saw that this was mirrored
by a lower income elasticity of retirement expenditure goals) and the
gaps between households with and without wage workers and with and
without self-employed adults narrowed somewhat (as self-employed men
22The estimates for 2008 are mostly similar to those reported in De Bresser and Knoef
(2015). The only exceptions are the estimated coefficients on household income and on
the education dummies. Our estimates of the elasticity of the annuities with respect to
net household income are around 0.3, while De Bresser and Knoef (2015) report smaller
estimates around 0.1. This difference stems from the use of another survey variable
for household income: the variable we use has been augmented with imputations and
responses to unfolding bracket questions, while the earlier paper used a less streamlined
income measure. This choice for a different income variable also reduces the differences
in annuities between university graduates and the lowest education group from 33-45%
to 24-27%, which confirms the interpretation that the large differences reported in that
paper partly reflect measurement error in income (De Bresser and Knoef 2015). All other
estimates for the annuity equations in 2008 are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to
those reported in the earlier paper.
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also reduced their retirement expenditure goals, their relative position
compared to wage workers improved).
All these changes can be explained by the worsened situation of occu-
pational pensions, which are relatively more important for high income
earners. As a result, pension cuts affect high earners disproportionately
and this flattens the association between income and annuities. The rel-
ative positions of old and young individuals, and of wage workers and
the self-employed are aligned by the same mechanism (since occupational
pensions typically play a minor role for the self-employed). Though the
changes we observe can plausibly be attributed to changing circumstances,
a change in the composition of socio-economic groups may also play a
role.
We find broadly similar patterns when we take into account all private
wealth. While in 2008 the annuity based on all wealth increased by 1.8% on
average for a 10 year increase in age, in 2014 the corresponding figure was
4.1%. Similarly, the relationship between income and annuities flattened
and the gap between households with and without salary workers closed.
Unsurprisingly, the role of homeownership changed between 2008 and
2014 once we take into account housing wealth. The importance of housing
in the household portfolio decreased as a result of lower house prices:
the difference between the average annuity of homeowners compared to
renters was 49% in 2008 and 45% in 2014.
524582-L-sub01-bw-Kools
Processed on: 20-9-2018
Cutting One’s Coat According to One’s Cloth Chapter 2 67
Table 2.20: Joint models of annuities and retirement expenditure goals –
annuity equations – pensions.
2008 2014 - 2008
Single -0.005 (0.0328) 0.044 (0.0353)
Female × single -0.079** (0.0354) 0.038 (0.0372)
Age HH head/10 -0.015* (0.0085) 0.035*** (0.0094)
Any kids -0.104*** (0.0270) 0.077** (0.0316)
Number children 0.026** (0.0115) -0.030** (0.0135)
Homeowner 0.089*** (0.0180) 0.025 (0.0195)
log HH income 0.304*** (0.0215) -0.096*** (0.0238)
Educationa Inter. secondary 0.010 (0.0348) 0.038 (0.0394)
Higher secondary 0.031 (0.0399) 0.023 (0.0451)
Inter. vocational 0.075** (0.0347) 0.015 (0.0391)
Higher vocational 0.167*** (0.0349) 0.023 (0.0394)
University 0.241*** (0.0399) -0.036 (0.0446)
Labor market status 1 salary worker 0.119*** (0.0273) -0.051* (0.0308)
All salary workers 0.056*** (0.0197) 0.023 (0.0235)
1 family business -0.053 (0.0612) -0.047 (0.0707)
All family business -0.218** (0.0980) 0.106 (0.1109)
1 self employed -0.147*** (0.0295) 0.071** (0.0340)
All self employed -0.208*** (0.0555) 0.084 (0.0638)
1 retired 0.037 (0.0329) -0.036 (0.0373)
All retired 0.051 (0.0329) 0.009 (0.0360)
1 disabled -0.076** (0.0315) 0.030 (0.0369)
All disabled 0.137* (0.0793) -0.110 (0.0861)
Marital statusa Separated/divorced -0.022 (0.0445) 0.009 (0.0481)
Female × sep/div -0.063 (0.0512) 0.016 (0.0559)
Widow -0.021 (0.0455) 0.033 (0.0476)
Never married -0.051** (0.0241) 0.048* (0.0264)
Urbanizationa Extremely urban -0.005 (0.0244) 0.053** (0.0260)
Very urban 0.023 (0.0253) 0.035 (0.0269)
Slightly urban 0.013 (0.0253) 0.050* (0.0270)
Not urban -0.01 (0.0281) 0.062** (0.0301)
Constant 5.123*** (0.1595) 0.273 (0.1776)
Sigma epsilon 0.229*** (0.0056)
Log likelihood -1310.33
N 4,521
a The reference categories are primary education; married; and moderately urban.
Dependent variables are logs of monthly annuities. Annuities standardized to a one-
person household. Standard errors in parentheses. *significant at 10%; **significant at
5%; ***significant at 1%.
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Table 2.21: Joint models of annuities and retirement expenditure goals –
annuity equations – pensions + wealth + housing.
2008 2014 - 2008
Single 0.169*** (0.0378) -0.003 (0.0414)
Female × single -0.143*** (0.0404) 0.068 (0.0428)
Age HH head/10 0.018* (0.0098) 0.023** (0.0111)
Any kids -0.069** (0.0309) 0.026 (0.0380)
Number children 0.024* (0.0132) 0.002 (0.0163)
Homeowner 0.493*** (0.0208) -0.040* (0.0231)
log HH income 0.333*** (0.0250) -0.068** (0.0283)
Educationa Inter. secondary 0.030 (0.0397) 0.015 (0.0465)
Higher secondary 0.087* (0.0458) -0.040 (0.0537)
Inter. vocational 0.074* (0.0396) 0.027 (0.0461)
Higher vocational 0.204*** (0.0399) -0.015 (0.0464)
University 0.271*** (0.0460) 0.021 (0.0527)
Labor market status 1 salary worker 0.058* (0.0314) -0.046 (0.0367)
All salary workers 0.014 (0.0226) 0.051* (0.0285)
1 family business 0.098 (0.0742) 0.098 (0.0890)
All family business -0.208* (0.1146) -0.019 (0.1374)
1 self employed -0.154*** (0.0337) 0.186*** (0.0411)
All self employed -0.090 (0.0646) 0.000 (0.0782)
1 retired 0.028 (0.0374) -0.031 (0.0442)
All retired 0.016 (0.0374) 0.049 (0.0419)
1 disabled -0.095** (0.0369) 0.043 (0.0455)
All disabled 0.091 (0.0901) -0.117 (0.1011)
Marital statusa Separated/divorced -0.026 (0.0514) -0.055 (0.0570)
Female × sep/div -0.087 (0.0589) 0.102 (0.0664)
Widow -0.024 (0.0514) 0.129** (0.0545)
Never married -0.003 (0.0282) 0.016 (0.0317)
Urbanizationa Extremely urban 0.057** (0.0281) -0.016 (0.0306)
Very urban 0.083*** (0.0290) 0.012 (0.0315)
Slightly urban 0.101*** (0.0291) -0.002 (0.0318)
Not urban 0.091*** (0.0323) 0.022 (0.0353)
Constant 4.724*** (0.1852) 0.161 (0.2115)
Sigma epsilon 0.273*** (0.0066)
Log likelihood -2404.34
N 4,420
a The reference categories are primary education; married; and moderately urban.
Dependent variables are logs of monthly annuities. Annuities standardized to a one-
person household. Standard errors in parentheses. *significant at 10%; **significant at
5%; ***significant at 1%.
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Error correlations
Table 2.22 reports the estimated correlations between the error terms for
all equations of the SUR model. We find that the cross-sectional correla-
tions between annuities and retirement expenditure goals are positive and
significant in both years (0.17-0.22). Hence, individuals in households that
can look forward to generous annuities conditional on their demographic
characteristics, are also more ambitious regarding their retirement expen-
diture goals. The cross-sectional correlations between expenditure goals
of partners within couples are even stronger, around 0.44-0.50, suggesting
some agreement between partners on the retirement expenditure goal they
should meet.23
As for correlations between the years we find that conditional on
background characteristics annuities are relatively persistent, even in times
of economic turbulence. The estimated correlations between the errors of
the annuity equations in 2008 and 2014 are 0.56 and 0.65 for annuities based
on pensions and on all wealth, respectively. Retirement expenditure goals
are autocorrelated as well, but less strongly with estimated correlations
around 0.36.
23For the revision of retirement expenditure goals between 2008 and 2014 we also find
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a. Annuities from pensions
Annuity 2008 1
Min exp. men 2008 0.22*** 1
Min exp. women 2008 0.21*** 0.44*** 1
Annuity 2014 0.56*** 0.06 0.07 1
Min exp. men 2014 0.14*** 0.36*** 0.03 0.15*** 1
Min exp. women 2014 0.07 0.22*** 0.38*** 0.15*** 0.49*** 1
b. Annuities from pensions and all wealth
Annuity 2008 1
Min exp. men 2008 0.17*** 1
Min exp. women 2008 0.19*** 0.44*** 1
Annuity 2014 0.65*** 0.09 0.09 1
Min exp. men 2014 0.05 0.36*** 0.06 0.12*** 1
Min exp. women 2014 0.08 0.24*** 0.39*** 0.12*** 0.50*** 1
**significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%
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Distribution of differences between goals and an-
nuities
2.J
Figure 2.6 shows the simulated differences between retirement expenditure
goals and annuities (both in logs and at the level of the individual).
The differences subtract expenditure goals from annuities, so a positive
difference means that the predicted annuity is sufficient to afford one’s
retirement expenditure goal and a negative difference implies insufficient
funds. The graphs in the left column correspond to 2008 and those on the
right to 2014, while different rows vary the scope of wealth from which
annuities are computed. Comparing the columns, one notices that the
locations of the distributions did not change much between 2008 and 2014.
However, the spread increased slightly: the Great Recession increased
inequality in retirement preparedness.






3 Health and Consumption
Preferences - Estimating the
Health State Dependence of
Utility using Equivalence Scales
Abstract
This chapter estimates health state dependence of utility in Europe. For
identification we introduce a new method using insights from the research
domain of living standards. We estimate how much extra (or less) income
is needed to maintain the same level of financial wellbeing after a health
shock, and we derive a simple relation between this estimate and the
health state dependence parameter. The results show positive health state
dependence. This is not driven by medical expenditures, and is robust
across alternative specifications and health measures. Interestingly, for
cognitive limitations we find negative health state dependence, presumably
resulting from a decreased ability to plan.
A working paper version of this chapter is published as Kools and Knoef (2017) and
is currently under review. The chapter is co-authored by Marike Knoef. The authors
thank the Network for Studies on Pensions, Aging and Retirement (Netspar) for financial
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participants of the Dutch Economist Day 2014, ESPE conference 2015, International Panel
Data Conference 2015, Pension Workshop Paris 2015, Winter School on Inequality and
Welfare 2016, Quantitative Society for Pensions and Saving Workshop 2016, EEA-ESEM
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3.1 Introduction
Assumptions about the degree and sign of health state dependence of the
utility function, i.e. the change in the marginal utility of consumption
with health status, have large implications for the optimal design of social
security and long term care systems (Viscusi and Evans 1990, and Finkel-
stein et al. 2013). Health state dependence of utility influences the optimal
level of life-cycle savings and health insurance. Health state dependence
can also serve as an explanation for observed spending phenomena, such
as the decreasing consumption path in old age (Börsch-Supan and Stahl
1991, and Domeij and Johannesson 2006).
Theoretically, health state dependence of utility could be positive just
as well as negative. Some goods are valued more in bad health (so called
complements to good health) and will raise marginal utility of consump-
tion when ill, whereas other goods are less valuable in bad health (the
substitutes to good health), thereby decreasing the marginal utility of con-
sumption when ill. Examples of the first category are market services for
physically demanding housework, like doing laundry, gardening, house-
cleaning, and cooking. Consumption of leisure activities is often placed
under the second category (e.g. traveling may become less enjoyable in bad
health). However, if individuals do not lose interest in leisure activities,
but the activities become more costly due to the extra help or comfort
required (e.g. travel assistance rather than solo traveling), those leisure
activities actually fall under the first category. Whether marginal utility of
consumption increases in bad health (positive health state dependence)
or decreases (negative health state dependence), depends on the impor-
tance of both the complements and the substitutes and the importance
attached to keeping up the pre-sickness lifestyle and activities when ill.1
The size and sign of health state dependence may thus be determined
by factors like socio-economic status and cultural background. Without
1For clarification, health state dependence is about the utility of nonmedical con-
sumption. Changes in utility following a tightened budget constraint due to decreased
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empirical grounding, it is impossible to make assumptions on health state
dependence.
Unfortunately, empirical work on the effects of health on consumption
preferences provide ambiguous results. Research, mostly based on US
data, shows evidence in favor of negative health state dependence of utility
(Finkelstein et al. 2013), in favor of positive health state dependence (Lillard
and Weiss 1997), and against the existence of health state dependence in
either direction (De Nardi et al. 2010). The variation in outcomes may be
attributed to the different methods used (Finkelstein et al. 2009). However,
there may also be important heterogeneities in the effect, such that the
choice of sample and health measure may be the source of the variety in
results.
This chapter estimates health state dependence of utility in Europe
using the Survey of Health, Aging and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). In
order to do so, we build upon insights from the research domain of living
standards and income adequacy (Pradhan and Ravallion 2000). We derive
a ‘health equivalence scale’ and show that health state dependence is a
transformation of this parameter.2
The results indicate positive health state dependence in Europe. We
show that the findings are not driven by medical expenditures. Further-
more, the results are robust for different (physical) health measures and
functional form assumptions. Among the robustness checks we find one
interesting anomaly: cognitive limitations lead to negative health state
dependence. When cognitive health declines, the willingness to undertake
(leisure) activities may decline and this may lower expenditures. On the
other hand, with physical health problems leisure activities may become
more expensive because of the extra help required.
The contribution of this chapter to the literature is threefold. First, we
introduce a new simple method for estimating the health state dependence
of utility using questions widely available in survey data. Second, by
2We define the health equivalence scale as the relative change in income needed to
maintain the same standard of living after a health shock. This equivalence scale is named
after the common ‘household equivalence scale’, which measures the relative change
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analyzing different measures of physical and cognitive health, we provide
insight into the mechanisms underlying health state dependence. Third,
to our knowledge we are the first to estimate health state dependence of
utility for Europe. Differences in consumption patterns between US and
Europe (Banks et al. 2015) may give rise to different sizes and even signs
of health state dependence.
The rest of this chapter is set up as follows. Section 3.2 discusses
the theoretical and empirical model underlying the analysis. Section 3.3
describes the data used, followed by the results of the empirical analysis
in section 3.4. Finally, section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Method
Many different methods have been developed to estimate health state
dependence of the utility function, all with their own benefits and flaws.
The contradictory results in the empirical work on the relationship be-
tween health and the marginal utility of consumption can in large part be
attributed to differences between these methods. Finkelstein et al. (2009)
distinguish two classes of methods to investigate health-state dependence.
The first class exploits individuals’ revealed demand for reallocating re-
sources across health states. If there is some form of health state depen-
dence of utility and individuals are forward-looking, they can be expected
to already reallocate resources across health states before they fall sick, so
that more can be consumed when marginal utility is highest. One could
for example investigate health insurance demand or compare consump-
tion paths across individuals who vary in their predicted probability of
entering poor health (Lillard and Weiss 1997, and Butrica et al. 2009).
The second class of methods focuses on observed utility changes. By
comparing within-individual utility changes associated with a health
shock for poor and rich individuals, one can identify the change in the
marginal utility of consumption due to a health shock. This can be done
by using a direct proxy for utility, such as happiness (Finkelstein et al.
2013). Another way is to ask individuals how much money would be
required to compensate them for hypothetical exposure to specific health
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risks, and examine how these self-reported compensating differentials
vary with income (Viscusi and Evans 1990, Evans and Viscusi 1991, and
Sloan et al. 1998).
The method we propose builds upon the second class of methods.
Similar to the second class of models, we make use of within individual
comparisons associated with a health shock. However, rather than compar-
ing overall utility changes at different income levels, we analyze average
individual changes in financial wellbeing. In this way the method is less
sensitive to bias stemming from unobserved characteristics correlated with
income, that influence the effect of a health shock on overall utility. The
intuition behind our method is as follows. Suppose an individual is asked:
“are you able to make ends meet, yes or no?” and answers affirmative. In
that case, his financial means must be above a personally set benchmark
level. No suppose this individual falls ill, his financial means remain the
same, but he now answers no to the posed question. Then his personally
set benchmark level must have changed. We argue that, in case medical
expenditures are covered by insurance, this change can only come from
a shift in the marginal utility of consumption and thus the size of the
average change in individual benchmark levels is sufficient to identify
health state dependence of utility.
Section 3.2.1 explains the theoretical framework used to analyze the
health state dependence parameter. Here, we also show the relation
between the health state dependence parameter and the health equivalence
scale. Section 3.2.2 explains how to estimate the health equivalence scale
using data on financial wellbeing. Finally, the assumptions underlying our
approach are laid out in section 3.2.3, together with the possible threats to
identification.
Theoretical framework 3.2.1
Our theoretical model is strongly related to that of Finkelstein et al. (2013),
who provide a thorough description of the theoretical framework under
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which one can study health state dependence of the utility function.3
Consider a retired individual and let S denote this individual’s health
status. For expositional purposes we define health to be binary: one is
either healthy (S = 0) or sick (S = 1). An individual lives two periods.
In the first period the individual is healthy. In the second period a
negative health shock arises with probability p. The health shock itself is
unanticipated, but the individual is aware of his chances to fall ill.
We assume that retired individuals derive utility U(C(S), S) from
consumption (C) and health (S). Health thus has a direct effect on overall
utility (in general people do not like to be ill), but can also have an indirect
effect on utility through consumption (which may be positive or negative).
This is in accordance with Viscusi and Evans (1990) and Evans and Viscusi
(1991), who explain that an adverse health shock may not only reduce
utility, but can also alter the structure of the utility function (i.e., it may
change the marginal utility of consumption). We are interested in this last
part: how does health affect the marginal utility of consumption.
Consider the following standard intertemporal utility maximization


















where Ct is consumption in period t, Y is lifetime income, γ denotes
the coefficient of relative risk aversion, δ the discount rate and r the real
interest rate. This chapter aims to estimate φ1, the health state dependence
parameter. Sickness decreases second period utility with φ0 and multiplies
3For sake of simplicity we use a standard intertemporal utility function. Finkelstein
et al. 2013 adopt a more general model. Comparing (3.6) and (3.7) in this chapter with
equations (9) and (10) in Finkelstein et al. 2013, we find that this leads to the same
indirect utility functions in case b = 1 and except for φ0, which ends up in β4 of equation
(15) in Finkelstein et al. 2013. When using the more general model, w also includes
a parameter for the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. In addition, Finkelstein et
al. generalize the model by including health insurance, which covers a fraction b of
second-period health expenditures. In the analysis, they select respondents with full
health insurance. In the European countries under consideration in this study, most of
the medical expenditures are covered by health insurances. Therefore, we assume b = 1.
In section 3.4.2 we test whether this assumption is justified.
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the marginal utility of second period consumption by a factor (1 + φ1).
We assume γ ≥ 0 and φ1 ≥ −1. By rewriting the budget constraint, we
obtain
C1 = Y − C21 + r . (3.2)
Health in period two is a random variable with probability of sickness p.

















which is maximized for






((1 + φ1p)(1 + r)/(1 + δ))
1/γ
1 + ((1 + φ1p)(1 + r)/(1 + δ))
1/γ /(1 + r)
Y ≡ wY. (3.5)
w is a proportionality factor, which is a function of the probability of
sickness, the real interest rate, the discount rate, the coefficient of relative
risk aversion, and the health state parameter φ1. In the remainder of this
chapter we denote Y to be permanent income. Since permanent income is
a fraction of lifetime income, this only changes the definition of w. From
(3.5) it follows that indirect second period utility in the healthy and sick
state are as follows
V(Y, S = 0) =
1
1 − γ (wY)
1−γ, (3.6)
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These two equations are equivalent to equations (9) and (10) in Finkelstein
et al. (2013)4 and show that φ1 can be identified separately from δ in
equation (3.1). The idea is that in period 1, before individuals know their
future health status, individuals choose how much of permanent income
Y to consume in the first period and how much to save for the second
period. In the second period health is realized, and individuals experience
utility V(Y, S = 0) or V(Y, S = 1), dependent on being in the healthy or
the sick state.
We define μ to be the proportionality factor indicating how much extra
(or less) income is needed in the sick state to be financially as well of as in
the healthy state and give it the name ‘health equivalence scale’ after the
more common household equivalence scales, which illustrate how needs
change when household size increases. The value of μ is such that
V(μY, S = 1) + φ0 = V(Y, S = 0). (3.8)
That is, μ equates the indirect utility derived from income in the sick state
and the healthy state and does not capture the direct effect of health on
indirect utility. This is in correspondence with the construction of house-
hold equivalence scales, which do not take into account the utility derived
from having a spouse or children, but only aim to capture economies of
scale in a household.
Combining equations (3.6), (3.7), and (3.8) we find that
μ = (1 + φ1)
− 11−γ . (3.9)
The aim of our empirical analysis is to obtain an unbiased estimate of φ1.
If we find an unbiased estimate of μ, we can retrieve φ̂1 using (3.9). To
find an estimate of μ we rely on information about financial wellbeing, as
we will explain in the following section.
4In case b = 1 and except for φ0, as explained in footnote 3.
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Figure 3.1: Benchmark levels making ends meet
Empirical model 3.2.2
Time periods in the empirical analysis can be thought of as repeated
observations of an individual in period 2 of the theoretical model. To
estimate the health equivalence scale μ we follow the reasoning of Pradhan
and Ravallion (2000). For each individual i in period t we observe answers
to a question on financial wellbeing (zit) on a qualitative scale. Answers
range from zit = 1 to zit = K, with higher values corresponding to higher
levels of wellbeing.5
Financial wellbeing (making ends meet) depends on income and indi-
vidual specific benchmark levels. Individual i reports financial wellbeing
level k if his permanent income Yi is at or above a certain benchmark Bk−1,
but below Bk (see figure 3.1 for the situation where K = 4), with
ln Bk,it = αk + ρ ln Yi + βSit + Xitη + νi + εit for k = 1, . . . , K − 1,
B0,it = −∞, and BK,it = ∞, (3.10)
where Sit and Yi are health status and permanent income, respectively.
Xit is a vector of time constant and time varying variables of individual
i in period t, νi an individual specific effect, and εit errors which we
assume to be distributed as standard normal with mean zero and variance
one independent of νi. Note that the individual benchmark levels Bk,it
depend on income Yi. Just as Pradhan and Ravallion (2000), we follow the
literature and assume a log-linear specification for the benchmark levels.
5Specifically, we observe whether individuals can make ends meet with great difficulty
(zit = 1), with some difficulty (zit = 2), fairly easily (zit = 3), or easily (zit = 4).
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The probability of observing outcome k is given by,
Prob(zit = k) = Prob(Bk−1,it ≤ Yi < Bkit), (3.11)
= Prob(ln Bk−1it ≤ ln Yi < ln Bkit), (3.12)
= Prob(αk−1 + ρ ln Yi + βSit + Xitη + νi + εit (3.13)
≤ ln Yi < αk + ρ ln Yi + βSit + Xitη + νi + εit),
= Prob(−αk + (1 − ρ) ln Yi − βSit − Xitη − νi (3.14)
≤ εit < −αk−1 + (1 − ρ) ln Yi − βSit − Xitη − νi),
= Φ(−αk−1 + (1 − ρ) ln Yi − βSit − Xitη − νi) (3.15)
− Φ(−αk + (1 − ρ) ln Yi − βSit − Xitη − νi),
k = 1, . . . , K,
such that we estimate the following random effects ordered probit model
z∗it = θ ln Yi + βSit + Xitη + νi + εit, (3.16)
where θ = −(1 − ρ) and where observed ordinal responses zit are gener-




1 if − α1 < z∗it,
2 if − α2 < z∗it ≤ −α1,
...
K if z∗it ≤ −αK−1.
(3.17)
To investigate within individual changes in health (and other time
varying variables), we follow Mundlak (1978) and parameterize the in-
dividual specific effect as a linear function of the average time-varying
explanatory variables over time, plus a random individual specific effect
that is assumed to be independent of the explanatory variables,
νi = ζ0S̄i + X̄iζ1 + ξi, (3.18)
where S̄i and X̄i are the individual means of Sit and Xit respectively (the
Mundlak terms) and ξi i.i.d. normal distributed with mean zero and
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variance σ2ξ .
6 Equation (3.16) can now be rewritten as
z∗it = θ ln Yi + βSit + Xitη + ζ0S̄i + X̄iζ1 + ξi + εit. (3.19)
μ is defined as the proportionality factor indicating how much extra
(or less) income is needed in the sick state to be financially as well off as
in the healthy state. From (3.19) it follows that the extra income needed








combining equations (3.9) and (3.20) shows that φ̂1 can be consistently
estimated by
φ̂1 = μ̂









where we need to fill in an appropriate value for the risk aversion parame-
ter γ.
Underlying assumptions and threats to identification 3.2.3
To summarize, we identify health state dependence of utility from the ef-
fect of a health shock on within individual financial wellbeing. Compared
6Permanent income is constant across time. θ is thus identified by variation between
individuals and we assume that there are no unobserved characteristics that influence
both permanent income and financial wellbeing. If any, however, we would expect a
positive correlation between permanent income and the individual unobserved effect.
For example, someone has an expensive hobby, therefore he works relatively much and
he receives a relatively high permanent income, but he is also demanding and therefore
he is more inclined to struggle to make ends meet. In this case the estimated θ is higher
than the true θ and this would bias our estimated health state dependence parameter
towards zero, whether or not the true state dependence were positive or negative (so, the
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to other methods this has the advantage that it is sufficient to analyze
average compensating differentials within individuals, rather than com-
paring compensating differentials across poor and rich individuals. In
this way the method is less sensitive to bias stemming from unobserved
characteristics correlated with income, that influence the effect of a health
shock on overall utility. As an example one could think of the distance
between individuals and their social network. High income people often
live further away from their social network (e.g. a carpenter can find a job
near to his family rather easily, whereas the university professor will have
more difficulties in finding a job close to his family and will generally
move greater distances during his life, which may also lead to friends
being more geographically spread, Kalmijn 2006). This may lead high
income individuals to suffer relatively more from a negative health shock,
when they become physically less able to visit their social network because
of the larger distances (e.g. they do not have the energy anymore to bridge
large distances). In the second class of models, described in section 3.2,
this may bias health state dependence. When using financial wellbeing one
does not have to unravel the effect of health on consumption preferences
from the effect of health on other aspects of life. This may lead to more
precise estimates.
A number of assumptions, however, are still needed when using this
approach. First, in the above model we assume that wealth in the sick state
is predetermined. Our sample is therefore limited to retired individuals
of age 65 and over, such that health shocks do not have a first order
effect on income (as in Finkelstein et al. 2013). Threats, however, can
occur because of changes in mortality risk, changes in out-of-pocket (OOP)
medical expenditures, or when health changes are anticipated. If a health
shock increases the (perceived) mortality risk, wealth per remaining year
increases and in that way financial wellbeing may increase even if the
marginal utility of consumption does not change, leading to a negative
bias in the estimates of health state dependence7. We cannot control for
this in our model, but we compared the results from the full sample to
the results from a sample limited to those with more than 75% of wealth
7This bias is weakened under the existence of a bequest motive.
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annuitized. The results are highly similar, which is as expected since
wealth is relatively small compared to income (appendix A). OOP medical
expenditures may bias us towards finding positive state dependence. We
check for this in section 3.4.2 and find that OOP medical expenditures
do not drive our results. In case health changes are anticipated, people
who know that they will become sick save more (less) than they otherwise
would have in case of positive (negative) health state dependence. Then,
the actual health shock will not result in a lower or higher financial
wellbeing, biasing our estimate of health state dependence towards zero
(but the sign remains correct). Finally, health shocks may decrease home
production and/or increase informal care, which can be considered as
income in broad terms. In this chapter we consider a narrow income
definition, such that the health state dependence parameter increases in
case more domestic services and repairs need to be bought in bad health.8
Second, a disadvantage stemming from the use of subjective data is
that of differential item functioning: different people interpret scales in
different ways. An optimistic individual may be more inclined to use
the top ends of the scale, whereas one who sees the glass half empty
will give answers towards the bottom end of the scale (Ferrer-i Carbonell
and Frijters 2004). We take differential item functioning into account
by investigating the effect of within individual health transitions on the
ability to make ends meet. However, answering styles are not necessarily
fixed over time. Health shocks, for example, may change an individual’s
answering style with regard to financial wellbeing. Our data shows that
individuals with limitations report negative feelings more often (such
as sadness, self-blame, and irritability), which may influence answering
styles. When we add negative and positive feelings as control variables
in the model the conclusions do not change (Appendix A.3). However,
by including positive and negative feelings in the model we introduce
simultaneity bias, such that the cure could be worse than the disease.
8This is common in the literature. For example, Finkelstein et al. (2009) mention that
the marginal utility of consumption could increase with deteriorating health, as prepared
meals or assistance with self-care may be substitutes for good health. Furthermore, Banks
et al. (2015), among others, classify domestic services and repairs as ‘housing related’
expenditures and not as medical spending.
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Third, socioeconomic status and other third factors can make it difficult
to establish causal relationships. Socioeconomic status (a combination of
factors like education, income, and family background) may influence both
health and financial wellbeing. As far as it concerns income and education,
we control for these variables in the model. As far as it concerns factors
such as family background, this is captured by following individuals over
time and by analyzing variation in health within individuals. Similarly, if
risk aversion is correlated with permanent income or the likelihood of a
negative health shock this is controlled for by following individuals over
time.
Fourth, people who struggle to make ends meet may experience more
stress and this may affect their health negatively (reverse causality). The
effect of stress on health is, however, probably more substantial in the
long run than in the short run. Long term stress may lead, amongst other
things, to a higher probability of cardiovascular diseases and thereby also
to more problems with activities of daily living in old age. These long term
differences between people, that probably arose already before retirement,
are captured by the individual specific effects. Reverse causality may also
arise when people who struggle to make ends meet are unable to pay for
customary medical interventions. This may lead to a higher probability to
encounter health problems. In the European countries under consideration
customary medical interventions are generally paid for by health insurance
or the government and we do not expect this reverse causality to have a big
influence on our results. Finally, a problem may arise when health shocks
lead to administrative help and making ends meet improves through this
pathway. This would lead to a negative bias in our estimate of φ1.9
Fifth, attrition may be systematically related to health. However, there
is no reason to assume that the probability of leaving the panel after a
health shock depends on the (change in) ability to make ends meet. We
thus believe that the results will not be heavily affected by attrition bias.
9This is biasing against our finding of positive state-dependent utility, such that the
true health state dependence parameter would even be more positive.
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Data 3.3
To estimate the parameters of the model we use the Survey of Health,
Aging, and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). SHARE is a multidisciplinary
database on health, socioeconomic status and social and family net-
works of individuals aged 50 and over. Data are collected in 2004/2005,
2006/2007, 2008/2009, 2011/2012 and 2013 in several European countries.
In 2004/2005 eleven European countries and Israel contributed data to the
SHARE project. Over the years, eight more countries started to participate.
Data were collected by face-to-face computer-aided personal interviews
(CAPI), plus a self-completion drop-off part with questions that require
more privacy.
The CAPI questionnaires of waves 1, 2, 4, and 5 are divided into
eighteen modules of which the order remained roughly unchanged over
the waves.10 The interview is split in two parts, in between which some
physical measurements are taken. The health module is in the first half of
the interview, together with a module about demographics, and followed
by a module on employment and pensions. Questions about informal
care, income, wealth, and consumption take place in the second half of
the questionnaire.
It is well known that questions asked earlier in a survey may influence
how people respond to later questions. Fortunately, questions about
health and about ‘making ends meet’ (in the consumption module) are in
different parts of the questionnaire.
The remainder of this section describes the data used for the baseline
regressions. We refer to appendix 3.A for more details and a description
of the data used for the additional analyses.
Sample selection 3.3.1
For all households we select the ‘household respondent’, who answers
the question on ‘making ends meet’. Furthermore, our interest is in
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics
mean sd. within sd. between min max N
Age 75.85 2.93 5.83 65 102 25827
Male 0.36 0 0.48 0 1 25827
Partner in household 0.41 0.19 0.45 0 1 25827
Highly educated 0.15 0 0.36 0 1 25827
Note: A respondent is considered highly educated with an ISCED level of five
or higher.
individuals of age 65 and older, for whom the spouse (if present) is 65 or
older, and for whom annual household income from a job or from self-
employment is less than 2000 euro. In this way we drop those households
for whom a health shock may lead to a substantial loss of income, due to
a job loss or early retirement.
We select singles and ‘household respondents’ with a spouse and do
not consider households with more than two people. SHARE only samples
individuals living independently (i.e. not in a nursing home). However,
if individuals make a transition into a nursing home over the course of
the survey they remain in the sample. We drop individuals who are
permanently living in a nursing home and we only consider individuals
for whom data on two or more waves are available, so that we are able to
measure transitions in health status. Because of this constraint we are left
with fifteen countries, namely: Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany,
Denmark, Spain, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, Czech
Republic, Poland, Estonia, and Slovenia.11 Finally, we drop individuals in
the top and bottom percentile of the income distribution, for each wave
and country separately. The resulting data set contains 25,827 observations
on 10,943 individuals. Table 3.1 shows descriptive statistics.
3.3.2 Health
SHARE includes many different measures of health, ranging from self-
perceived health status to reported limitations and major health conditions,
11Israel is excluded because their surveys were conducted at different points in time
than the rest and differ slightly from those of the other countries.
524582-L-sub01-bw-Kools
Processed on: 20-9-2018
Health and Consumption Preferences Chapter 3 89
Figure 3.2: Prevalence of limitations in activities of daily living
across age
health care usage, and physical performance measures. In this chapter
our main health measure is limitations in activities of daily living (ADL),
which are encountered by many in old age. Figure 3.2 plots the prevalence
of the six types of limitations in ADL against age. The prevalence of
limitations increases with age and the most common problems are those
with dressing, bathing, and showering. We define individuals to be
‘limited’ when they have one or more problems with ADL. 19.5% of the
individuals in our sample experience a health shock, measured by the
presence of ADL limitations.
The use of ADL limitations has several advantages. First of all, by
taking a measure of physical limitations, we focus on that aspect of health
that is assumed to be a mediating factor between health and consumption.
When considering a measure like the number of chronic diseases, the range
of illnesses (from asthma to cancer) could make it hard to differentiate
the possible implications of these illnesses to everyday life, hindering
interpretation of the estimation results. Moreover, ADL limitations are
relatively objective, in the sense that the domains of functionality are
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narrowly focused and the interviewer can partly validate the answer by
observing the respondent.12 This is important since the variable we aim
to explain (making ends meet) has a subjective component. Would the
measure of limitations also be subjective (for example self-assessed health
status), then correlated errors could bias the results.13 We also conduct
analyses using measures of IADL, chronic disease count, and cognitive
functioning. More information on these health measures can be found in
Appendix 3.A.1.
3.3.3 Income and assets
SHARE contains data on income, assets, and housing wealth. We construct
an aggregated measure of household income by computing the sum of
net household income and 5 percent of net financial assets (following
Finkelstein et al. 2013).14 In this way we account for the fact that elderly
households may be spending down their accumulated financial savings.
As a measure of permanent income we take the average of income over the
different waves for each individual. All amounts are equivalized to a one
person household using the OECD equivalence scale15 and ppp-adjusted
to 2004 German price levels.
For our selected sample average net household income equals 17,999
euro per year. Net household income is right skewed, with a median
of 13,080 euro (substantially lower than the average). The average value
of net financial assets equals 31,620 euro, with a median of 7914 euro.
Permanent income is on average 19,225 euro, with a median of 15,092 euro.
We control for the presence of positive net housing wealth and we add
wave dummies to take into account possible effects of the Great Recession.
12Mete (2005) calls ADL limitations a quasi-objective health measure by using scare
quotes (‘objective’).
13Responses to self-assessed health questions are not that robust. Using SHARE data,
Lumsdaine and Exterkate (2013) show that self-assessed health suffers from question
order and framing effects, which depend on observable characteristics such as health.
14We only use the income and wealth information from the observations included in
the sample. If for example an individual is present in all waves, but only retired in wave
4, only the information from wave 4 and 5 is used to construct the permanent income
measure.
15This means that income is divided by 1.5 for two person households.
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Appendix 3.A.2 provides detailed information on income and assets per
country.
Like all major household surveys, SHARE suffers from item non-
response. In this chapter we make use of the imputations provided
by SHARE for total net household income, net financial assets and net
housing wealth. A multiple imputation technique has been used, which
means that we have five different complete data sets that differ from one
another only with respect to the imputed values. To capture uncertainty
due to the imputation of missing values we perform the regressions on
each dataset separately and then combine the results from all five datasets
using the imputation method explained by Christelis (2011).16
Making ends meet 3.3.4
To measure financial wellbeing, respondents were asked the following
question:
Thinking of your household’s total monthly income, would
you say that your household is able to make ends meet...
Respondents can answer by choosing either one of the categories (1) with
great difficulty, (2) with some difficulty, (3) fairly easily, or (4) easily.
Figure 3.3 shows the fraction of individuals without difficulties to make
ends meet (i.e. they answered fairly easily, or easily) across income
percentiles for two groups: (1) those without any ADL limitations and
(2) those with one or more ADL limitations. As expected, the ability to
make ends meet increases with income. Moreover, conditional on income,
individuals without physical limitations struggle less to make ends meet.
16The averages in this section are based on the first set of imputations.
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Figure 3.3: ‘Making ends meet’ across health and income
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Baseline
Column (1) of table 3.2 presents the baseline estimation results. The first
coefficient in panel A shows that after a health shock individuals report a
lower ability to make ends meet. More income is required after a health
shock for individuals to reach the same level of financial wellbeing as
before. This is reflected by the health equivalence scale reported in panel
B, which has a point estimate of 1.133. This implies that individuals on
average need 13.3% more income after a health shock to be financially as
well off as before. To calculate the corresponding health state dependence
parameter we assume the risk aversion parameter γ to be 3, which is a
reasonable value obtained by previous studies (e.g. Skinner 1985, and
Palumbo 1999). We find positive health state dependence: the marginal
utility of consumption is higher in bad health than in good health, with a
proportionality factor of φ̂1 = 0.284.
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Table 3.2: Baseline results
(1) (2) (3)
baseline excl. wave 4 excl. wave 4 +
OOP med. exp.
A. Estimation results
limitation -0.110*** -0.0813 -0.0719
(0.0353) (0.0564) (0.0561)
ln(Y) 0.880*** 0.834*** 0.844***
(0.0323) (0.0476) (0.0479)
HH OOP med. exp. -3.75e-05*
(2.10e-05)
age -0.0482** 0.00848 0.00786
(0.0217) (0.0312) (0.0313)
has partner in household 0.281*** 0.213*** 0.216***
(0.0596) (0.0810) (0.0811)
positive housing wealth -0.0186 -0.0598 -0.0590
(0.0467) (0.0799) (0.0800)
male 0.169*** 0.169*** 0.169***
(0.0264) (0.0410) (0.0410)
high education 0.328*** 0.331*** 0.330***
(0.0371) (0.0597) (0.0596)
cut-off point 1 8.552*** 8.142*** 8.261***
(0.372) (0.548) (0.551)
cut-off point 2 10.14*** 9.714*** 9.834***
(0.375) (0.554) (0.556)
cut-off point 3 11.63*** 11.22*** 11.34***
(0.379) (0.559) (0.561)
σ2ξ 0.890*** 0.895*** 0.893***
(0.0327) (0.0509) (0.0507)
Observations 25,827 11,000 11,000
Number of individuals 10,943 4,882 4,882
b. Health state dependence
unit change in limitations
Health equivalence scale (μ̂) 1.133 1.102 1.089
(1.044, 1.223) (0.956, 1.249) (0.947, 1.231)
Health state dependence (φ̂1) 0.284 0.215 0.186
(0.081,0.487) (-0.108, 0.538) (-0.124, 0.495)
sd change in limitations
Health equivalence scale (μ̂) 1.029 1.022 1.019
(1.010, 1.047) (0.992, 1.053) (0.989, 1.049)
Health state dependence (φ̂1) 0.058 0.045 0.039
(0.020,0.096) (-0.018, 0.107) (-0.022, 0.010)
Standard errors clustered at the individual level. Income and OOP medical expen-
ditures in 2004 German euros and equivalized to a one-person household using the
OECD equivalence scale. Mundlak terms and dummies for countries, waves, and
wave participation are included. μ̂ and φ̂1 are constructed according to equations (3.20)
and (3.22), choosing γ = 3. Panel A: standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01,
**p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Panel B: 95% confidence intervals between parentheses.
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In order to be able to compare the results for different kinds of health
limitations, we also provide the estimates for a standard deviation change
in limitations, rather than a unit change. In this way we can take into
account that the scale as well as the severity of limitations differ. After a
standard deviation increase in limitations, one needs 2.9% more income
to be financially as well off as before, with a health state dependence
parameter of 0.058.17
3.4.2 Medical costs
For the baseline estimates we assumed that health insurance coverage in
Europe is universal and that the insured in Europe have negligible OOP
medical expenditures, so that we do not need to worry about private
expenditures on health care. However, if individuals do bear medical costs
in (some) European countries and are not insured for that, the positive
health state dependence of utility that we find could be driven by increased
medical expenditures, rather than an increase in the marginal utility of
non-medical consumption. OECD (2015) shows that especially in the north
of Europe health care is mainly financed by the government and social
security. Private OOP medical expenses are low. However, other sources
raise concern when it comes to universal coverage and OOP medical
expenses (Cylus and Papanicolas 2015, and Scheil-Adlung and Bonan
2012). Therefore, we perform two tests for medical expenditures.
First, we include survey data on OOP medical expenditures in our
regression. Unfortunately, data on OOP medical expenditures in SHARE
are erratic.18 The non-response rate is high and as from wave 4 the question
components were changed. More importantly, in wave 4 the questions were
17The health state dependence parameter is sensitive to the risk aversion parameter
γ, however, it does not change the sign of health state dependence. When we assume a
risk aversion parameter of 2, health state dependence for a standard deviation change in
health is 0.029. When we assume a risk aversion parameter of 4, health state dependence
is 0.123.
18Therefore, we did not include them in the baseline regression.
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temporarily moved to the drop-off questionnaire19, so that imputations are
not available for wave 4. If we want to include OOP medical expenditures
we thus need to drop wave 4, leading to a large decline in the number of
observations. To facilitate comparisons, we first re-estimate the baseline
model on the new (smaller) sample. The results are shown in column (2)
of table 3.2. The estimated health state dependence of utility is slightly
smaller for this subsample, namely φ̂1 = 0.215 and insignificant, probably
due to the lack of observations. Next, we add household OOP medical
expenditures to the regression, for which the results are shown in column
(3) of table 3.2. The point estimate for health state dependence hardly
changes, from 0.215 to 0.186. We thus conclude that the presence of OOP
medical expenses may lead to a slight overestimation of the health state
dependence parameter, but does not drive our results.
Second, we exploit variation in institutions between countries. The
data cover fifteen European countries that can be roughly divided into
three groups based on their health care system. In the northern European
countries the government is mainly responsible for organizing care. In
the south/eastern countries, on the contrary, the family of the individual
bears the main responsibility for providing care. In central countries, the
responsibility for care is shared between the government and the family.20
Medical costs are likely to be higher in countries where the government
plays a small role in health care. Therefore, we expect individuals in
central and south/eastern European countries to encounter more medical
costs than individuals in northern European countries. In table 3.3 we
interact all variables in the baseline model with the north, central and
south/east European country groups. In correspondence with the test for
OOP medical expenses, we find a slightly higher health state dependence
parameter for central and southern/eastern European countries (0.272 and
19The drop-off questionnaire is a traditional paper questionnaire separately from the
CAPI questionnaire. This questionnaire has a higher non-response than the regular CAPI
questionnaire.
20Because of the number of observations we group countries together. Verbeek-Oudijk
et al. (2014) classify northern countries: Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands; central
countries: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany; and south/eastern countries: Czech
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland. We
classified Greece to the south/east group.
524582-L-sub01-bw-Kools
Processed on: 20-9-2018
96 Health and Consumption Preferences Chapter 3
Table 3.3: Test for coverage of health care costs
North Central South/East
a. Estimation results
limitation -0.0837 -0.106** -0.113*
(0.0810) (0.0525) (0.0589)
ln(Y) 0.901*** 0.876*** 0.913***
(0.0873) (0.0458) (0.0533)
age -0.0662** -0.0216 -0.0726***
(0.0264) (0.0240) (0.0252)
partner in household 0.483*** 0.160 0.270***
(0.110) (0.104) (0.0983)
positive housing wealth 0.266** -0.0635 -0.0608
(0.124) (0.0711) (0.0706)
male 0.0895 0.258*** 0.112***
(0.0602) (0.0407) (0.0433)
high education 0.187** 0.297*** 0.485***
(0.0802) (0.0515) (0.0718)
Observations 25,827
Number of individuals 10,943
b. Health state dependence
unit change in limitations
Health equivalence scale (μ̂) 1.097 1.128 1.131
(0.903, 1.292) (0.995, 1.261) (0.988, 1.275)
Health state dependence (φ̂1) 0.204 0.272 0.280
(-0.223, 0.632) (-0.028, 0.573) (-0.046, 0.606)
sd change in limitations
Health equivalence scale (μ̂) 1.020 1.029 1.029
(0.981, 1.060) (1.000, 1.058) (0.999, 1.060)
Health state dependence (φ̂1) 0.041 0.059 0.059
(-0.039, 0.122) (-0.001, 0.118) (-0.004, 0.122)
Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. Income is in 2004 German
euros and equivalized to a one-person household using the OECD equivalence
scale. Mundlak terms and dummies for countries, waves, and wave participation are
included. μ̂ and φ̂1 are constructed according to equations (3.20) and (3.22), choosing
γ = 3. Panel A: standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Panel B: 95% confidence intervals between parentheses.
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0.280 compared to 0.204). However, health state dependence of utility in
the central and south/east European countries is not significantly different
from health state dependence in north European countries, suggesting
that (OOP) medical expenses are not driving our results.
Alternative health measures 3.4.3
In order to improve our understanding of the mechanisms underlying
health state dependence of utility, we re-estimate our model using other
health measures. First, we examine problems with instrumental activities
of daily living (IADL) and a measure of mobility problems. IADL and
mobility problems are composite measures for a range of problems that
can be encountered in daily life (just as ADL problems). Examples of
IADL are shopping for groceries, taking medications and preparing a
hot meal. Examples of mobility tasks are walking 100 meters, climbing
stairs, and pulling/pushing large objects. IADL and mobility problems
are of a milder nature than the ADL limitations, are observed at a higher
frequency, and occur already earlier in life.
Columns (1) and (2) of table 3.4 show that IADL and mobility problems
result in slightly larger estimates of health state dependence than ADL
problems (0.377 and 0.366, compared to 0.284). This may indicate that,
apart from increased preferences for assistance in housework, increased
preference for assistance in leisure activities causes the positive effect
(e.g. special transport and adapted leisure activities to keep up old ways
of living). When physical limitations are mild, one might try hard to
maintain the old lifestyle, but if physical limitations become too severe,
one rather gives up on some of these activities. When we include the three
types of limitations in one model simultaneously, the estimates are not
significantly different.
Column (3) of table 3.4 shows that for each additional chronic disease,
individuals need about 5.9% more income to be just as well off as before,
corresponding to a parameter of health state dependence equal to 0.121.
So, also here we measure positive health state dependence. The estimates
are highly comparable, with a health state dependence parameter of 0.058
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for a standard deviation in ADL limitations and a parameter of 0.060 for a
standard deviation in the number of chronic diseases. This strengthens
our baseline results.
In addition to measures of physical health, column (4) of table 3.4
shows the results for cognitive functioning as a measure of health status.
As individuals age, their ability to take initiative, to plan, and to organize
activities decreases. This is, amongst others, probably due to a decline
in the functioning of the frontal lobe, which is vulnerable to the effects
of aging (this has been found both in behavioral and MRI studies, Craik
and Grady 2002). The frontal lobe is also heavily demanded in memory
tasks. In this study we use a test on long term word recall to construct
a measure of cognitive functioning.21 Whereas we find a positive effect
of physical limitations on the marginal utility of consumption, we find
that cognitive limitations have a negative effect on the marginal utility of
consumption. This suggests that, in contrast to individuals with physical
limitations, individuals that experience a cognitive decline probably might
not be willing to invest in adapted activities, as their motivation and will
to undertake any activities declines.22
Robustness checks 3.4.4
The functional form of a model may have an impact on the size of the
coefficients. Following the method of Pradhan and Ravallion (2000) we
estimate the coefficients using a random effects ordered probit model.
However, one could also think about a linear specification. Riedl and
Geishecker (2014) compare linear and nonlinear ordered response esti-
mators and find that in general the choice seems to have little effect on
the size of ratios of estimated coefficient. Column (2) of table 3.5 shows
the results for the linear specification. The estimated health state depen-
21See appendix 3.A for more details on the measure of cognitive functioning.
22One could argue that after a negative shock in cognitive health, administrative help
may increase, and this could be the reason that making ends meet improves. However,
only 6.8% of the individuals with a negative shock in cognitive health start to receive
administrative help between two waves, which is not significantly different from those
without a negative shock in cognitive health (on average 8.3% of them start to receive
administrative help from one wave to the other).
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dence parameter is very similar (0.294 compared to 0.284). Also, including
country-by-year fixed effects rather than country effects and year effects
separately (to account for possible country-specific shocks), does not affect
our results (0.281 compared to 0.284), as shown in column (3).
An important assumption underlying our model is that permanent
income is not affected by health. This does not need to be the case since a
health shock can affect life expectancy and thereby the amount of wealth
that can be consumed each remaining year. When we rerun our model on
the subsample of households with 75% of wealth annuitized the results
hardly change (column (4) of table 3.5), so that our assumption seems
justified.
Financial wellbeing is measured on a four-point scale. The fact that the
scale is finite may lead to a bias in our estimates. The baseline estimates
show that, on average, individuals rate their financial wellbeing lower
after a health shock than before. Now imagine a healthy individual
who is very dissatisfied with his or her financial situation. When this
individual experiences a health shock, (s)he might experience an even
lower financial wellbeing than before, but cannot express this in the answer
to the survey question, because he was already at the lowest category of
financial wellbeing. This would bias our estimate of the health state
dependence of utility downward.
As a robustness check we therefore repeat the baseline regression,
while excluding those in the lowest or highest income quartile for each
country within the selected sample. As shown in figure 3.3, healthy
individuals with low incomes often provide answers on the bottom end of
the scale. Therefore, we would expect to find a larger decline in financial
wellbeing after a health shock and thus a higher estimate of health state
dependence when excluding the lowest income quartile. Indeed, as shown
in column (5) of table 3.5, the estimated parameter is larger than in the
baseline (0.582 compared to 0.284). The higher estimate can also be the
result of heterogeneous effects for poor and rich individuals. In any case,
the positive health state dependence found in our baseline specification
remains convincing. This also holds when we exclude the highest income
quartile for each country (column (6) of table 3.5).
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In a recent paper, Finkelstein et al. (2013) find negative health state
dependence using a measure of chronic disease count on a sample of
elderly US citizens. For a comparable sample to ours (age ≥ 65, not in
the labor force, and with health insurance) and under the assumption of
γ = 3, they find a proportionality factor of −0.142 for a one standard
deviation change in limitations.23 To ensure that these differences in
estimates do not stem from methodological differences, we re-estimate the
model of Finkelstein et al. (2013) on our dataset.24 Our hypothesis is that
as long as there are no unobserved characteristics that are correlated with
income and have an effect on the change in utility after a health shock, the
methods should provide roughly the same results.
Finkelstein et al. (2013) use happiness as a proxy for utility. Unfortu-
nately, this variable is not available in SHARE. Instead, we use general life
satisfaction. General life satisfaction and happiness are no exchangeable
concepts (as pointed out by Kahneman and Deaton 2010), but we believe it
suffices for this context. We apply a linear random effect specification with
Mundlak terms to deal with possible problems of endogeneity. Because
the answering scale of the life satisfaction question was different in wave
1 than in the other waves, we drop wave 1 for this part of the analysis.
Column (1) of table 3.6 shows the results of the baseline regression ex-
cluding the observations of wave 1. The estimate is almost equal to the
estimate including wave 1, and has only a slightly larger 95% confidence
interval. Column (2) shows the estimates based on the same sample, but
using overall life satisfaction and the method of Finkelstein et al. (2013).
We find the same sign of health state dependence, but the coefficient is
somewhat larger (φ̂1 = 0.438 instead of 0.285) and not significant. Lastly,
we re-estimate column (2) using the same health measure as Finkelstein et
al. (2013), namely the number of chronic diseases. This measure has been
constructed in correspondence with the baseline health measure used in
Finkelstein et al. (2013). As shown in column (3) of table 3.6 we find an
23See table 3, column 2b of Finkelstein et al. (2013).
24The alternative, to apply our method to the HRS data, unfortunately will not work,
since individuals in this dataset are likely to have out-of-pocket health expenditures (also
when they are insured), which are not recorded in the data.
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age -0.0727** -0.0123 -0.00427
(0.0307) (0.0371) (0.0376)
partner in household 0.344*** 0.257*** 0.249***
(0.0711) (0.0786) (0.0785)
positive housing wealth 0.0195 0.0222 0.0213
(0.0526) (0.0616) (0.0617)
male 0.201*** 0.00546 0.00868
(0.0292) (0.0316) (0.0321)
high education 0.306*** 0.244*** 0.261***
(0.0402) (0.0378) (0.0379)
Observations 20,025 20,508 20,490
Number of individuals 9,022 9,222 9,213
b. Health state dependence
unit change in limitations
Health state dependence (φ̂1) 0.285 0.438 0.409
(0.063, 0.507) (-0.540, 1.417) (-0.102, 0.919)
sd change in limitations
Health state dependence (φ̂1) 0.057 0.098 0.192
(0.017, 0.098) (-0.121, 0.316) (-0.048, 0.431)
Dependent variable: general life satisfaction. Standard errors are clustered at the
individual level. Income is in 2004 German euros and equivalized to a one-person
household using the OECD equivalence scale. For sake of readability of the coefficients
in column (2) and (3) Y is divided by 10,000. Mundlak terms and dummies for
countries, waves, and wave participation are included. For the calculation of health
state dependence in column (1) and the construction of the income measure in
columns (2) and (3) we assume γ = 3. Panel A: standard errors in parentheses.




104 Health and Consumption Preferences Chapter 3
estimate of 0.192 (insignificant at a 5% level) for a one standard deviation
change in limitations.
This analysis shows that the contradictory signs of the health state
dependence of utility found between the US and Europe seem to be due
to heterogeneity in the population, as opposed to methodological differ-
ences. This may be due to cultural differences, institutional differences or
differences in consumption patterns. Banks et al. (2015) compare life-cycle
consumption patterns for the US and the UK.25 They show that budget
shares on recreation are higher in the UK than in the US. If people in
Europe find recreation a more essential consumption good than people in
the US, they may need more money to keep doing these activities in bad
health (e.g. more help and assistance during a holiday). Transportation
costs, on the other hand, are relatively high in the US compared to the
UK (maybe because of the longer distances in the US). The question arises
whether Americans still incur these costs when they become sick. If not,
this may explain (part of the) negative health state dependence in the US.
Future research on consumption data is needed to provide clear answers.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter estimates health state dependence of utility in Europe. We
develop an approach that uses insights from the domain of living standards
and income adequacy (Pradhan and Ravallion 2000). We derive a simple
relationship between the health state dependence parameter within the
optimal life cycle framework and a so called ‘health equivalence scale’,
which we define as the relative change in income needed to maintain the
same level of financial wellbeing after a health shock. This allows us to
identify health state dependence of utility using a measure of financial
wellbeing. Compared to other observed utility approaches a benefit of this
method is that it does not require to compare individual level changes at
different income levels to overcome the obstacle that health shocks affect
both the level and shape of the utility function. Since making ends meet is
25The UK is not included in SHARE, but this comparison may give us some clue about
differences between the US and Europe.
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a common question in questionnaires, this method can easily be used by
researchers all over the world.
We implement the approach using panel data from the Survey of
Health, Aging and Retirement in Europe. Our baseline estimates show
positive health state dependence of the utility function, with a proportion-
ality factor equal to 0.284 in the presence of ADL limitations. We show
that our results are not driven by medical expenditures, and that they
are robust against alternative physical health measures and specifications.
Interestingly, for cognitive health limitations we find negative health state
dependence. When cognitive health declines, people’s ability to plan,
organize, and take initiative becomes worse. These developments seem to
lower the marginal utility of consumption.
To compare the results for the US and Europe, we also apply the
approach of Finkelstein et al. (2013) on the SHARE data. Because of
data limitations the comparison is not completely clean, but again, we
find positive health state dependence. The sign thus remains the same,
however, the coefficient is somewhat larger and not significantly different
from zero. Remarkably, for the European countries in our sample we
find positive health state dependence repeatedly, whereas Finkelstein et al.
(2013) find negative health state dependence in the US for the same age
group (retirees). The results suggest that this is due to heterogeneity in
the population as opposed to methodological differences. Differences in
consumption patterns, such as budget shares on leisure and transportation
may explain the contradictory signs in the US and Europe for health
state dependence of the utility function. Further research on consumption
patterns is needed to explain this difference. Further research could also
aim at exploring heterogeneities in health state dependence of utility
across individuals with different characteristics.
The health state dependence parameter is important for many economic
questions such as the optimal savings rate and the optimal level of health
insurance. Positive health state dependence implies that both the optimal
savings rate and the optimal level of health insurance increase, relative
to the situation where health state dependence is not taken into account.
However, in old age cognitive health also declines and this lowers the
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marginal utility of consumption. As far as health limitations occur early in
the life-cycle when people are in good cognitive health, extra money may
be desirable to be able to keep doing (leisure) activities. On the other hand,
in old age, where health limitations coincide with a decline in cognitive
health, our results show that extra money or a high insurance for health
costs is less necessary.
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Additional descriptive statistics 3.A
This appendix provides details about the data and a description of the
data used for the additional analyses.
Health 3.A.1
This chapter uses five different health measures. In the baseline analysis we
use data on limitations in activities of daily living, described in section 3.3.
In the additional analyses we use data on instrumental activities of daily
living, physical mobility, the number of chronic diseases and cognitive
functioning. This section provides a description of these variables.
IADL and mobility
Both limitations in instrumental activities of daily living (IADL) and limi-
tations in physical mobility are closely related to limitations in activities of
daily living (ADL). IADL is scored with a list of seven activities: (1) using
a map to get around, (2) preparing a hot meal, (3) shopping for groceries,
(4) making telephone calls, (5) taking medications, (6) working around the
house or garden, and (7) managing money. These type of limitations are
slightly milder than limitations with ADL, therefore are more prevalent:
26% of observations have at least one limitation in IADL, see table 3.7. The
most common limitations are limitations with house and garden work,
grocery shopping and using a map. After the age of 80 also problems
with managing money and preparing a hot meal start to become more
prevalent, see figure 3.4.
Table 3.7: Summary statistics for health variables
mean sd. within sd. between min max N
limitation in ADL 0.16 0.29 0.23 0 1 25827
# chronic disease 1.59 0.65 1.03 0 7 25797
limitation in IADL 0.26 0.34 0.28 0 1 25827
limitation in mobility 0.65 0.35 0.32 0 1 25824
limitation in cognitive ability 0.75 0.35 0.26 0 1 25334
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Figure 3.4: Limitations in instrumental activities of daily living
across age
Figure 3.5: Limitations in physical mobility across age
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Physical mobility is scored with a list of ten activities: (1) walking
100m, (2) sitting for 2 hours, (3) getting up from a chair, (4) climbing
stairs, (5) climbing one flight of stairs, (6) stooping, kneeling or crouching,
(7) reaching above one’s shoulder, (8) pulling or pushing large objects,
(9) lifting or carrying over 5kg, and (10) picking up a small coin. These
limitations are even milder than those listed for IADL, not only do more
individuals experience these type of limitations (65% of all observations,
see table 3.7), also they start to appear earlier in life. At early ages
individuals often report problems with stooping, kneeling or crouching
or climbing stairs, followed by sitting for 2 hours and getting up from a
chair, see figure 3.5.
As the listed limitations in physical mobility and IADL are slightly
milder than those in ADL, often individuals who report to have limitations
in ADL, also report to have limitations in one of the other categories.
Figure 3.6 shows the prevalence of the different limitations across age.
Chronic diseases
The prevalence of chronic diseases is an objective measure of health which
is often used in the literature. For sake of comparability, we construct this
variable in correspondence with Finkelstein et al. (2013). SHARE contains
a list of 18 chronic diseases (three of which are not included in the first
wave), for which the respondents should indicate whether a doctor has
ever told that them they had or that they are currently being treated for or
bothered by that condition. We include (1) heart attack/heart problems, (2)
high blood pressure/hypertension, (3) stroke/cerebral vascular disease, (4)
diabetes/high blood sugar, (5) chronic lung disease (e.g. chronic bronchitis
or emphysema), (6) arthritis, including osteoarthritis or rheumatism, (7)
cancer or malignant tumor, including leukemia or lymphoma, but exclud-
ing minor skin cancers. Contrary to ADL limitations, chronic diseases are
considered permanent. For each chronic disease, prevalence is modeled
as an absorbing state. 82% of the person-year observations have at least 1
chronic disease. High blood pressure and arthritis are the most common
diseases, see figure 3.7.
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Figure 3.6: Different type of limitations across age
Figure 3.7: Chronic diseases across age
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Cognitive functioning
Cognitive functions encompass aspects like attention, memory, perception,
language, and decision making (Glisky 2007). As individuals age cognitive
functioning may decline, such that the ability to take initiative, plan, and
organize activities decreases and individuals experience more fear.
Our measure of cognitive functioning is based on a word recall question.
The interviewer reads a list of 10 words to the survey respondent. After
the interviewer is finished he asks the respondent to recall aloud as many
words as possible, in any order. The number of words that the respondent
remembers is stored and seen as the ability of short term recall. After
this task the respondent is given a verbal fluency task and a series of
computational tasks. Then he is asked again to remember aloud the
words provided in the beginning of the series of tasks, in any order. He
gets one minute to complete the task. The amount of words that the
respondent remembers at this point is seen as the ability of long term
recall. We use this second variable to measure cognitive functioning:
the more words one can remember, the higher the cognitive functioning.
We dichotomize the variables, in correspondence with the other health
measures, by defining someone to experience cognitive limitations if the
number of words recalled is less than average in our sample (5/10 words
recalled). According to this cut off 75% of individuals has a limitation in
cognitive functioning, see table 3.7.
Income and assets 3.A.2
SHARE contains detailed questionnaires on income and assets. Different
income components are elicited stepwise, so that we can be sure transfers
from private and public pension programs are earmarked as income.
Over the years there are some slight changes in the wording of the
questionnaire. Most importantly, in the first wave the respondents are
asked to provide gross amounts of income, whereas from wave two on net
amounts are elicited. To correct for this we translated the gross amounts to
net amounts using information from the OECD on each country’s average
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tax rate per decile for singles and couples separately.26 Table 3.8 provides
detailed information on income and assets per country.
Positive and negative feelings 3.A.3
Our results may be biased due to time-varying optimism and pessimism
correlated with health status lead to changes in answering styles. Although
we cannot control for this in a proper way, we do want to check what
happens when we include measures of positive and negative feelings in
the model. This is not without problems, since by including these variables
in our estimating equation we introduce simultaneity bias into our model.
The results from this model should thus definitely by interpreted with
caution.
Using questions from the EURO-D depression scale, we construct
measures of positive and negative feelings, similar to Fischer and Sousa-
Poza (2008). Our variable ‘negative feelings’ is the summation of dummy
variables indicating whether an individual experiences feelings of sadness,
guilt, and hostility. The variable ‘positive feelings’ is a summation of
dummy variables indicating whether an individual experiences feelings
of self-assurance, attentiveness, and joviality. As shown in table 3.9,
individuals with ADL limitations tend to experience less positive feelings
and more negative feelings. When including the measures of positive and
negative feelings to the regressions, the estimated health state dependence
parameter is still significant at a 5% level and only slightly smaller than
the baseline estimate, 0.208 compared to 0.284 (column (1) of table 3.10).
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Table 3.9: Percentage of respondents experiencing positive and negative
feelings.
≥ 1 ADL no ADL
problem problem
Positive feelings
- has hopes for the future 66% 82%
- has enjoyed an activity recently 75% 88%
- has good concentration on 62% 82%
reading/entertainment
Negative feelings
- has been sad or depressed in the last month 60% 40%
- has felt to rather be death in the last month 21% 8%
- has feelings of guilt or self-blame 11% 7%
- has been irritable recently 31% 21%
- has cried in the last month 39% 25%
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Table 3.10: Results including measures of positive and negative
feelings
(1) (2)













Number of id 10,943 10,658
b. Health parameter estimates
unit change in limitations
Health equivalence scale (μ̂) 1.133 1.099
(1.044, 1.223) (1.008, 1.190)
Health state dependence (φ̂1) 0.284 0.208
(0.081,0.487) (0.008, 0.409)
sd change in limitations
Health equivalence scale (μ̂) 1.029 1.021
(1.010, 1.047) (1.002, 1.04)
Health state dependence (φ̂1) 0.058 0.043
(0.020,0.096) (0.005, 0.082)
Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. Income is in 2004
German euros and equivalized to a one-person household using the OECD
equivalence scale. For sake of readability of the coefficients in column (2)
and (3) Y is divided by 10,000. Mundlak terms and dummies for countries,
waves, and wave participation are included. For the calculation of health
state dependence in column (1) and the construction of the income measure
in columns (2) and (3) we assume γ = 3. Panel A: standard errors in






4 Graded Return-to-Work as a
Stepping Stone to Full Work
Resumption
Abstract
While there is increasing evidence that graded return-to-work is an effec-
tive tool for the rehabilitation of sick-listed workers, little is known on the
optimal timing and level of grading in return-to-work trajectories. We use
administrative data from a Dutch private workplace reintegration provider
to fill this gap. In order to correct for the selection bias inherent to the
evaluation of activation strategies, we exploit the discretionary room of
the case managers in setting up treatment plans. We find that graded
return-to-work reduces sick spells with eighteen weeks within the first two
years after reporting sick. However, the probability of work resumption
after two years remains unchanged. Work resumption can be achieved
faster when graded return-to-work is started earlier or at a higher rate
of work resumption. These findings however do not hold for individuals
who have problems related to mental health.
A working paper version of this chapter is published as Kools and Koning (2018)
and is currently under review. The chapter is co-authored by Pierre Koning. The authors
gratefully acknowledge the financial support from Instituut Gak for this research project.
They also thank Bénédicte Rouland, Rob Euwals and Bertjan Teunissen for detailed
comments and suggestions on earlier versions of the paper, as well as seminar participants
that gave feedback at the EALE conference in St. Gallen in 2017 and the research seminars
at CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, the University of Antwerp
and RWI in Essen.
524582-L-sub01-bw-Kools
Processed on: 20-9-2018
118 Graded Return-to-Work Chapter 4
4.1 Introduction
In the past decades many Western countries have seen a rise in uptake
of disability benefits (OECD 2010). In an effort to curb this trend, there
has been an increased focus on what disabled individuals can do at work,
rather than what they cannot. For example, in England sick notes have
been replaced by a statement of fitness for work in 2010 (Wainwright
et al. 2011), in Sweden general practitioners are recommended to subscribe
part-time sick leave rather than full time sick leave (Kausto et al. 2008)
and in Norway sick-listed employees are since 2004 required to work
partially after eight weeks of sick leave unless a physician has stated
this is impossible (Hernæs 2017). In a similar vein, part-time sick leave
is often used as a workplace based intervention aimed at speeding up
the rehabilitation process of sick-listed employees. In these interventions
usually the amount of hours worked gradually increases over time, up
to the moment that full work resumption is achieved. The idea is that
graded work prevents the loss of working skills and may even speed up
the recovery from certain injuries. For instance, Andren and Svensson
(2012) argue that particularly individuals with musculo-skeletal problems
benefit from graded work activities. Likewise, Individual Placement and
Support (IPS) interventions for sick workers with mental impairments are
built upon the idea that work activities may contribute to the recovery
process.1
Research shows almost unanimously positive effects of graded work
on work rehabilitation2, whereas interventions like vocational rehabili-
tation and regular paramedical care rather seem to lengthen sick spells
(Markussen and Røed 2014, Rehwald et al. 2016). This however does not
mean that graded return-to-work is beneficial for all individuals (Andren
1 Corrigan and McCracken (2005) argue that psychiatric problems can be addressed
only for some workers in real-life settings, so as to identify the cause of them.
2See e.g. Bernacki et al. (2000), Bethge (2016), Hernæs (2017), Høgelund et al. (2010),
Kausto et al. (2014), Markussen et al. (2012), Rehwald et al. (2016), Viikari-Juntura et al.
(2012). The general finding that graded work increases work resumption is confirmed
in peer reviewed papers on the effects of part-time sick leave, active sick leave, phased
return to work, and graded return to work. Related to this literature, evidence on graded
work exposure or light duties also points at positive results, see e.g. Krause et al. (1998).
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2014, Andren and Svensson 2012, Høgelund et al. 2012). Starting graded
work trajectories too soon or for too many hours may induce stress or
strain on the body, hampering the recovery process. In light of these
considerations, it is important to understand what separates an effective
graded return-to-work trajectory from an ineffective one.
In this chapter we analyze how the specifics of the set-up of a graded
return-to-work trajectory determine its effectiveness. More specifically, we
analyze if work resumption rates change when the trajectory is started
later or at a higher initial rate of work resumption. For this we make use
of registered data from a private workplace reintegration provider, which
performs case management for mostly small and medium sized firms.
This provider offered reintegration services for about 12,000 long-term
sick listed workers, of which 62% participated in graded work trajectories
between the years 2011 and 2014. We observe detailed worker information
on the timing and the degree of grading that is used, as well as informa-
tion on impairment types, employer, and other individual characteristics.
We enrich these data with information on the case managers that were
assigned to them by the reintegration provider.
In order to correct for the selection bias inherent to the evaluation
of activation strategies, we follow an instrumental variables approach
for which we exploit the discretionary room of the case managers in
setting up treatment plans. We use the tendency of a case manager
to focus on early/intense graded work (graded work propensity) as an
instrument to actually receiving such a strategy. In doing so, we follow
a strand of literature applying this technique in the context of activation
strategies for sick-listed employees, such as Dean et al. (2015), Markussen
and Røed (2014) and Rehwald et al. (2016).3 As case managers may
learn on the job or change their preference for graded work, we allow
graded work propensities to vary across years. Our key assumption
is that the assignment of (new) sick-listed workers to case managers is
3For the Dutch case, where sick-listed employees have to follow a return-to-work plan
established in the beginning of the sick-spell, we prefer this approach over the use of
proportional hazard models, as used by for example Høgelund et al. (2010) for the case
of Denmark, which relies on the non-anticipation assumption. Other methods used in
the context of graded return-to-work are propensity score matching (Bethge 2016) and
randomized control trials (Viikari-Juntura et al. 2012).
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exogenous. We argue that this assumption is plausible, as the assignment
is driven by the direct availability of case managers. Moreover, all the
individual information on new sick-listed workers that is available to the
case managers at the moment of intake is observed in our data. This
means that any selection on observables can be controlled for. Reversely,
we also can test for the importance of such selection effects by estimating
model specifications without individual controls.
Our analysis also extends on earlier studies in this field of research by
using alternative propensity measures that proxy the specifics of graded
work trajectories. In line with earlier work, we will first define case
managers’ propensity measures as the likelihood of initiating a trajectory
for sick-listed workers that haven’t started one yet. With the information
of workers that have effectively started a trajectory, we next construct
propensity measures of case managers that proxy the timing of graded
work during the sickness spell as well as the graded work percentage
that is applied. This then enables us to evaluate the effects of differences
in the timing and the degree of grading of the interventions on (full)
work resumption for those individuals that have started a graded work
program. We thus gain insight in the optimal timing of graded work and
the importance of gradually increasing the degree of grading.
We also shed new light on the determinants of graded work propensi-
ties and the implications of this for the interpretation of our findings. Even
though the case managers’ tendencies to use graded work interventions
can be considered as exogenous, we cannot be sure that they are uncor-
related with other case manager characteristics affecting the likelihood
of work resumption. For instance, high graded work propensities may
be a marker of high quality case managers that also show higher work
resumption rates without the use of graded work interventions. If so,
the effectiveness of graded work interventions will be overestimated. We
therefore estimate model versions with various proxies for case manager
quality as additional controls. Among others, these proxies include the
current and past work resumption rates of (other) sick-listed workers that
were assigned and work resumption rates of workers that are out of our
sample. When controlling for these proxies, we are able to assess the
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extent to which graded work effects are truly driven by the allocation to
trajectories, rather than other case manager activities that are correlated
with graded work.
In line with earlier literature, we find overall positive effects of graded
return-to-work. Graded return-to-work speeds up the recovery process.
At the same time, graded work does not necessarily help rehabilitate
individuals who would otherwise have not rehabilitated. We find an
increase in the number of weeks worked during the first two years after
sick-listing of 18 weeks due to graded return-to-work, but no significant
effects on the probability to return to work within two years. Moreover,
we find that starting the graded return-to-work trajectory earlier and at a
higher rate of work resumption speeds up the recovery process. Starting
one week earlier raises the number of weeks worked in the first two
years with two weeks. Starting a graded return-to-work trajectory at a
work resumption rate which is 10 percentage point higher increases the
probability to return to work within two years with 2.5 percentage point.
Work resumption rates are more strongly affected by the moment that
graded return-to-work is started than by the moments within the trajectory
at which the level of work resumption is increased.
The positive effects of graded return-to-work are especially strong for
individuals who have general medical conditions. For them the positive
effects persist at the end of the waiting period. For individuals with
problems related to mental health we find no significant effects of graded
return-to-work. Moreover, and contrary to the overall findings, for these
individuals starting the graded return-to-work trajectory one week ear-
lier decreases the probability to return to work within two years with 3
percentage point.
In the following section, we explain the system of sick leave and
disability insurance in the Netherlands. Then, in Section 4.3 we provide
descriptive statistics on the sick-listed individuals in the data set, the
graded return-to-work trajectories, and the case managers. In Section 4.4,
we explain our empirical strategy and underlying assumptions. We present
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4.2 Institutional setting
The Dutch disability system used to be notorious for its large and increas-
ing number of beneficiaries; at its peak those receiving benefits amounted
up to 12 percent of the insured individuals (Koning and Lindeboom 2015).
Since the beginning of the 21st century disability insurance award rates
have been steadily declining, due to a number of reforms to the system.
Among these reforms was the introduction of the Gatekeeper Protocol,
obliging employers and employees to engage in activities aimed at reinte-
grating sick-listed workers into the workforce. As a consequence of the
Gatekeeper Protocol, disability insurance inflow was estimated to reduce
by about 40 percent (van Sonsbeek and Gradus 2013). This positive effect
can partly be attributed to improved screening, making it more difficult to
use DI as an alternative exit root for Unemployment Insurance (de Jong
et al. 2011). Moreover, increased employer responsibilities have played a
crucial role in curbing the rise in DI beneficiaries, both as a stimulus to ac-
tively prevent sickness and as a way to accommodate activation strategies
for sick-listed workers (Koning and Lindeboom 2015).
As a result of the reforms the Netherlands has a rather unique, largely
privately organized sickness and disability system (Koning 2017). This
section describes those elements of the system that are relevant for under-
standing the context within graded return-to-work is used.
4.2.1 Gatekeeper Protocol
In the Netherlands all workers are insured against income losses due to
injuries, irrespective of having incurred the injury at the workplace or
not. Individuals can apply for DI benefits after a two year waiting period,
during which the employer is obliged to continue payments of at least
70% of the employees regular salary.4 In practice, most Collective Labor
Agreements stipulate full wage payments in the first year and 70% in the
4For comparison, in Scandinavian countries employers are responsible for two to three
weeks of continued wage payments, after which the Social Insurance Administration
(Sweden/Norway) or municipalities (Denmark) take over the burden (Andren 2014,
Markussen and Røed 2014, Rehwald et al. 2016).
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Figure 4.1: Time line of the gatekeeper protocol.
second year. During these two years, sick-listed workers can start with
graded work or adapted work. As long as the waiting period proceeds
and the worker has not fully recovered, wage payments are continued.
During the waiting period the employer and the employee are obliged
to undertake efforts towards re-integration of the sick-listed employee.
The Gatekeeper Protocol (in Dutch: Wet verbetering Poortwachter) gives
directions as to what these efforts should entail. Figure 4.1 shows a time
line of the concrete steps that need to be taken under the Gatekeeper
Protocol. In the sixth week a disability assessment should be conducted
by a medical officer (company doctor). This assessment is used as input
for a reintegration plan, due in week 8. This plan is composed by the
employer and employee, and should stipulate the reintegration aim5 and
the planned steps towards reaching this aim. A case manager should be
appointed to keep track of the reintegration process and the return-to-work
plan may be reevaluated at set dates.
After 42 weeks of sick-listing, the employer has to declare the sick-listed
employee to the Social Benefit Administration (responsible for Disability
Insurance) and after a year the reintegration efforts undertaken so far have
to be evaluated. In the 87th week the employer and employee have to
compose a return to work report, including all the reintegration efforts
5Preferably, the reintegration aim should be (partial/adapted) employment with the
current employer ‘first track’ reintegration). Only if this is out of reach, one can aim at
fitting employment with another employer (‘second track’ reintegration).
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taken. This report will be assessed by the Social Benefit Administration in
the 91th week, when also the residual earnings capacity of the individual
is established. Finally, at the end of the waiting period the individual
can apply for (wage-related) DI benefits granted that (1) both employer
and employee can show they have taken adequate reintegration measures
and (2) the individual has a residual earnings capacity of less than 65%
of his/her pre-disability earnings. In case the employer has not shown
sufficient collaboration, the waiting period can be extended with one more
year at maximum.
4.2.2 Private insurance of continued wage payments and case man-
agement
Employers can insure themselves against the risk of the continued wage
payments during the waiting period via private insurers. Approximately
76% of Dutch employers has such an insurance (de Jong et al. 2014). The
employees of the uninsured and insured firms are similar in terms of age
and gender, however insured firms are usually smaller than the uninsured
firms. 78% of firms with 2-10 employees has an insurance for continued
wage payments, whereas only 27% of firms with more than 100 employees
has such an insurance. For small employers the risk of continued wage
payments is similar to large firms, the relative burden however is higher.
Insurers can offer the possibility to not only insure wages, but also insure
all the costs that come with the obligations of the Gatekeeper Protocol. At
least 67% of the insured firms have such a ‘broad’ insurance (de Jong et al.
2014). One such obligation is to assign a case manager that serves as a
link between all the parties involved and keeps track of the progress of
the sick-listed employee.6
6There are many variations possible when it comes to these insurances. There is
freedom of choice in the percentage of wages insured (77% of firms chooses to insure
100% of the wages paid in the first year and 70% of the wages paid in the second year of
sick leave), firms can opt-in for a deductible (77% of firms chooses to keep two weeks
to two months of sick leave on their own account), and firms can choose for a stop-loss
insurance (only chosen by 5% of firms of which most are firms with more than 100
employees). Of the firms surveyed by de Jong et al. (2014) 9% answered that their
insurance only covers continued wage payments, 67% answered their insurance covers
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During the waiting period, the sick-listed employee is allowed to work
partially. The employee can either do therapeutic work wherein he or she is
considered as an extra pair of hands, or do graded work. In the latter case,
the employee engages in productive work and the employer pays for those
productive hours worked and the insurer only pays the hours foregone.
For example, if an employee engages for 20% in graded work, he gets paid
100% of his pre-sickness wage of which 80% is covered by the insurer and
20% by the employer. As the case managers are hired by the insurer, they
have a direct financial incentive to actively keep track of the individuals’
residual earnings capacity and to try to get the individual to participate in
paid work for as much as deemed possible. With full insurance and full
sick pay coverage, direct financial incentives are obviously less strong for
employers and employees, but they do have an interest in work resumption
anyway. For employers, sickness absence may be costly for other reasons
than wage continuation, non cooperation may lead to an extension of the
waiting period, and potential DI benefit costs after the waiting period
are experience rated. Moreover, non-cooperation with reintegration plans
inhibits the risk of getting fired or loosing eligibility to DI benefits for
sick-listed employees.7
The data used in this chapter come from a private workplace reintegra-
tion provider that is the sole provider of case management for two large
insurers, together holding a market share of about 30% of the insurances
for continued wage payments (Dutch Association of Insurers 2016). The
workplace reintegration provider offers different types of products, from
the registration of sickness absence to case management for individuals
at risk of long term absence. In the current study, we focus on the in-
dividuals assigned to case management. Employers who take out the
‘broad’ insurance package with either of the two insurers are automatically
directed to our workplace reintegration provider for case management.
Those who are only insured against continued wage payments can opt
wage payments and the costs for gatekeeper obligations, 4% has some other type of
package, and 19% does not know what their insurance covers.
7The evidence also confirms that private workplace reintegration providers usually
increase reintegration activities in the waiting period (Everhardt and de Jong 2011). This
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to work with a case manager from within their own company, hire an
external case manager, or hire the services of the case manager of our
workplace reintegration provider.
In a typical case management trajectory a sick-listed employee can
be directed to our workplace reintegration provider when a disability
assessment is made by the company doctor. When there is an indication
for imminent long-term absenteeism at that time and the contract with the
provider includes case management, the employee gets assigned to a case
manager who establishes a more detailed diagnosis and writes the return
to work plan. The assignment of sick-listed employees to case managers
is based on caseload, i.e. the case manager that has time takes on the
sick-listed employee. Stated differently, case managers are not specialized
in specific health problems, sectors, or regions.8
The case managers working at our workplace reintegration provider
are not doctors. Usually, case managers have a background in law, HR, or
(para)medical care. They purely serve as a manager of the reintegration
process: consulting with the occupational physician, keeping in regular
contact with the employer and sick-listed employee, identifying the steps
to be taken by the employer and employee, putting together the return to
work plan, and administrating the process. Based on cost-benefit analysis
case managers can decide to buy rehabilitation products from external
parties, such as paramedical care, job training, and coaching. They do not
provide this care themselves.
4.3 Data
4.3.1 Characteristics of sick-listed employees
We have access to all files on sick-listed employees that were assigned to
case management at our private workplace reintegration provider between
the years 2011 and 2014. We exclude those individuals that hold specific
8The workplace reintegration provider has only one office, located in the center of
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insurance contracts, which include extra services before case management
and/or earlier entry into case management (when there is not yet a risk
of long term sickness). These contracts are predominantly held by self-
employed.9 The client files include characteristics like gender, gross (pre-
sickness) wage earnings, and age. Moreover, they include the exact dates of
the first sick day, of the entry day at the workplace reintegration provider,
and of (partial) recovery. These files are merged to a file containing the
interventions applied to each sick-listed employee and a file containing
information on the assigned case manager. The data covers 11,741 sick-
listed employees that are assigned to 68 case managers.
Table 4.1 shows the characteristics of the sick-listed employees in our
sample. Almost half of the individuals is female and they are on average
42 years old. The time between sick-listing and the sick leave file arriving
at the provider is on average nine weeks, whereas individuals are legally
obliged to start their return to work activities by the eight week. Figure 4.2
shows that roughly half of the individuals do enter case management
before the eighth week of sickness absence. However, it also shows that
there is quite some spread in the moment at which the individuals start
case management. As the elapsed duration until intake is likely to affect
both the likelihood of graded work and work resumption, we should
take this into account in our empirical analysis. We have no information
on possible reintegration efforts by the employer and employee between
the moment of sick-listing and the moment of entry at the workplace
reintegration provider.
Individuals earn on average 255.86 euro a day and mostly work in
small to average sized firms. 32.7% of the individuals has a general
medical condition, 10.7% has physical problems, 20.5% has musculo-
skeletal problems, 30.6% has psychiatric, psychological, or social problems,
4.0% has a conflict at work, and 1.5% has some kind of other condition,
such as flue or complaints due to pregnancy. When it comes to general
medical conditions one must think of individuals who are recovering
from surgery or suffer from chronic illness. The average individual has
9Table 4.12 of Appendix 4.A shows the selection of our data in more detail. As
becomes apparent from the table, we also exclude observations that were assigned to
caseworkers with less than 25 clients in a particular year.
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% female 47.3% 49.6% 45.9% 0.000
age at start case management 42.4 41.9 42.8 0.000
weeks until start case management 9.2 9.3 9.1 0.207
gross pre-sickness wage (euro/day) 255.86 235.12 268.76 0.458
firm size
- 1 employee 15.2% 17.0% 14.1% 0.000
- 2 to 9 employees 36.3% 37.5% 35.5% 0.031
- 10 to 49 employees 35.8% 32.8% 37.7% 0.000
- 50 or more employees 2.6% 1.9% 3.1% 0.000
- number of employees unknown 10.1% 10.9% 9.5% 0.020
type of condition
- general medical - mild 7.7% 10.9% 5.7% 0.000
- general medical - medium 13.5% 11.7% 14.7% 0.000
- general medical - severe 11.5% 10.5% 12.1% 0.007
- physical - mild 7.1% 6.9% 7.3% 0.395
- physical - severe 3.6% 3.3% 3.8% 0.127
- neck, shoulder, arm complaints 6.9% 5.6% 7.7% 0.000
- hip, ankle, knee complaints 6.3% 4.7% 7.4% 0.000
- back complaints 7.3% 6.2% 8.1% 0.000
- psychiatric 1.8% 1.9% 1.7% 0.442
- psychological - mild 11.4% 10.4% 12.0% 0.007
- psychological - severe 2.8% 2.6% 2.9% 0.303
- psychosocial - mild 10.7% 10.1% 11.0% 0.106
- psychosocial - severe 1.8% 1.4% 2.0% 0.004
- social problems 2.1% 2.1% 2.0% 0.751
- conflict 4.0% 8.6% 1.1% 0.000
- otherb 1.5% 3.2% 0.4% 0.000
time spent on claimant (min/week) 17.0 23.1 13.2 0.000
weeks until closing of file 42.1 36.0 45.9 0.000
returns to work within one year 59.6% 53.6% 63.3% 0.000
returns to work within two years 76.7% 59.3% 87.6% 0.000
a Two-sided t-test on difference between sample with graded work and no graded work,
with unequal variances.
b Other contains conditions such as flu and complaints due to pregnancy.
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Figure 4.2: Histogram of application moments.
Figure 4.3: Recovery patterns by type of diagnosis
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17 minutes per week allocated to him by the case manager. Individuals
exit the trajectory on average after 42.1 weeks, with 59.6% of individuals
returning to work within a year, and 76.7% of individuals returning to
work within two years. Figure 4.3 shows the percentage of individuals that
recovered in each sick week, stratified with respect to type of diagnosis.
It should be stressed here that we only consider the individuals that
were directed to the workplace reintegration provider after some period
of sickness. As a result of this type of selection, recovery and work
resumption rates remain close to zero in these first weeks. In line with
expectations, we observe that individuals with less severe problems on
average recover faster than those with more severe problems. The different
type of musculo-skeletal problems (neck/shoulder/arm, hip/ankle/knee,
and back) show similar recovery patterns.
Table 4.1 also shows the characteristics of the sick-listed employees for
those who did and those who did not participate in a graded return-to-
work arrangement. We define an individual to be in graded return-to-work
when his wage value, e.g. the degree of pre-sickness productive work
time resumption, exceeds 0%. Roughly 60% of the individuals in our
data set participate in graded return-to-work at some point during their
sick spell. The two groups are comparable in terms of age, gender, and
moment of application; the differences in means are statistically significant
in some cases, but not substantial. The graded individuals do not earn
significantly more than the non-graded individuals. The compositions
of the groups are slightly different when it comes to the diagnoses. For
example, people who have a conflict at work rarely enter a graded return-
to-work trajectory. Presumably, cooperation of the employer and possibly
work place adaption is more troublesome in situations where there is a
conflict.
Those in graded return-to-work have on average less time devoted to
them by their case manager than those who are not in graded return-to-
work. Despite the longer average sickness duration, those participating
in graded return-to-work have a higher probability of returning to work
in the longer run. This is also reflected in Figure 4.4 showing survival
probabilities and hazard rates for individuals who started a graded return-
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Figure 4.4: Survival and hazard rates for individuals with and
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to-work in the first year of their sick leave and for individuals who did not
start a graded return-to-work in the first year, respectively. Individuals
participating in graded return-to-work have a lower probability to recover
in the first weeks of illness, but start to perform better than those not
participating in graded return-to-work from about the 25th week onward
leading to substantially lower probabilities of non-recovery in the 70th
week. From that point on the lines run roughly parallel to each other.
The hazard rate spikes after the first year of sick-leave and at the end of
the second year. These spikes correspond to the two annual evaluation
moments in the Gatekeeper Protocol.
4.3.2 Characteristics of case managers
Table 4.2 shows case manager characteristics of our sample. We have infor-
mation on 68 case managers, who are predominantly female (70.6%). They
have on average about 68 sick-listed employees assigned to them per year.
There is quite some spread however, with case managers treating up to 123
individuals a year at maximum. We dropped those case manager-years
in which a case manager treated less than 25 individuals in a particular
year.10
In principle individuals are assigned to case managers based on
caseload. That is, new clients are directed to those who have time. How-
ever, there seems to be some clustering at certain case managers based
on gender and type of diseases. More specifically, the spread of the case
manager averages is relatively high for these variables. This could hint at
some form of specialization, in the sense that case managers select those
individuals that they know best how to deal with. However, when it comes
to the diagnoses of the clients, the variation is more likely to be a result
10 In the appendix, we present the results of robustness analyses that take different
cutoffs (see Tables 4.20, 4.21, 4.22 and 4.23 in Appendix 4.B). When setting the cutoff too
low, the average behavior of case managers with only a few clients is more likely to be
a poor representation of grading practices. This will weaken the explanatory power of
the instrument. When setting the cutoff too high, however, many observations need to
be dropped, thus decreasing the efficiency of the estimations. As we will show, both
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Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics of the 68 case managers
mean sd min max
a. characteristics of case manager
female 70.6%
age on 1 Nov 2014 39.1 10.1 25 65
number of clients per year 68.4 23.1 25 123
b. characteristics of the clients of case managers
fraction of clients female 48.5% 14.8% 20.9% 76.6%
average age at start of case management 42.4 1.7 37.6 46.1
weeks until start of case management 9.1 1.1 60.4 11.1
average gross pre-sickness wage (euro/day) 253.08 242.16 76.45 1317.26
median gross pre-sickness wage (euro/day) 108.12 5.04 84.36 110.00
fraction of clients from firm size categories
- 1 employee 15.1% 5.7% 2.6% 30.6%
- 2 to 9 employees 36.5% 5.8% 24.0% 51.9%
- 10 to 49 employees 35.4% 7.8% 13.3% 56.0%
- 50 or more employees 2.8% 3.5% 0.0% 23.1%
- number of employees unknown 10.2% 3.4% 3.6% 18.3%
fraction of clients with condition type
- general medical - mild 8.3% 6.8% 0.0% 28.8%
- general medical - medium 13.3% 6.0% 3.7% 41.0%
- general medical - severe 10.9% 4.6% 0.0% 25.3%
- physical - mild 7.4% 7.0% 0.0% 39.3%
- physical - severe 3.7% 2.8% 0.0% 17.6%
- neck, shoulder, arm complaints 6.7% 3.9% 0.0% 19.0%
- hip, ankle, knee complaints 6.4% 3.8% 0.0% 16.4%
- back complaints 7.2% 3.2% 0.0% 17.5%
- psychiatric 1.7% 1.4% 0.0% 6.3%
- psychological - mild 11.6% 7.8% 0.0% 40.7%
- psychological - severe 2.8% 3.0% 0.0% 19.3%
- psychosocial - mild 10.4% 7.2% 0.0% 33.1%
- psychosocial - severe 1.7% 1.8% 0.0% 8.5%
- social problems 2.3% 3.6% 0.0% 21.4%
- conflict 4.1% 2.5% 0.0% 11.9%
- othera 1.5% 2.0% 0.0% 8.0%
c. activities and results of case managers
fraction of clients in graded work 60.2% 8.2% 33.9% 77.4%
average time allocated to client (min/week) 17.0 3.1 10.6 28.4
average weeks until closing of file 41.0 6.2 21.2 57.2
fraction of clients rtw within one year 60.8% 10.3% 23.3% 92.0%
fraction of clients rtw within two years 76.9% 8.5% 40.7% 94.1%
a ‘Other’ contains conditions such as flu and complaints due to pregnancy.
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of the reporting behavior of the case managers than reflecting selection.
This is because the diagnoses are established by the case managers after
the clients are assigned to them. The results from the sensitivity checks
reported in Section 4.5.4 will show that our results are unlikely to be
driven by potential specialization of case managers.
Case managers differ substantially in their use of graded return-to-
work, with some case managers only having 33.6% of their clients in
graded return-to-work and others having up to 82.6% of their clients
participating in graded return-to-work. Also the average time allocated to
the individuals vary greatly among case managers.
4.3.3 Setup of graded return-to-work trajectories
Within the group of clients that started a graded work trajectory, relevant
outcomes measures are the moment and the degree at which grading
is started. The variable ‘wage value’, which we use to construct our
graded return-to-work index, may contain any integer value ranging
from 0 to 100 and can be updated up to 24 times at maximum in a
two-year-trajectory. Case managers are encouraged to fill in the variable
succinctly, as any degree of work resumption implies lower costs for the
workplace reintegration provider. The extent to which we can use this
detailed information depends on the variation in the graded return-to-
work trajectories. In this section we explore the different trajectories in
detail.
Figure 4.5 shows the percentage of individuals participating in graded
return-to-work in a certain week, where we define five categories of graded
work: 1-20%, 21-40%, 41-60%, 61-80%, and 81-100% of the pre-sickness
wage value, respectively.11 The figure shows that in the first weeks of
sickness individuals usually work modest amounts of time (21-60% graded
work). Towards the 20th week, individuals participate more often in high
degrees of graded work resumption (81-100%) or very low degrees (<20%).
11When calculating this percentage, we include individuals from the first sick day up
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Figure 4.5: Percentage of individuals participating in graded
return-to-work per week.
Table 4.3: Variation in grading practices across case managers.
mean sd min max
average weeks waited until start graded rtw 20.85 2.83 12.56 25.92
average degree of grading at start graded rtw 36.01% 4.24% 28.26% 55.15%
fraction of graded rtw that started:
1 - 8 weeks 13.90% 5.82% 3.85% 31.34%
9 -16 weeks 35.14% 6.39% 22.95% 55.56%
16 - 24 weeks 22.42% 6.07% 8.96% 36.84%
24 - 32 weeks 11.97% 3.84% 3.70% 23.08%
after 32 weeks 16.56% 6.51% 0.00% 28.32%
fraction of graded rtw started at a grade between:
1 - 20% of pre-sickness wage value 26.4% 8.5% 0.0% 47.4%
21 - 40% of pre-sickness wage value 34.6% 7.3% 7.1% 60.0%
41 - 60% of pre-sickness wage value 31.3% 8.7% 17.9% 78.6%
61 - 80% of pre-sickness wage value 4.0% 2.9% 0.0% 15.6%
81 - 100% of pre-sickness wage value 3.7% 2.9% 0.0% 14.3%
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In the later weeks (when most have recovered), those who are still in
graded return-to-work mostly work modest amounts of time, i.e. < 20%
graded work resumption.
Table 4.3 shows the variation in grading practice of the different case
managers. On average case managers wait 20.85 weeks before starting
the graded return-to-work and do so at a degree of 36.01%. The fastest
case manager waits on average 12.56 weeks and the slowest 25.92. The
case manager that starts grading at the lowest degree does so at 28.26%
on average and the one that starts the highest does so at 55.15% on
average. There are some case managers that never start a graded return-
to-work arrangement after 32 weeks, while others start almost a third of
the trajectories that late. Also, some case managers never start a graded
return-to-work arrangement at 1-20% of pre-sickness wage value, whereas
others start almost half the arrangements at this level. We thus conclude
there is quite some variation in the grading practice of the different case
managers.
4.4 Estimation strategy
To identify the effectiveness of graded return-to-work at reducing the
length of sick spells, we use an instrumental variable (IV) method which
was introduced by Duggan (2005). Duggan analyzes how expenses on
new drugs affect total medical expenditures by exploiting the variation
in psychiatrists’ preferences in drugs prescription as an instrument for
individual expenses on certain types of new drugs. In a similar fash-
ion, more recent applications exploit variation in strictness of disability
examiners and judges in awarding disability benefits (French and Song
2014, Maestas et al. 2013) and the propensities of employment offices
or individual caseworkers to use certain interventions (Dean et al. 2015,
Markussen and Røed 2014, Markussen et al. 2017, Rehwald et al. 2016).
Our approach is most similar to Markussen et al. (2012), who exploit
variation in physicians’ use of graded absence certificates to identify the
effect of part-time sick leave on absence duration.
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In our case, employees are send to the reintegration provider after
some weeks of absence. The provider assigns them to case managers
that have substantial discretionary room in choosing specific treatments.
Case managers are encouraged to use graded return-to-work whenever
possible. However, the actual grading practice may vary among the
case managers. First, this is because different case managers may make
different assessments of when an individual is ready to start graded
return-to-work and the individuals’ ability to work. Second, one cannot
simply assign an individual to graded return-to-work in all relevant work
environments. The case manager has to negotiate the possibilities of
adapted work duties with the employer, who is not always willing to allow
for such flexibility (Wainwright et al. 2011).12 One case manager may be
better in this negotiation process than the other, speeding up the process
towards graded return-to-work. Hence, whether an individual participates
in graded return-to-work and when he starts to do so, may depend on the
case manager he is assigned to. This means the case manager’s propensity
to grade can be used to instrument the graded return-to-work variable.
Within the context of the current analysis, the validity of instrumental
variables estimation essentially requires four conditions to be met. First,
the probability of graded work should be affected by the concerning
case managers’ propensity to use a graded work for all other individuals
that are assigned to him (‘relevance’). In light of the time span of four
years that is covered, assuming the tendency to use graded work to be
constant over time may be too restrictive. Case managers may change
their behavior over time, as they may learn from earlier experiences. We
therefore construct propensities by case manager for each year in our
sample. This also potentially increases the efficiency of our estimates.13
Our second condition for IV to work is that sick listed individuals
are assigned randomly to case managers. Stated differently, this implies
that sick-listed individuals with long and short expected sick durations
12When performing a decomposition analysis of the observed variation in graded-work
applications across case managers and employers, we see indeed that the individual’s
employer is more important than the individual’s case manager. As long as individual’s
are randomly assigned to case managers, however, this does not burden our analysis. At
most, it decreases the efficiency of our method.
13At the same time, the sample size per case manager per time unit should be sufficient.
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do not cluster among certain case managers. With the information on
sick-listed workers in our data, we can test for randomness by excluding
client characteristics in our model. If this yields different coefficient values
for graded work, this suggests there is clustering on worker types. In a
similar vein, we can re-run the analyses while excluding case managers
who have abnormal client group compositions. The results of both of these
analyses are reported in Section 4.5.4. Obviously, testing for clustering on
unobservable characteristics is more complex, but it should be stressed that
case managers did not receive more information than the registered data
we have. This renders it plausible there was no selection on unobservables.
Third, we rely upon the assumption that graded work effects are not
correlated with the general ability of case managers in getting individuals
back to work (i.e., the ‘exclusion restriction’). For instance, if high quality
case managers have a strong tendency to use graded work, the IV model
will overestimate the effect of graded work. We therefore will conduct
various sensitivity tests that use proxies for the overall quality of case
managers. In particular, such proxies include both current and lagged
work resumption rates for clients that were assigned to case managers or
work resumption rates for individuals that were on graded work already
at the moment of intake. The results of these analyses are reported in
Section 4.5.4
Finally, individuals who would not be treated by a high propensity
case manager, should also not be treated by a low propensity case manager.
This monotonicity assumption implies that the graded work propensities
should impact all individuals equally in our sample. For instance, this
assumption may be violated if one case manager is more inclined to use
graded work for individuals with mental issues, but less inclined to use
graded work for individuals with musculo-skeletal problems. With this
in mind, we will conduct tests on the equality of graded work propensity
impacts on the actual use of graded work – i.e, the first stage estimates.
The results of these checks are reported in Section 4.5.4.
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Specification of the effect of graded work 4.4.1
When specifying the IV model that estimates the effect of graded-work on
the incidence of work resumption and the number of sickness weeks, we
closely follow Markussen and Røed (2014) and Rehwald et al. (2016). In
these analyses, the aim is to estimate the effect of the provision of graded
work (G). As we will show later on, we extend their analysis in two ways.
First, we will develop propensities for the weeks waited until the start
of graded work (W). For the individuals with graded work, this enables
us to estimate the impact of the timing of graded work on full work
resumption. Second, we will focus on the impact of the level of graded
work at the start of a graded work trajectory (S). For ease of exposition,
we will consider a single time period for which we construct case manager
propensities. As argued above, we can extend this by allowing for case
manager propensities for each year in our sample.
To start with, we structure the cross sectional data on the sick-listed
individuals to a panel where every period t corresponds to one week. We
include all individual-weeks in the first year of the sick-spell up to and
including the week in which graded work started or, in case of the absence
of a graded work treatment, until the sick spell ended (i.e., individual went
back to work or entered the DI scheme). Then, we run an OLS regression
on a dummy indicating whether the individual is or is not starting to
participate in graded work that week. In this regression we control for time
constant individual characteristics xi for individual i (e.g. age, age squared,
sex, sick type, log gross (pre-sickness) wage, log gross (pre-sickness) wage
squared, firm size, year of application, type of insurance contract, sick
duration until application at the re-integration office), together with period
dummies (dateit), and dummies for all possible outcomes of elapsed sick
weeks (dit):
gradedijt = x′i θ
g + δ
g
1 dit + δ
g
2 dateit + u
g
ijt, (4.1)
i = 1, . . . n (individuals),
j = 1, . . . J (case managers),
t = 1, . . . T (periods),
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where uijt is i.i.d. and clustered at the level of case manager-year combi-
nations. The parameters θg, δg1 and δ
g
2 describe the effects of individual
characteristics, the elapsed sick weeks and period dummies, respectively.
Using the estimated individual errors ûgijt, we next construct the case
manager propensities to treat ψgi . We sum the errors over the periods for






where Ti is the last period individual i is at risk of making a transition
into treatment. Following Markussen and Røed (2014) and Rehwald et al.
(2016), ûgij can be interpreted as the difference between the duration until
treatment of individual i and the average duration until treatment for
individuals with the same pre-treatment characteristics as individual i.
We next take the average of all ûgij per case manager, while leaving out û
g
ij





nj − 1 ∑k∈N−ij
ûgkj, (4.3)
where Nj is the set of individuals corresponding to case manager j. For
ease of interpretation, we rescale these ψgi from 0 to 1, with 0 indicating
the lowest propensity to use graded work and 1 indicating the highest
propensity to use graded work.
In order to estimate the effect of graded return-to-work on the prob-
ability to return to work (yi), we collapse the data to one observation
per individual. This observation may either be the probability of work
resumption or the number of weeks that have been worked over a certain
time window. We estimate the effect of having participated in graded
return-to-work on the return-to-work probability, using the propensity to
grade (ψgi ) as an instrumental variable. We control for the same individual
characteristics as in the propensity regressions. This yields the following
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IV model:
yi = x′i β
g + γg Ĝi + �
g
i , (4.4)
Gi = x′i π





Specification of the effect of timing and initial degree of
graded work
4.4.2
Following the IV estimation procedures as in equations (1) to (5), the
variation in graded-work propensities of case managers that we exploit
essentially stems from two sources. First, case managers show differences
in the likelihood of starting graded work interventions. Second, there
is variation in the timing of treatments across case managers for those
individuals that start graded work. To estimate the isolated impact of the
duration until graded return-to-work on absence duration, we select only
those individuals that enter graded return-to-work at some point during
their sickness absence, next recalculate the propensities as explained in
equations (1), (2), and (3) and denote these as ψwi . Next, for this sub-sample
of individuals, we define the variable Wi as the number of weeks until the
start of graded return-to-work for individual i and estimate the effect of
this variable on the absence durations using ψwi as an instrument:
yi = x′i β
w + γw Ŵi + �wi , (4.6)
Wi = x′i π
w + αw ψwi + η
w
i . (4.7)
As with any IV model, it is important to stress at this point that our
parameter of interest in the above equation, γw, should be interpreted as a
local average treatment effect (LATE). This parameter denotes the effect of
waiting one week extra before starting the trajectory on absence duration
for those individuals. This result does not necessarily extrapolate to all
individuals or to the whole support of the weeks waited variable, Wi.
Our data also allow us to focus on the tendency of case managers to
start graded work at a high or low degree. For this purpose, we calculate
a propensity based only on the percentage of pre-sickness hours worked
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during the first week of graded return-to-work, i.e. the starting level
denoted by Sij, for the selected sample of individuals with graded work.
We estimate a regression corresponding to equation (1),
Sij = x′i θ
s + δs1 di + δ
s
2 datei + u
s
ij, (4.8)
i = 1, . . . n (individuals),
j = 1, . . . J (case managers), (4.9)
where usij is i.i.d. and clustered with respect to case manager-year combi-
nations. Based on the outcomes of this regression, we calculate similar
propensities as in equation (4.3) for individual i with case manager j. We
denote these as ψsi . We instrument the initial degree of grading with the
average initial degree of grading for all other sick listed workers that were
assigned to this case manager. This enables us to conduct an IV regression
as above using the degree of graded work resumption rate at the start of
graded return-to-work as the intervention:
yi = x′i β
s + γs Ŝi + �si , (4.10)
Si = x′i π




4.5.1 Overall effects of graded return-to-work
Table 4.4 shows the effects of graded return-to-work trajectories on (1) a
dummy variable indicating whether the sick-listed employee returned to
work within 1 year; (2) a dummy variable indicating whether the sick-
listed employee returned to work within 2 years; (3) the number of weeks
worked in the first year; (4) the number of weeks worked in the first two
years. Panel a shows the OLS results, panel b shows the IV results and
panel c shows the reduced form or ‘Intention-to-treat’ estimates for the case
manager propensity measure. The results for the regressions underlying
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the propensities and the estimated coefficients for the control variables of
the regressions are shown in Tables 4.15 and 4.16 of Appendix 4.B.
Columns 1 to 4 of Table 4.4 present the baseline results, where we
consider an individual as treated if he enters a graded return-to-work
trajectory within the first year of sick leave.14 Based on the OLS results,
one would conclude that graded return-to-work trajectories have substan-
tial and positive rehabilitation effects. The IV estimates however show
only moderate and statistically insignificant effects, suggesting positive
selection into the treatment. This is best illustrated by the outcomes at
the end of the second year. The OLS estimates indicate a 30 percent-
age point increase in return to work probabilities for individuals on a
graded return-to-work trajectory, whereas the IV estimates show only a
7.5 percentage point (insignificant) increase. Similarly, the reduced form
estimates indicate that individuals assigned to a case manager with the
highest propensity to use graded return-to-work are only 2 percentage
point (insignificant) more likely to rehabilitate within two years than those
assigned to the case manager with the lowest propensity to use graded
work.
Columns 5 to 8 of Table 4.4 show the results when only considering
graded return-to-work trajectories which started in the first 26 weeks of
sick leave as a treatment (individuals who started a graded return-to-work
trajectory after the 26 weeks are considered untreated). Compared to
the earlier results with 52 weeks as a maximum, there are noticeable
differences in the effects. The probability to return to work increases
with 30.8 percentage point compared to 12.7 percentage point and the
number of weeks worked increases with 8.9 weeks compared to 1.2. One
explanation for this difference in outcomes is that graded return-to-work
trajectories are more effective when started earlier, which is the hypothesis
we will further explore in Section 4.5.2. Another explanation is that there
is a lock-in for graded return-to-work trajectories that occurs in the first
145.3% of untreated individuals do start a graded return-to-work trajectory in the
second year of sick leave. Since these trajectories start later in time than outcome
variables (1) and (3), we consider these individuals as untreated. When we do consider
them as treated and estimate the effects at the end of the two year waiting period,
outcome variables (2) and (4), we find slightly smaller effects: return to work probabilities
increase by 0.0488 (0.112), the number of weeks worked increases by 1.728 (8.680).
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weeks of grading. If so, we would expect differences in effectiveness of
graded work to fade out over time. This is confirmed when comparing
the long-term effects that are shown in column 2 and 6 of Table 4.4.
To illustrate the evolution of the effects in more detail, Figure 4.6 shows
the effects of graded return-to-work trajectories that started in the first
half year on the return to work probability as well as the number of weeks
worked. The effect on the return-to-work probabilities is increasing up to
week 46, after which the effect declines. It appears that graded return-to-
work speeds up the recovery process, with the return-to-work probabilities
being almost equal after two years. In line with this, the steep increase in
weeks worked between week 40 and 60 does not persist, such that the line
flattens out towards the end of the second year.
The effect of graded return-to-work spells started in the first half year
on weeks worked in the first year is comparable to the effect found in
Markussen et al. (2012) with data from sick-listed workers in Norway. They
find that part-time sick leave decreases the absence spells with eight to ten
weeks. Rehwald et al. (2016) find substantially bigger results, amounting
to a 30 week increase in weeks in regular employment in the first year.15
Contrary to our results, both Markussen et al. (2012) and Rehwald et al.
(2016) find positive long run effects. The first shows that employment
two years after sick listing increases with 16 to 21 percentage point, the
latter finds a increase of 27 weeks worked during the second year and an
increase of 26 weeks in the third year. When comparing these outcomes
with ours, one should bear in mind that employers in the Netherlands are
committed to facilitate the return-to-work for the sick-listed workers for at
least two years. Accordingly, we may expect that individuals in the control
group – i.e., those without graded return-to-work – are likely to receive
other services. This in turn may explain why the long-term impacts we
find are smaller and insignificant. Still, our evidence also suggests that
graded return-to-work may speed up the recovery process, particularly
when starting early.
15Markussen et al. (2012) only consider grading decisions made within the first eight
weeks of sick leave. In the field experiment of Rehwald et al. (2016), graded return-to-
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Figure 4.6: Cumulative effects of graded work per sick weeks
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Effects of the timing and initial level of graded work 4.5.2
We argued earlier that both the timing and the initial level of graded
work may determine the effectiveness of graded work trajectories. To
investigate the importance of these two parameters, we select the sample
of individuals who entered a graded return-to-work trajectory in the first
year of their sick leave. Using a similar setup as for our benchmark model,
we first estimate the effect of starting a graded return-to-work trajectory
one week later on the outcome measure. The results are reported in
Panel a of Table 4.5. The first stage results show that being assigned to
the case manager with the highest propensity of graded work leads to
a four week reduction in waiting time until graded return-to-work, as
compared to the case manager with the lowest propensity. The second
stage results indicate that waiting one week extra before starting graded
return-to-work, decreases the probability to rehabilitate within one year
with 4.4 percentage point, whereas the probability to return to work within
two years is not affected. This again suggests that graded return-to-work
speeds up the recovery process, rather than increasing the long-term
probability of recovery. Starting graded return-to-work one week later
results in a trajectory that lasts half a week longer, so that the number
of weeks worked in the first year decreases by 1.5. When taking a time
horizon of two years, the number of weeks worked even decreases by 2.2.
In panel b of Table 4.5 we consider the effect of the level of work
resumption at the start of the graded return-to-work trajectory on work
resumption. In this setup, the instrument orders case managers in terms of
their preference to start a return-to-work trajectory at high levels of graded
work resumption. As the table shows, being assigned to a case manager
that tends to start trajectories at high rates rather than to one that tends
to start at low rates, increases the starting level of work resumption by 25
percentage point. From the second stage estimates we infer that starting
at a 10 percentage point higher level of grading results in a 6 percentage
point higher chance of recovering in the first year.16 The return to work
16Note that more than 90 % of the trajectories have an initial degree of graded work
that is less than 60%. Accordingly, variation in the degrees we study typically reflects
differences between one, two or three days of working at the start of graded work.
524582-L-sub01-bw-Kools
Processed on: 20-9-2018
148 Graded Return-to-Work Chapter 4
Table 4.5: Effect of starting graded return-to-work one week later or at a
higher starting level: IV estimates.
Returned to work Weeks worked in
1 year 2 years week 1-52 week 1-104
a. Duration until start of graded return to work trajectory
Sick weeks until grading start -0.044*** -0.001 -1.497*** -2.177***
(0.010) (0.005) (0.257) (0.489)
n 5,906 5,906 5,906 5,906
R2 -0.028 0.033 0.105 0.111
stage 1: ψ[weeks waited] -3.935***
(0.791)
b. Level of work resumption at start (linear specification)
Starting level (0-100) 0.006*** 0.003** 0.135*** 0.318***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.052) (0.111)
n 5,913 5,913 5,913 5,913
R2 0.142 0.018 0.314 0.199
stage 1: Ψ[degree grading] 25.37***
(0.564)
Control variables include gender, age, wage, sick weeks until application, year dum-
mies, medical conditions, contract types and firm size.
Propensities are calculated on the sample of graded individuals. Claimants are
excluded when their assigned case manager graded fewer than 25 claimants in the
same year as the claimant.
Clustered (case manager - year) standard errors between parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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probability for the first two years is increased by 2.5 percentage point.
The number of weeks worked in the first year increases by 1.4, whereas
individuals work 3.2 additional weeks in the first two years. This suggests
that a higher initial level of grading also improves long-term recovery
rates. It may thus be that giving sick-listed individuals an easy start by
re-introducing them to work for a very limited amount of hours, may
actually harm them. It may be that the potential positive effects of graded
work cannot be established if the individual cannot properly participate
in work processes and is not viewed as a full-fledged employee.
Effects for different types of medical conditions 4.5.3
Table 4.6 shows IV estimates for samples of specific medical conditions that
are registered by the reintegration provider. Panel a shows the baseline
estimates for all graded return-to-work trajectories and panel b those for
all graded return-to-work trajectories started in the first 26 weeks. The
first stage estimation results are similar in size across medical conditions,
suggesting that the extent to which case managers can affect the use of
graded work is equal across groups in the first 26 weeks of absence. The
second stage estimates however vary across medical conditions. While
graded return-to-work increases first year return-to-work probabilities
substantially for general medical as well as musculo-skeletal problems,
it seems to have little effect on workers with mental problems. This
corresponds with the findings of Høgelund et al. (2010) and Andren (2014)
who both find no effects of graded return-to-work for individuals with
mental disorders, but positive effects for individuals with other disorders.
Also Hernæs (2017) finds larger effects for individuals with musculo-
skeletal problems, than for individuals with psychological problems. After
two years of sickness, the effect for individuals with musculo-skeletal
problems tends to zero, whereas the effect for individuals with general
medical problems remains high. This suggests that graded work can
be meaningful for individuals with chronic illnesses or individuals that
recover from medical treatments.
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Table 4.6: IV estimation results on work resumption for different medical
conditions.
General medical Musculo-skeletal Mental
Returned to work Returned to work Returned to work
1 year 2 years 1 year 2 years 1 year 2 years
a. Overall effect: trajectories started week 1-52
Graded rtw 0.572* 0.563** 0.477 -0.203 -0.0234 -0.108
(0.327) (0.244) (0.540) (0.413) (0.352) (0.373)
stage 1: 0.191*** 0.155 0.170**
Ψ[graded rtw] (0.072) (0.095) (0.074)
b. Overall effect: trajectories started week 1-26
Graded rtw 0.789*** 0.468** 0.539* -0.061 0.051 -0.259
(0.238) (0.205) (0.323) (0.261) (0.261) (0.296)
stage 1: 0.281*** 0.229*** 0.266***
Ψ[graded rtw] (0.066) (0.076) (0.079)
c. Duration until start trajectory
Sick weeks until -0.040** -0.0003 -0.016 0.016 -0.010 0.030*
start grading (0.017) (0.008) (0.011) (0.010) (0.018) (0.017)
stage 1: -5.025*** -5.179*** -3.559**
Ψ[weeks waited] (1.704) (1.738) (1.402)
d. Initial degree of grading
Starting level (%) 0.005* 0.002 0.010*** 0.003 0.007*** 0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
stage 1: 30.59*** 23.31*** 26.71***
Ψ[degree graded] (0.859) (1.141) (0.841)
The group ‘general medical’ consists of individuals with the conditions general
medical - mild/medium/severe. The group musculo-skeletal consists of individual
with the conditions neck, shoulder, arm, hip, ankle, knee or back complaints. The
group mental consists of individuals with the conditions psychiatric, psychological -
mild/severe, psychosocial - mild/severe or social problems. Individuals with physical
mild/severe conditions are not considered because of the small sample size. Also
individuals labels as ‘other’ or having a conflict are excluded. Control variables
include gender, age, wage, sick weeks until application, year dummies, medical
conditions, contract types and firm size. Claimants are excluded when their assigned
case manager treated fewer than 10 claimants of the same type in the same year as
the claimant. Panels a and b are based on 3,971 observations with general medical
conditions, 1,947 with musculo-skeletal conditions, and 3,380 with conditions related
to mental health. Panels c and d are based on 1,667 observations with general medical
conditions, 982 with musculo-skeletal conditions, and 1,807 with conditions related to
mental health. Clustered (case manager - year) standard errors between parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Panels c and d of Table 4.6 show the effects of the timing and initial
level of graded work on work resumption for different medical conditions,
respectively. Starting the trajectory one week later decreases the probability
to return to work for individuals with general medical problems within one
year with 4 percentage point, but the effect becomes small and insignificant
after two years of absence. For musculo-skeletal conditions we do not find
any significant effects on the probability to return to work. There also
is no evidence of effects of starting later in the short run for individuals
with mental conditions. In the long run, it even seems harmful to start
graded work early for this group. In particular, the effect of starting the
graded return-to-work trajectory one week later amounts to an increase in
the probability to return to work within two years that is equal to about
3 percentage point. Finally, starting at a higher initial level of graded
work resumption results in higher probabilities to return to work after one
year and no significant effect after two years for all three types of medical
conditions. The results for weeks worked correspond to the results for the
return-to-work probability and can be found in Table 4.19 of Appendix 4.B.
Sensitivity tests 4.5.4
Endogeneity and specialization
We stated earlier that new clients were assigned to case managers based
only on their caseload. As a result, there would be no specialization
of case managers that could result in a positive correlation between the
propensity to grade and the likelihood to return to work for reasons other
than graded return-to-work itself. Based on observed characteristics of
clients that are assigned to the same case managers, we can test for this
assumption and biases that may stem from specialization. At the same
time, we should bear in mind that for analyses based on samples of graded
individuals only, there may be non-random selection – even if there is no
specialization to start with. This may occur if for instance case managers
that only grade few individuals do this because they only grade the most
easy cases, which are also easy to grade early and at a high starting degree.
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In that case, there will be a positive correlation between the weeks waited
propensity (or the degree grading propensity) and the likelihood to return
to work, for other reasons than starting the trajectory early (or starting at
a high degree).
To ensure that potential non-random distribution of clients over case
managers does not affect our results, we run a set of sensitivity analyses
which are reported in Tables 4.7 and 4.8. As the most prominent effects
on graded work were found in the first year of absence, we focus on
the return-to-work dummy within one year as the variable that is to be
explained. First, we re-run the regressions while excluding specific sets
of covariates. If these covariates are correlated with both the probability
to recover as well as the propensity to grade, the baseline analysis is
subject to omitted variable bias. We exclude sick types in column (2), sick
weeks until application in column (3), and all covariates expect the time
dummies in column (4). Overall, the results are similar to the baseline. As
for the overall effect estimates for trajectories that started in weeks 1 to
52, we find the most substantial difference from the baseline occurs when
excluding all variables, with a decrease in the point estimate from 0.127
(0.122) to -0.0270 (0.132); see table 4.7 panel a. Coefficient estimates are
hardly affected when we concentrate on trajectories starting in the first
26 weeks of absence; see table 4.7 panel b. It is only when we exclude
the sick type dummies that the point estimate increases from 0.380 to
0.477. To put these findings in perspective, it is important to bear in mind
that sick type is not known at the start of the case management trajectory,
but determined by the case manager after the client is assigned to him.
Differences in reporting a condition for example as general medical or
physical, may be influenced by case manager beliefs. These beliefs may
in turn be correlated with the propensity to grade. A similar explanation
may also hold for the change in the effect estimate of the initial degree of
grading that occurs when we exclude sick type dummies – see table 4.8
panel b. In all cases, the sizes of the difference in point estimates do not
lead to concerns about the validity of our approach.
As a second sensitivity check, we exclude case managers with abnor-
mal client group compositions. We define a group composition by the
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group averages of the characteristics of the clients per case manager-year
combination. If a group average of one of the characteristics is more than
three (column 4) or two (column 5) standard deviations away from the
mean of the group averages the group composition is defined as abnormal.
In effect, it means that if a case managers has an extremely high or low
number of clients of the same sick type or gender or extremely high or
low average ages, sick duration until application at the office, or wage
levels among his clients, the clients belonging to this case manager in the
respective year are removed from the sample. Excluding these observa-
tions results in slightly smaller point estimates than the baseline, but not
statistically significantly different.
Finally, we have conducted similar sensitivity tests that apply to the
sample with individuals with graded work only – i.e., the analyses on
timing and initial degree of graded work. In particular, we add the
propensity used in table 4.7 panel a to the regressions in table 4.8, to check
if the weeks waited and probability to recover are correlated with the
overall propensity to grade.17 With results that are virtually identical, the
picture that emerges is that sample selection effects are negligible.
Case manager quality
Graded return-to-work is only one of the pieces in the case manager’s
toolbox. He may also make use of other interventions such as paramedical
care, job training, or coaching. Or he may assert control by contacting
the employee at the right moments and giving valuable advice. A case
manager thus can be effective in many different ways. For the validity
of our approach, we assume that the case managers’ propensity to grade
is not correlated with overall case manager quality – i.e., the exclusion
restriction. This assumption may not hold when, for example, high quality
case managers are also better at motivating the employer and employee
in setting up graded return-to-work arrangements, so that there exists a
17The correlation between the propensity to grade and the weeks waited propensity
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positive correlation between the propensity to grade and the likelihood
to return to work for reasons other than graded return-to-work itself. Or,
on the contrary, it could be that lower quality case managers tend to
overestimate the ability of individuals to participate in graded return-to-
work and enter individuals in graded return-to-work too early, leading to
a negative correlation between propensities to grade and the likelihood to
return to work.
A straightforward measure of case manager quality is his success: does
he or she manage to get individuals back to work quickly? Similar to
the propensity to grade, we therefore define a ‘propensity to cure’ that
measures the ability of the case manager to get individuals, other that
the individual concerned, back to work quickly. Column (2) of Table 4.9
shows the results of the IV regressions when we control for case manager
quality using this propensity to cure. Again, we take the return-to-work
within one year as the relevant outcome measure. Being appointed to the
highest quality case manager rather than the lowest quality case manager
increases the likelihood to return to work with 36 percentage point. At the
same time, the effect of graded return-to-work itself decreases to -0.027
when all trajectories are considered and to 0.191 when only the trajectories
in the first half year are considered. Following these results, one could
conclude that half of the effect of the graded return-to-work trajectories
started in the first half year could actually be ascribed to general case
manager quality and grading itself is less effective on its own.
That being said, using case manager quality in the way described may
be problematic for the same reason as not controlling for quality at all. In
particular, the overall quality that we measure may partly be due to the
appropriate usage of graded return-to-work, such that the propensity may
absorb a too large part of the effect.18 Under the assumption that case
manager quality is relatively constant19, but the usage of graded work
may vary, we could partly resolve this problem by using a lagged quality
18The correlation between the propensity to grade (within the first half year) and the
propensity to cure is 0.200.
19In principle some may have more natural ability at the job than others. At the same
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Table 4.9: Sensitivity tests for the importance of case manager quality
Dependent: (1) (2) (3) (4)
rtw within 1 year Baseline Quality: Propensity to cure
Regular Lagged Graded at start
a. Overall effect: trajectories started in week 1-52
Graded rtw 0.127 -0.027 0.266* 0.080
(0.122) (0.088) (0.143) (0.133)
Ψ[cure] 0.356*** 0.202*** 0.143***
(0.044) (0.071) (0.038)
stage 1: Ψ[graded rtw] 0.270*** 0.277*** 0.267*** 0.268***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.032) (0.027)
stage 1: Ψ[cure] -0.059* -0.091** -0.008
(0.030) (0.037) (0.023)
b. Overall effect: trajectories started in week 1-26
Graded rtw 0.380*** 0.191** 0.396*** 0.323**
(0.125) (0.085) (0.123) (0.133)
Ψ[cure] 0.342*** 0.188*** 0.137***
(0.043) (0.060) (0.035)
stage 1: Ψ[graded rtw] 0.268*** 0.268*** 0.284*** 0.257***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.030) (0.031)
stage 1: Ψ[cure] -0.0004 -0.036 0.004
(0.028) (0.034) (0.021)
c. Duration until start of trajectory
Weeks waited -0.044*** -0.041*** -0.048*** -0.050***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011)
Ψ[cure] 0.153** 0.074 0.063
(0.061) (0.083) (0.053)
stage 1: Ψ[weeks waited] -3.935*** -3.970*** -4.125*** -3.490***
(0.791) (0.791) (0.833) (0.848)
stage 1: Ψ[cure] 0.398 0.165 -0.324
(0.894) (1.094) (0.741)
d. Initial degree of grading
Degree grading (0-100) 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.005** 0.006***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Ψ[cure] 0.157** 0.068 0.065
(0.066) (0.080) (0.046)
stage 1: Ψ[degree grading] 25.37*** 25.43*** 25.51*** 25.25***
(0.564) (0.574) (0.757) (0.608)
stage 1: Ψ[cure] -0.712 0.560 1.146**
(0.709) (0.810) (0.505)
Claimants excluded when the assigned case manager treated fewer than 25 claimants
that year. Panels a and b based upon 11,741 observations of which 8,319 remain in
column (3) and 10,244 in column (4). Panels c and d based upon 5,913 observations of
which 4,408 remain in column (3) and 5,591 in column (4). Baseline results for the
subsample of column (3): a. 0.180 (0.131); b. 0.355*** (0.122); c. -0.0483*** (0.00973);
d. 0.00510** (0.00236). Baseline results for the subsample of column (4): a. 0.107
(0.138); b. 0.360*** (0.139); c. -0.0515*** (0.0114); d. 0.00596*** (0.00209). Clustered
(case manager - year) se in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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measure. Using a lagged quality measure as a control variable, we find
point estimates of the effect of graded work – as shown in panels a and
b – that are virtually equal to those in the baseline model. Moreover, the
maximum effect of case manager quality on work resumption is about 20
percentage point.20
Lastly, the original data set also included individuals that already
participated in graded return-to-work before entering case management.
These individuals were excluded from the sample for the baseline regres-
sions, as the case manager had no influence on their graded return-to-work
status. As an auxiliary source of information, we calculated the case man-
agers’ propensity to cure on the sample of individuals graded at the start,
for each case manager-year combination with at least ten observation in
the sample graded at start. As such, we have a proxy of case manager
quality apart apart from the ability to appropriately use graded return-
to-work.21 Using this measure of quality we find only a slight decrease
in the point estimate of graded work. Based on these estimates, it thus
seems that the quality of the case manager does not drive the effects we
find. Being appointed to the highest quality case manager rather than the
lowest quality case manager does increase the likelihood to return to work
with about 14 percentage point.
We have also conducted the above-mentioned sensitivity tests on the
regressions for the effects of the timing and the initial degree of grading.
As panels c and d of Table 4.9 show, including proxies for case manager
quality does not change these results considerably. This suggests that high
quality case managers may be inclined to use graded work more often,
but not at an earlier stage or at a higher starting level than low quality
case managers.
20When we assume case manager quality is fully constant over time, we could also
control for it using case manager fixed effects. In that case the effect of graded return-
to-work trajectories started in the first half year on work resumption within one year is
estimated at 0.268.
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Table 4.10: First stage results for detailed subcategories
subgroup overall: started in N duration initial N




general medical 0.174* 0.175 907 -1.040 24.17*** 348
- mild (0.104) (0.109) (1.393) (6.003)
general medical 0.343*** 0.334*** 1,588 -6.012** 24.65*** 895
- medium (0.067) (0.067) (2.458) (3.580)
general medical 0.198*** 0.202*** 1,350 -8.520*** 32.40*** 632
- severe (0.075) (0.075) (2.387) (4.770)
physical 0.177* 0.120 838 -0.757 25.16*** 455
- mild (0.093) (0.092) (2.647) (7.668)
physical 0.488*** 0.495*** 427 1.166 29.52*** 216
- severe (0.099) (0.101) (2.103) (5.026)
neck, shoulder, arm 0.179 0.228* 810 -0.311 32.03*** 463
complaints (0.146) (0.127) (4.670) (10.29)
hip, ankle, knee 0.318*** 0.391*** 743 -7.416*** 20.91*** 447
complaints (0.106) (0.105) (2.158) (5.683)
back complaints 0.081 0.036 860 5.988 50.97 477
(0.232) (0.222) (9.330) (35.04)
psychiatric 0.043 0.082 210 -10.67 11.64 86
(0.196) (0.195) (8.060) (9.802)
psychological 0.140* 0.172** 1,338 -1.664 24.19*** 687
- mild (0.077) (0.085) (1.924) (4.475)
psychological 0.042 -0.116 328 -10.58 -2.960 146
- severe (0.173) (0.162) (6.954) (12.57)
psychosocial 0.370*** 0.288*** 1,254 -2.800 20.93*** 706
- mild (0.084) (0.098) (2.144) (3.369)
psychosocial 0.445*** -0.001 209 1.262 33.69*** 127
- severe (0.156) (0.169) (7.123) (8.998)
social problems 0.423*** 0.481*** 244 -7.968*** 29.91*** 137
(0.096) (0.101) (2.301) (4.790)
conflict 0.228 0.440** 464 -1.023 14.54* 67
(0.197) (0.187) (3.003) (8.334)
othera 0.269** 0.247** 171 -0.255 38.80** 24
(0.110) (0.106) (5.230) (15.41)
F-test on equality of coefficients:
F(15, 181) / F(15,130) 1.98 1.94 1.70 1.53
p-value 0.0190 0.0220 0.0578 0.1049
a ‘Other’ contains conditions such as flue and complaints due to pregnancy.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 4.11: First stage results for rough subcategories
subgroup overall: started in N duration initial N




general medical 0.261*** 0.176 3,845 -5.752*** 27.18*** 1,875
(0.049) (0.108) (1.344) (2.166)
musculo-skeletal 0.298*** 0.333*** 2,413 -5.367*** 25.85*** 1,387
(0.060) (0.067) (1.377) (2.621)
mental 0.246*** 0.207*** 3,373 -2.527* 21.40*** 1,803
(0.048) (0.075) (1.430) (2.623)
F-test on equality of coefficients:
F(2,181) / F(2, 130) 0.21 1.15 1.68 1.00
p 0.8094 0.3186 0.1909 0.3701
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Monotonicity
For the interpretation of our results as local average treatment effects, we
need instrumental monotonicity to hold. That is, an individual who would
not be treated when assigned to a high propensity case manager, should
also not be treated when assigned to a low propensity case manager.
This would be violated if certain case managers are more likely to grade
individuals with psychological problems, whereas other case managers
are more likely to grade individuals with musculo-skeletal complaints.
The correlation between the case managers propensity to grade and the
individuals grading status should thus be roughly equal for each subgroup
of individuals. Table 4.10 shows the first stage correlation coefficients for
each subgroup of diagnosis. For most diagnoses these are comparable,
but not for all. When clustering sick types to the subgroups that we have
used earlier in section 4.5.3, however, we get first-stage results that are
very similar (Table 4.11). It thus appears that the differences in first-stage
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Conclusion 4.6
In this chapter we investigate the conditions under which graded return-
to-work arrangements are most effective at rehabilitating sick-listed em-
ployees. We use administrative data from a Dutch private rehabilitation
provider and exploit the differences in grading practices between case
managers to identify the effect of graded return-to-work. Our analysis
relies on the fact that the assignment of new sick-listed clients to case
managers is based on caseload. Based on this assumption, we effectively
compare the full work resumption rates of case managers with a high
propensity to grade to those with a low propensity to grade. We extend
this method by also constructing propensities for the speed of starting
graded work and the initial level of graded work.
Generally, we find positive effects of graded return-to-work on the
number of weeks worked by sick-listed workers. When initiated in the
first half year of sick leave, graded return-to-work increases the probability
to return to work within one year by 38 percentage point. After two
years of absence, however, we do not find statistically significant effects
on the probability to return to work. Graded return-to-work increases the
number of weeks worked in the first two years after sick-listing with 18
weeks. Overall, these results suggest that graded return-to-work speeds
up the recovery process, rather than having a permanent impact on work
resumption.
Our evidence suggests that the timing of graded work and the initial
level of graded work are crucial determinants of the success of trajectories.
Broadly speaking, graded work trajectories should start early and at an
initial level that should be sufficiently substantial. Even though starting
graded work one week earlier does not affect the return to work rate
after two years, it does raise the number of weeks worked in the first
two years after sick-listing with two weeks. In addition, starting a graded
return-to-work trajectory at a work resumption rate which is 10 percentage
point higher increases the probability to return to work within two years
with 2.5 percentage point.
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The positive effects of graded return-to-work we find are especially
strong for individuals who have general medical conditions, such as
chronic illnesses. For these the positive effects persist at the end of the
waiting period. For individuals with problems related to mental health,
however, we find no significant effects of graded return-to-work. For
these individuals, speeding up the start of graded work even causes work
resumption rates to decrease.
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Additional data descriptives 4.A
Table 4.12: Data selection steps
Selection step Observations
Total number of clients 35,040
Selection on contract type and insurer a - 14,156
Individual died or left because of problems with insurance -139
No case management/reported goal different than back to work - 2,093
Intervention/graded rtw took place before application at Keerpunt -5,030
Implausible dates - 121
Individual could not have been observed for two years at October 7,
2016
- 5
year 2009 - 2010 deleted (only few observations) - 221
Observations left 13,275
Individuals excluded due to missing values or being assigned to - 1,534
Case managers with less than 25 clients that year
Observations used for analysis 11,741
a Different contract types follow different processes leading onto application at the
workplace reintegration provider. The selected contract types follow similar proce-
dures. The main criterion for selection was that the individuals should not have been
in contact with the workplace reintegration provider before the application date.
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Table 4.13: Additional case manager
characteristics
average working hours per year:
- less than 800 33.8%
- 800 - 1000 20.6%
- more than 1000 26.5%
- unknown 19.1%






- less than 10 courses 16.2%
- 10 - 19 courses 44.1%
- 20 - 29 courses 26.5%
- 30 - 39 courses 10.3%
- 40 or more courses 1.5%
- unknown 0.0%
Table 4.14: Reasons for sick-listing
Freq. Percent
general medical - mild 1,509 8.75
general medical - medium 2,423 14.05
general medical - severe 1,827 10.59
physical - mild 1,304 7.56
physical - severe 625 3.62
neck, shoulder, arm complaints 1,199 6.95
hip, ankle, knee complaints 1,092 6.33
back complaints 1,324 7.68
psychiatric 291 1.69
psychological - mild 1,895 10.99
psychological - severe 440 2.55
psychosocial - mild 1,787 10.36
psychosocial - severe 298 1.73
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Additional results 4.B
The propensities are calculated based on an an OLS regression using
all individual-week observations up to and including the first week into
graded work or up to the end of the first year of sickness, using a dummy
indicating whether one entered graded work as left hand side variable
and individual characteristics as right hand side variables. The results
are shown in panels a of Tables 4.15, 4.16, 4.17, and 4.18. Females are
more likely to be assigned to graded work. The likelihood to participate
is hump shaped in age and income. Those who apply later are more
likely to participate in graded work. In the year 2012 people were less
likely to participate in graded work. The results do not seem to differ
substantially for the different categories. The coefficients for the sick week
dummies are plotted in Figure 4.7. Using the errors from these regressions
we calculate the year-case manager propensities to treat. The distribution
of these propensities, before rescaling, is shown in Figure 4.8.
Panels b and c of Tables 4.15, 4.16, 4.17, and 4.18 show all the coeffi-
cient estimates for the control variables of the regressions underlying the
baseline IV estimates in Tables 4.4 and 4.5.
Table 4.19 show the results for different medical conditions correspond-
ing to Table 4.6 for the other to outcome measures. Tables 4.20, 4.21, 4.22,
and 4.23 show the results using different cut-offs for the minimum number
of clients per case manager.
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Table 4.15: Effect of graded return-to-work when started in week 1-52, including coefficients on
control variables.
a. Stage 0 - dependent: participates in graded return-to-work
sex 0.000 (0.001) condition: contract type:
age at application 0.001*** (0.000) general medical - medium 0.010*** (0.001) B 0.001 (0.002)
age at application2 0.000*** (0.000) general medical - severe 0.000 (0.001) C 0.003 (0.002)
ln(gross wage) 0.005*** (0.001) neck, shoulder, arm 0.007*** (0.001) D 0.001 (0.002)
ln(gross wage)2 0.000*** (0.000) physical - mild 0.008*** (0.001) E 0.003** (0.002)
weeks until application 0.001*** (0.0001) physical - severe 0.004** (0.002) F 0.008*** (0.002)
weeks until application2 0.000 (0.000) hip, ankle, knee 0.012*** (0.002) G 0.003 (0.002)
application year: other -0.011*** (0.002) H 0.004** (0.002)
2012 -0.001 (0.002) psychiatric -0.002 (0.002) I 0.004** (0.002)
2013 0.001 (0.002) psychological - mild 0.004*** (0.001) firm size:
2014 0.002 (0.003) psychological - severe -0.002 (0.002) 2-9 employee 0.001* (0.001)
Constant -0.016 (0.088) psychosocial - mild 0.006*** (0.001) 10-49 employees 0.004*** (0.001)
psychosocial - severe 0.005* (0.002) 50+ employees 0.010*** (0.002)
back complaints 0.007*** (0.001) unknown 0.001 (0.001)
Observations 290,929 social problems 0.008*** (0.002)
R-squared 0.011 conflict -0.012*** (0.002)
b. Stage 1 - dependent: participates in graded return-to-work
ψ 0.270*** (0.027) condition: contract type:
sex 0.002 (0.009) general medical - medium 0.200*** (0.024) B 0.027 (0.027)
age at application 0.013*** (0.003) general medical - severe 0.107*** (0.024) C 0.049* (0.027)
age at application2 0.000*** (0.000) neck, shoulder, arm 0.193*** (0.024) D 0.035 (0.025)
ln(gross wage) 0.102*** (0.018) physical - mild 0.166*** (0.025) E 0.059** (0.026)
ln(gross wage)2 -0.006*** (0.002) physical - severe 0.159*** (0.032) F 0.115*** (0.035)
weeks until application 0.000 (0.002) hip, ankle, knee 0.236*** (0.026) G 0.039 (0.040)
weeks until application2 0.000*** (0.000) other -0.254*** (0.039) H 0.070*** (0.026)
application year: psychiatric 0.046 (0.039) I 0.066** (0.031)
2012 -0.048*** (0.012) psychological - mild 0.148*** (0.022) firm size:
2013 -0.063*** (0.012) psychological - severe 0.078** (0.031) 2-9 employee 0.021 (0.015)
2014 -0.070*** (0.013) psychosocial - mild 0.163*** (0.024) 10-49 employees 0.060*** (0.014)
Constant -0.311*** (0.076) psychosocial - severe 0.211*** (0.037) 50+ employees 0.129*** (0.028)
back complaints 0.181*** (0.023) unknown 0.007 (0.018)
Observations 11,741 social problems 0.152*** (0.038)
conflict -0.300*** (0.027)
c. Stage 2 - dependent: returned to work within 1 year
intervention 0.127 (0.122) condition contract type:
sex -0.031*** (0.009) general medical - medium -0.169*** (0.030) B 0.047* (0.025)
age at application 0.0003 (0.003) general medical - severe -0.531*** (0.024) C 0.042 (0.027)
age at application2 0.000 (0.000) neck, shoulder, arm -0.271*** (0.032) D -0.018 (0.028)
ln(gross wage) 0.017 (0.020) physical - mild -0.100*** (0.028) E -0.002 (0.027)
ln(gross wage)2 -0.003* (0.002) physical - severe -0.446*** (0.035) F 0.030 (0.037)
weeks until application -0.010*** (0.002) hip, ankle, knee -0.197*** (0.036) G 0.034 (0.035)
weeks until application2 0.000 (0.000) other -0.439*** (0.066) H -0.023 (0.027)
application year: psychiatric -0.478*** (0.037) I 0.027 (0.031)
2012 0.171*** (0.017) psychological - mild -0.319*** (0.029) firm size:
2013 0.181*** (0.020) psychological - severe -0.510*** (0.035) 2-9 employee 0.012 (0.014)
2014 0.149*** (0.021) psychosocial - mild -0.170*** (0.026) 10-49 employees 0.017 (0.016)
Constant 0.713*** (0.076) psychosocial - severe -0.416*** (0.045) 50+ employees 0.054 (0.035)
back complaints -0.274*** (0.030) unknown 0.017 (0.019)
Observations 11,741 social problems -0.073** (0.032)
R-squared 0.195 conflict -0.108** (0.047)
a baseline category: general medical light (for final results make other the baseline)
b baseline category: 0-2 week
c baseline category: 2011
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 4.16: Effect of graded return-to-work when started in week 1-26, including coefficients on
control variables.
a. Stage 0 - dependent: participates in graded return-to-work
sex -0.001 (0.001) condition: contract type:
age at application 0.001*** (0.000) general medical - medium 0.006*** (0.002) B 0.003 (0.003)
age at application2 0.000*** (0.000) general medical - severe -0.017*** (0.002) C 0.005* (0.003)
ln(gross wage) 0.008*** (0.002) neck, shoulder, arm 0.001 (0.003) D 0.002 (0.003)
ln(gross wage)2 0.000*** (0.000) physical - mild 0.008*** (0.003) E 0.006** (0.003)
weeks until application 0.001** (0.000) physical - severe -0.009*** (0.003) F 0.011*** (0.004)
weeks until application2 0.000 (0.000) hip, ankle, knee 0.007** (0.003) G 0.007* (0.004)
application year: other -0.027*** (0.004) H 0.006* (0.003)
2012 -0.003 (0.004) psychiatric -0.020*** (0.004) I 0.008** (0.003)
2013 0.000 (0.005) psychological - mild -0.005** (0.002) firm size:
2014 0.002 (0.007) psychological - severe -0.017*** (0.003) 2-9 employee 0.002 (0.001)
Constant -0.014 (0.106) psychosocial - mild 0.001 (0.002) 10-49 employees 0.006*** (0.001)
psychosocial - severe -0.013*** (0.004) 50+ employees 0.014*** (0.003)
back complaints 0.000 (0.003) unknown 0.003 (0.002)
Observations 147,713 social problems 0.009** (0.004)
R-squared 0.007 conflict -0.028*** (0.003)
b. Stage 1 - dependent: participates in graded return-to-work
ψ 0.268*** (0.027) condition: contract type:
sex -0.009 (0.009) general medical - medium 0.088*** (0.025) B 0.038 (0.028)
age at application 0.007** (0.003) general medical - severe -0.114*** (0.024) C 0.065** (0.029)
age at application2 0.000*** (0.000) neck, shoulder, arm 0.059** (0.024) D 0.035 (0.028)
ln(gross wage) 0.078*** (0.017) physical - mild 0.104*** (0.027) E 0.065** (0.030)
ln(gross wage)2 -0.005*** (0.002) physical - severe -0.037 (0.032) F 0.085** (0.034)
weeks until application -0.016*** (0.002) hip, ankle, knee 0.096*** (0.027) G 0.069* (0.039)
weeks until application2 0.000 (0.000) other -0.269*** (0.037) H 0.063** (0.028)
application year: psychiatric -0.163*** (0.036) I 0.069** (0.032)
2012 -0.038*** (0.010) psychological - mild 0.004 (0.023) firm size:
2013 -0.033*** (0.011) psychological - severe -0.113*** (0.030) 2-9 employee 0.015 (0.014)
2014 -0.052*** (0.012) psychosocial - mild 0.053** (0.024) 10-49 employees 0.048*** (0.013)
Constant -0.005 (0.072) psychosocial - severe -0.066 (0.041) 50+ employees 0.124*** (0.029)
back complaints 0.048** (0.024) unknown 0.022 (0.018)
Observations 11,741 social problems 0.103** (0.040)
conflict -0.347*** (0.027)
c. Stage 2 - dependent: returned to work within 1 year
intervention 0.380*** (0.125) condition contract type:
sex -0.027*** (0.009) general medical - medium -0.176*** (0.020) B 0.036 (0.026)
age at application -0.001 (0.003) general medical - severe -0.473*** (0.024) C 0.023 (0.028)
age at application2 0.000 (0.000) neck, shoulder, arm -0.267*** (0.022) D -0.028 (0.028)
ln(gross wage) -0.001 (0.020) physical - mild -0.117*** (0.024) E -0.020 (0.028)
ln(gross wage)2 -0.002 (0.002) physical - severe -0.411*** (0.026) F 0.011 (0.035)
weeks until application -0.004 (0.003) hip, ankle, knee -0.203*** (0.025) G 0.011 (0.035)
weeks until application2 0.000 (0.000) other -0.370*** (0.064) H -0.039 (0.027)
application year: psychiatric -0.408*** (0.039) I 0.008 (0.032)
2012 0.179*** (0.017) psychological - mild -0.301*** (0.021) firm size: (CHECK)
2013 0.186*** (0.018) psychological - severe -0.455*** (0.034) 2-10 employee 0.008 (0.014)
2014 0.160*** (0.019) psychosocial - mild -0.168*** (0.020) 10-49 employees 0.006 (0.016)
Constant 0.634*** (0.073) psychosocial - severe -0.362*** (0.035) 50+ employees 0.022 (0.035)
back complaints -0.268*** (0.021) unknown 0.010 (0.018)
Observations 11,741 social problems -0.090*** (0.026)
R-squared 0.230 conflict -0.014 (0.053)
a baseline category: general medical light (for final results make other the baseline)
b baseline category: 0-2 week
c baseline category: 2011
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 4.17: Effect of starting moment of graded return-to-work, including coefficients on control
variables
a. Stage 0 - dependent: participates in graded return-to-work
sex -0.008*** (0.002) condition: contract type:
age at application -0.001** (0.001) general medical - medium -0.095*** (0.007) B 0.008 (0.007)
age at application2 0.000 (0.000) general medical - severe -0.149*** (0.007) C 0.005 (0.007)
ln(gross wage) 0.006 (0.005) neck, shoulder, arm -0.120*** (0.007) D -0.005 (0.007)
ln(gross wage)2 -0.001 (0.000) physical - mild -0.087*** (0.008) E 0.003 (0.007)
weeks until application -0.002*** (0.001) physical - severe -0.137*** (0.008) F 0.003 (0.009)
weeks until application2 0.000*** (0.000) hip, ankle, knee -0.114*** (0.007) G -0.001 (0.009)
application year: other -0.087*** (0.020) H -0.001 (0.007)
2012 -0.007 (0.008) psychiatric -0.144*** (0.010) I 0.004 (0.008)
2013 0.006 (0.010) psychological - mild -0.122*** (0.007) firm size:
2014 -0.008 (0.013) psychological - severe -0.153*** (0.008) 2-9 employee -0.004 (0.003)
Constant 0.273 (0.275) psychosocial - mild -0.106*** (0.007) 10-49 employees -0.002 (0.003)
psychosocial - severe -0.149*** (0.009) 50+ employees 0.000 (0.006)
back complaints -0.113*** (0.007) unknown 0.007 (0.004)
Observations 71,670 social problems -0.055*** (0.011)
R-squared 0.027 conflict -0.076*** (0.013)
b. Stage 1 - dependent: participates in graded return-to-work
ψ -3.935*** (0.791) condition: contract type:
sex 0.838*** (0.268) general medical - medium 4.687*** (0.478) B -0.822 (0.897)
age at application 0.123 (0.079) general medical - severe 12.37*** (0.563) C -0.882 (0.998)
age at application2 -0.001 (0.001) neck, shoulder, arm 7.064*** (0.582) D 0.607 (0.933)
ln(gross wage) -0.705 (0.654) physical - mild 3.876*** (0.463) E -0.234 (0.965)
ln(gross wage)2 0.062 (0.056) physical - severe 10.28*** (0.755) F 0.059 (1.079)
weeks until application 0.841*** (0.058) hip, ankle, knee 6.403*** (0.550) G -0.239 (1.170)
weeks until application2 -0.003* (0.002) other 4.237** (1.834) H 0.156 (0.991)
application year: psychiatric 10.77*** (1.368) I -0.337 (0.962)
2012 -0.073 (0.338) psychological - mild 7.849*** (0.572) firm size:
2013 -1.238*** (0.326) psychological - severe 13.21*** (1.166) 2-9 employee 0.290 (0.378)
2014 0.127 (0.377) psychosocial - mild 5.751*** (0.492) 10-49 employees 0.066 (0.383)
Constant 5.933** (2.566) psychosocial - severe 12.50*** (1.203) 50+ employees -0.068 (0.838)
back complaints 6.620*** (0.610) unknown -0.753 (0.531)
Observations 5,906 social problems 1.747** (0.687)
conflict 2.983*** (0.939)
c. Stage 2 - dependent: returned to work within 1 year
intervention -0.044*** (0.010) condition contract type:
sex 0.005 (0.015) general medical - medium 0.131** (0.054) B -0.064 (0.049)
age at application 0.003 (0.005) general medical - severe 0.105 (0.128) C -0.071 (0.056)
age at application2 0.000 (0.000) neck, shoulder, arm 0.134* (0.077) D -0.050 (0.050)
ln(gross wage) 0.006 (0.051) physical - mild 0.098* (0.051) E -0.091* (0.051)
ln(gross wage)2 -0.003 (0.004) physical - severe 0.118 (0.116) F -0.020 (0.059)
weeks until application 0.028*** (0.009) hip, ankle, knee 0.143* (0.074) G -0.016 (0.059)
weeks until application2 0.000*** (0.000) other 0.000 (0.127) H -0.093* (0.052)
application year: psychiatric 0.114 (0.121) I -0.084 (0.053)
2012 0.142*** (0.030) psychological - mild 0.095 (0.083) firm size:
2013 0.129*** (0.034) psychological - severe 0.137 (0.142) 2-10 employee 0.010 (0.020)
2014 0.126*** (0.031) psychosocial - mild 0.146** (0.066) 10-49 employees -0.003 (0.020)
Constant 1.101*** (0.167) psychosocial - severe 0.204 (0.139) 50+ employees 0.034 (0.043)
back complaints 0.122 (0.075) unknown -0.010 (0.027)
Observations 5,906 social problems 0.059 (0.044)
R-squared -0.028 conflict 0.025 (0.078)
a baseline category: general medical light (for final results make other the baseline)
b baseline category: 0-2 week
c baseline category: 2011
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 4.18: Effect of initial degree of graded return-to-work, including coefficients on control
variables.
a. Stage 0 - dependent: initial degree of graded return-to-work
sex -1.566*** (0.566) condition: contract type:
age at application -0.016 (0.171) general medical - medium -6.155*** (1.290) B -2.310 (1.702)
age at application2 0.000 (0.002) general medical - severe -11.13*** (1.410) C -2.014 (1.793)
ln(gross wage) -1.440 (1.328) neck, shoulder, arm -6.723*** (1.456) D -3.437** (1.737)
ln(gross wage)2 0.019 (0.117) physical - mild -4.538*** (1.444) E -2.251 (1.715)
weeks until application 0.101 (0.152) physical - severe -11.81*** (1.777) F -0.986 (2.162)
weeks until application2 0.003 (0.005) hip, ankle, knee -5.661*** (1.463) G -0.400 (2.347)
application year: other 6.618 (4.229) H -2.102 (1.784)
2012 2.477 (1.891) psychiatric -12.34*** (2.448) I 0.262 (1.928)
2013 3.799 (2.481) psychological - mild -11.64*** (1.366) firm size:
2014 3.855 (3.172) psychological - severe -10.35*** (2.029) 2-9 employee 1.162 (0.826)
Constant 85.950*** (12.63) psychosocial - mild -9.015*** (1.344) 10-49 employees 1.321 (0.824)
psychosocial - severe -10.02*** (2.133) 50+ employees 1.320 (1.636)
back complaints -8.308*** (1.441) unknown 0.956 (1.111)
Observations 5,913 social problems -4.814** (2.024)
R-squared 0.098 conflict 4.507* (2.676)
b. Stage 1 - dependent: initial degree of graded return-to-work
ψ 25.373*** (0.564) condition: contract type:
sex -1.499*** (0.512) general medical - medium -8.477*** (1.443) B -2.953* (1.727)
age at application -0.125 (0.167) general medical - severe -14.59*** (1.407) C -2.777 (1.727)
age at application2 0.002 (0.001) neck, shoulder, arm -9.749*** (1.653) D -4.255** (1.823)
ln(gross wage) -1.943 (1.759) physical - mild -6.011*** (1.435) E -3.643** (1.780)
ln(gross wage)2 0.066 (0.140) physical - severe -14.91*** (1.629) F -1.534 (2.162)
weeks until application -0.189 (0.136) hip, ankle, knee -8.306*** (1.515) G -0.950 (2.370)
weeks until application2 0.009* (0.005) other 2.851 (5.991) H -3.603** (1.712)
application year: psychiatric -16.02*** (2.167) I -0.883 (1.957)
2012 4.470*** (0.258) psychological - mild -14.56*** (1.404) firm size:
2013 4.994*** (0.309) psychological - severe -14.75*** (2.229) 2-9 employee 1.660** (0.833)
2014 2.090*** (0.334) psychosocial - mild -11.20*** (1.239) 10-49 employees 2.013*** (0.750)
Constant 42.303*** (6.564) psychosocial - severe -13.31*** (2.395) 50+ employees 1.501 (1.688)
back complaints -10.44*** (1.472) unknown 1.985* (1.075)
Observations 5,913 social problems -6.074*** (1.721)
conflict 3.661 (3.570)
c. Stage 2 - dependent: returned to work within 1 year
intervention 0.006*** (0.002) condition: contract type:
sex -0.023** (0.013) general medical - medium -0.033 (0.025) B -0.012 (0.032)
age at application -0.002 (0.004) general medical - severe -0.367*** (0.035) C -0.024 (0.033)
age at application2 0.000 (0.000) neck, shoulder, arm -0.133*** (0.033) D -0.053 (0.037)
ln(gross wage) 0.042 (0.032) physical - mild -0.049* (0.025) E -0.061* (0.034)
ln(gross wage)2 -0.006** (0.003) physical - severe -0.258*** (0.049) F -0.025 (0.044)
weeks until application -0.007** (0.003) hip, ankle, knee -0.101*** (0.033) G -0.002 (0.046)
weeks until application2 0.000** (0.000) other -0.225*** (0.085) H -0.080** (0.035)
application year: psychiatric -0.282*** (0.064) I -0.067* (0.039)
2012 0.121*** (0.027) psychological - mild -0.174*** (0.039) firm size:
2013 0.155*** (0.030) psychological - severe -0.377*** (0.052) 2-9 employee -0.010 (0.018)
2014 0.110*** (0.031) psychosocial - mild -0.051* (0.030) 10-49 employees -0.019 (0.018)
Constant 0.641*** (0.152) psychosocial - severe -0.282*** (0.054) 50+ employees 0.030 (0.041)
back complaints -0.115*** (0.030) unknown 0.016 (0.028)
Observations 5,913 social problems 0.007 (0.035)
R-squared 0.142 conflict -0.132** (0.060)
a baseline category: general medical light (for final results make other the baseline)
b baseline category: 0-2 week
c baseline category: 2011
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
524582-L-sub01-bw-Kools
Processed on: 20-9-2018
170 Graded Return-to-Work Chapter 4
Figure 4.7: Duration coefficients
Figure 4.8: Propensities to treat before scaling.
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Table 4.19: IV estimation results for different medical conditions – weeks
worked.
General medical Musculo-skeletal Mental













a. Baseline, all trajectories started in week 1-52
Graded rtw 9.066 30.54 8.680 6.885 7.341 6.824
(9.855) (20.87) (17.21) (29.57) (10.85) (24.74)
stage 1: 0.191*** 0.155 0.1703**
Ψ[graded rtw] (0.072) (0.095) (0.074)
b. Baseline, all trajectories started in week 1-26
Graded rtw 20.06*** 42.12*** 14.31 18.34 5.354 -0.427
(7.555) (15.51) (11.33) (21.25) (7.752) (19.92)
stage 1: 0.281*** 0.229*** 0.266***
Ψ[graded rtw] (0.066) (0.076) (0.079)
c. Duration until start of graded return to work trajectory
Weeks waited -
1.577***
-1.924** -0.867** -0.791 -0.532 0.490






Ψ[weeks waited] (1.704) (1.738) (1.402)
d. Level of work resumption at start
Degree grading (0-100) 0.156** 0.303** 0.250*** 0.546*** 0.193*** 0.355***
(0.066) (0.133) (0.078) (0.174) (0.062) (0.125)
stage 1: 30.59*** 23.31*** 26.71***
Ψ[degree grading] (0.859) (1.141) (0.841)
The group general medical consists of individuals with the conditions general medical
- mild/medium/severe. The group musculo-skeletal consists of individual with the
conditions neck, shoulder, arm, hip, ankle, knee or back complaints. The group mental
consists of individuals with the conditions psychiatric, psychological - mild/severe,
psychosocial - mild/severe or social problems. Individuals with physical mild/severe
conditions are not considered because of the small sample size. Also individuals
labels as ‘other’ or having a conflict are excluded. Control variables include gender,
age, wage, sick weeks until application, year dummies, medical conditions, contract
types and firm size. Claimants are excluded when their assigned case manager
treated fewer than 10 claimants of the same type in the same year as the claimant.
Panels a and b are based on 3,971 observations with general medical conditions, 1,947
with musculo-skeletal conditions, and 3,380 with conditions related to mental health.
Panels c and d are based on 1,667 observations with general medical conditions, 982
with musculo-skeletal conditions, and 1,807 with conditions related to mental health.
Clustered (case manager - year) standard errors between parentheses. *** p < 0.01, **
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 4.20: Overall results (1-52 weeks) using different cut-
offs for the minimum number of clients per case
manager
Returned to work Weeks worked in
1 year 2 years week 1-52 week 1-104
a. 15 clients or more per caseworker (N=12,534)
Graded rtw 0.093 0.086 -0.784 4.090
(0.117) (0.103) (3.489) (8.245)
stage 1: Ψ[graded rtw] 0.385***
(0.033)
b. 20 clients or more per caseworker (N=12,258)
Graded rtw 0.129 0.079 0.487 5.821
(0.115) (0.109) (3.375) (8.189)
stage 1: Ψ[graded rtw] 0.343***
(0.032)
c. 25 clients or more per caseworker (N=11,741)
Graded rtw 0.127 0.075 1.173 6.642
(0.122) (0.109) (3.581) (8.531)
stage 1: Ψ[graded rtw] 0.270***
(0.027)
d. 30 clients or more per caseworker (N=11,343)
Graded rtw 0.145 0.041 1.243 5.922
(0.121) (0.108) (3.626) (8.469)
stage 1: Ψ[graded rtw] 0.268***
(0.029)
e. 35 clients or more per caseworker (N=10,810)
Graded rtw 0.188 0.054 2.757 7.682
(0.124) (0.110) (3.683) (8.734)
stage 1: Ψ[graded rtw] 0.271***
(0.030)
Only graded rtw spells started in the first half year are considered
Contains results of IV regressions
Clustered (case manager - year) standard errors between parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 4.21: Overall results (1-26 weeks) using different cut-
offs for the minimum number of clients per case
manager
Returned to work Weeks worked in
1 year 2 years week 1-52 week 1-104
a. 15 clients or more per caseworker (N=12,534)
Graded rtw 0.344*** 0.0736 7.605** 16.02**
(0.115) (0.100) (3.596) (8.113)
stage 1: Ψ[graded rtw] 0.386***
(0.034)
b. 20 clients or more per caseworker (N=12,258)
Graded rtw 0.348*** 0.061 7.331** 15.56*
(0.111) (0.103) (3.355) (7.945)
stage 1: Ψ[graded rtw] 0.386***
(0.035)
c. 25 clients or more per caseworker (N=11,741)
Graded rtw 0.380*** 0.070 8.901** 18.30**
(0.125) (0.104) (3.759) (8.624)
stage 1: Ψ[graded rtw] 0.268***
(0.027)
d. 30 clients or more per caseworker (N=11,343)
Graded rtw 0.337*** 0.031 7.803** 14.84*
(0.119) (0.103) (3.699) (8.227)
stage 1: Ψ[graded rtw] 0.268***
(0.028)
e. 35 clients or more per caseworker (N=10,810)
Graded rtw 0.335*** 0.0272 8.125** 13.99
(0.123) (0.109) (3.745) (8.520)
stage 1: Ψ[graded rtw] 0.244***
(0.026)
Clustered (case manager - year) standard errors between parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 4.22: Weeks waited results using different cut-offs for the
minimum number of clients per case manager
Returned to work Weeks worked in
1 year 2 years week 1-52 week 1-104
a. 15 clients or more per caseworker (N=6,672)
Weeks waited -0.046*** -0.005 -1.397*** -2.234***
(0.008) (0.004) (0.200) (0.435)
stage 1: Ψ[weeks waited] -6.751***
(0.995)
b. 20 clients or more per caseworker (N=6,436)
Weeks waited -0.0428*** -0.003 -1.402*** -2.066***
(0.008) (0.004) (0.218) (0.417)
stage 1: Ψ[weeks waited] -5.064***
(0.826)
c. 25 clients or more per caseworker (N=5,906)
Weeks waited -0.044*** -0.001 -1.497*** -2.177***
(0.010) (0.005) (0.257) (0.489)
stage 1: Ψ[weeks waited] -3.935***
(0.791)
d. 30 clients or more per caseworker (N=5,411)
Weeks waited -0.042*** 0.001 -1.359*** -1.891***
(0.010) (0.005) (0.229) (0.454)
stage 1: Ψ[weeks waited] -4.230***
(0.825)
e. 35 clients or more per caseworker (N=4,658)
Weeks waited -0.040*** 0.002 -1.337*** -1.854***
(0.011) (0.006) (0.245) (0.457)
stage 1: Ψ[weeks waited] -4.290***
(0.903)
Clustered (case manager - year) standard errors between parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 4.23: Degree grading results using different cut-offs for the
minimum number of clients per case manager
Returned to work Weeks worked in
1 year 2 years week 1-52 week 1-104
a. 15 clients or more per caseworker (N=6,679)
Degree grading 0.006*** 0.002** 0.150*** 0.327***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.047) (0.093)
stage 1: Ψ[degree grading] 28.650***
(0.481)
b. 20 clients or more per caseworker (N=6,443)
Degree grading 0.006*** 0.003*** 0.148*** 0.335***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.049) (0.099)
stage 1: Ψ[degree grading] 25.178***
(0.459)
c. 25 clients or more per caseworker (N=5,913)
Degree grading 0.006*** 0.003** 0.135*** 0.318***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.052) (0.111)
stage 1: Ψ[degree grading] 25.373***
(0.564)
d. 30 clients or more per caseworker (N=5,415)
Degree grading 0.007*** 0.003** 0.183*** 0.408***
(0.003) (0.001) (0.055) (0.119)
stage 1: Ψ[degree grading] 23.244***
(0.638)
e. 35 clients or more per caseworker (N=4,661)
Degree grading 0.007*** 0.002 0.203*** 0.387***
(0.003) (0.001) (0.065) (0.137)
stage 1: Ψ[degree grading] 19.691***
(0.670)
Clustered (case manager - year) standard errors between parentheses.





5 One-stage versus two-stage
cluster sampling, a simulation
study
Abstract
Two-stage cluster sampling is a widely used method to sample households
for large-scale face-to-face household surveys. Developments in survey
sampling methodology, such as gridded sampling, can make it easier
to define smaller Primary Sampling Units and adopt a one-stage cluster
sampling approach. This approach may mitigate the risk of excluding
mobile populations and reduce operational costs per cluster by combining
the listing and interviewing phases. However, one-stage cluster sampling
may require larger sample sizes if households of the same type tend to live
close to each other. Based on a synthetic population of Oshikoto, Namibia,
we analyze the potential increase in the required number of clusters under
a one-stage design to achieve the statistical power of a typical two-stage
cluster sample. We find that under moderate assumptions sample sizes
at most double. However, in some extreme cases the required number
The chapter is co-authored by Dana Thomson. The authors thank Felicity Cutts and
Dhale Rhoda for their feedback at several stages of the chapter. Furthermore, the authors
thank Chris Jochem for his guidance in setting up the synthetic data set. The authors
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geospatial datasets used in this study. The geospatial datasets were produced by David
Kerr, Heather Chamberlain, Chris T. Lloyd, Maksym Bondarenko (WorldPop, University
of Southampton), Gregory Yetman, and Linda Pistolesi (Center for International Earth
Science Information Network, Columbia University) in the framework of the WorldPop
âĂIJGlobal High Resolution Population DenominatorsâĂİ Project funded by the Bill &
Melinda Gates Foundation (OPP1134076). Lieke Kools received financial support from
the Leiden University Fund/Kroese-Duijsters Fonds for conducting a research visit to
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of clusters can increase by up to thirteen times. The potential increase
depends on both prevalence of the characteristic and the intracluster corre-
lation at the level of Enumeration Areas. The differences between extreme
and moderate scenario’s fade out when segment sizes are increased.
5.1 Introduction
Large multi-topic household surveys, such as the Living Standards Mea-
surement Study (LSMS) and Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) in
low and middle income countries (LMICs) and EU-SILC in Europe are an
important tool for monitoring socio-economic progress. When deciding
how to select the respondents for such surveys, one has to ensure that
the resulting sample is representative of the population and large enough
to estimate key characteristics at the (sub)national level with sufficient
precision. On the other hand, the survey should be affordable and the
approach easy to implement in the field. A two-stage cluster sampling
design was historically the only available study design and is seen as the
gold standard for survey sampling in LMICs, because it offers a good
balance between these requirements. However, in cases where clusters
contain few household and the target population is rare, recent WHO
guidelines also suggest one-stage cluster sampling as a suitable sampling
method (World Health Organization 2015). Thanks to novel ways of defin-
ing clusters this alternative method now even becomes feasible for general
household surveys. Compared to two-stage sampling, one-stage cluster
sampling may reduce operational costs per cluster and may mitigate the
risk of excluding hard-to-survey populations. However, it is more sensitive
to spatial clustering of household characteristics and may therefore come
at the cost of larger sample size requirements. The potential usefulness of
one-stage cluster sampling in the field depends on the required increase
in sample size to maintain the same statistical precision as a two-stage
cluster sample. Therefore, an effort to quantify this increase is needed.
Two-stage cluster sampling is a common sampling approach for face-
to-face household surveys. The first stage consists of defining primary
sampling units (PSUs), i.e. mutually exclusive subsets of the population,
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and then selecting a subset of these PSUs.1 PSUs can for example be
defined based on administrative boundaries, such as the Enumeration
Areas (EAs) used in the most recent Census, or by overlaying a map by a
raster (gridded sampling, Galway et al. (2012), Thomson et al. (2017)). In
the second stage a subset of households within each PSU is selected, who
together form the sample of the survey. Often this is done by visiting the
selected PSU, listing all the households in that region, taking a systematic
or random sample from this list, and then revisiting these households for
an interview. Two-stage cluster sampling has practical benefits compared
to taking a Simple Random Sample (SRS) of the population: building
the sampling frame does not require complete population registries and
field work can be concentrated in a few areas. However, the sampling
approach may result in non-random selection of household types due
to various reasons. Among these is the substantial time lag between the
listing phase and interviewing phase, which has as a consequence that
mobile populations, such as seasonal workers, are at risk of being excluded
from the sample.
One could forgo on revisits by defining PSUs in such a way that
each contains only few households and interview all the households in
the selected PSU, i.e. one-stage cluster sampling. For example, a grid
cell of 100m2 is often smaller than a EA, such that gridded sampling
offers opportunities for one-stage cluster sampling. Also, when taking
a gridded sampling approach, PSUs of different sizes can be established
by combining neighboring cells or segmenting cells. A one-stage cluster
approach could potentially lead to cost savings because the area to cover in
the sampled clusters is much smaller, so that listing and interviewing can
be executed on the same day. Moreover, the one-stage setup does allow to
capture mobile and non-standard households, as shown by Himelein et al.
(2014). However, if similar types of households tend to live close to each
other, each one-stage cluster adds less new information to the sample than
each two-stage cluster of the same sample size, so that one should sample
1There also exist two-stage methods in which the PSUs are not a mutually exclusive
subset of the population. For example when points on a map are sampled and the PSU
is defined as the region in a specified radius around that point. In such cases survey
weights should be adapted for the possibility that two selected PSUs overlap.
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more clusters for a one-stage cluster sample to achieve the same precision
as a two-stage cluster sample. How many more depends on the spatial
clustering of characteristics and thus on the variable of interest and the
context these are measured in.
There is little evidence on the difference in precision of one- and two-
stage cluster samples and how different forms of spatial clustering affect
these differences. However, literature on other sampling procedures may
give guidance for the direction of the results, in particular the literature
on two-stage EPI sampling. For this approach, the second stage consists
of selecting a random starting point in the PSU and from there taking
a ‘random walk’ through the PSU on which households are selected
until the required number of households are interviewed. The most
prominent critique on this sampling method is that is does not lead to
a true probability sample2, however another critique is that households
living close together are more likely to be sampled than households living
further apart. Therefore, a two-stage EPI sample is affected by spatial
clustering in a similar way as a one-stage cluster sample. Indeed, Milligan
et al. (2004) show that implementation of two-stage EPI sampling and one-
stage cluster sampling3 lead to equivalent point estimates of vaccination
coverage in the Western region of Gambia. The EPI approach has been
shown to be sensitive to pocketing of vaccinated individuals (Lemeshow
et al. 1985) and to perform poorly for socio-economic variables (Bennett
et al. 1994). However, the approach does usually lead to estimates within
2When selecting households using a ‘random walk’, the households in the EA are
not listed. As most two-stage sampling methods, the EPI approach depends on the
last census for its sampling frame. These sampling frames are usually outdated, so
that without listing all the households currently living in the EA one cannot establish
second stage sampling probabilities. Therefore, despite the ease of implementation, the
current survey guidelines of the WHO recommend against the use of this approach and
in favor of systematic two-stage cluster sampling or one-stage cluster sampling (World
Health Organization 2015). Contrary to the EPI approach, one-stage cluster sampling
does generally lead to a true probability sample.
3Actually Milligan et al. (2004) compare the EPI approach to an approach they call
two-stage compact segment sampling. This approach was introduced by Turner et al.
(1996) and consists of first sampling PSUs, dividing these PSUs in x equal segments, and
subsequently interview all households in one segment per PSU. Practically this gives a
similar sample to a one-stage cluster sample, with the only exception that in a one-stage
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10% of the population mean (the EPI criterion for a good sample) and has
shown to provide similar estimates for mortality and vaccination status as
more systematic sampling procedures (Luman et al. 2007, Rose et al. 2006).
To our knowledge, specific guidelines with respect to the difference in the
number of clusters to sample are not given in the literature.
In this chapter we aim to find out how many additional clusters need to
be sampled when using a one-stage cluster design to achieve the statistical
power of a typical two-stage cluster sample in LMIC household surveys.
In order to answer this question we create a synthetic population of
households in Oshikoto, Namibia. We argue that this population has the
same properties as the true population in the sense that both population
averages and the distribution of EA-level prevalences are equivalent for key
characteristics.4 Next we adopt several scenarios for the spatial distribution
of individuals within each EA, while keeping EA-level prevalences fixed.
For each of these different scenarios we calculate the minimal number of
clusters to be sampled to achieve a given statistical precision based on
bootstrapped measures of performance. We focus on three measures (1)
household wealth index, (2) womens use of modern contraception, and (3)
0-5 years old children’s DPT3 vaccination coverage. These measures show
different distributions of EA-level prevalences and each cover a different
subsample of the population.
The results show that under moderate assumptions sample size require-
ments at most double. However, under extreme assumption of within EA
clustering sample size requirements can increase dramatically, especially
for variables with low EA-level ICCs and prevalence levels near 50%. The
most extreme case showed an increase in the minimal number of clusters
to sample of almost thirteen times. The differences between extreme and
moderate scenario’s fade out when segment sizes are increased. Before
implementing one-stage cluster sampling one should carefully examine
the likely scenarios of within EA clustering, to assess feasibility of the
approach.
4That is, we expect the intra cluster correlations found in the synthetic population is
close to those in the true population.
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5.2 Method
We evaluate the sampling procedure using a synthetic population of the
region Oshikoto in Namibia. This region was selected because of both the
availability of high quality data and the diversity of the region. The region
covers 38, 653km2 including planned and unplanned city neighborhoods,
rural settled agriculture, rural nomadic populations and large unpopulated
areas. In this section we briefly explain how the synthetic population is
generated and argue why this provides a valid testing ground for the
question at hand. Next, we explain how we constructed the different
scenarios of within EA clustering and how we calculate the minimal
number of clusters to be sampled when using either a one- or two-stage
cluster sampling approach. For a more detailed description of the data and
methods used to construct the synthetic population, we refer the reader to
Thomson et al. (2018).
5.2.1 Generating a realistic synthetic population
The synthetic population is constructed using the 2013 Namibian Demo-
graphic Household Survey (DHS), the 2011 Namibian census Public Use
Microdata Sample (PUMS), a set of publicly available spatial covariates,
and a household point location file constructed by visual inspection of
satellite imagery of the region. Table 5.1 provides an overview of the
datasets and variables used to generate the synthetic population. The
population is created in three steps: first we predict the spatial distribution
of household types, which we then use to assign a realistic set of synthetic
households to realistic household locations, and finally we predict some
extra characteristics of the individuals. The steps constitute of a series of
random processes, which will be further explained below, so that execut-
ing them once results in one of many possible realizations of the synthetic
population. For the analysis we generate five realizations of the synthetic
population, run the analysis on each of these realizations, and base our
conclusions on the combined results of the different analyses.
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Table 5.1: Overview of data sources used for simulations




geo-displaced cluster coordinates, ur-
ban/rural (hv025), cluster (v001), hhsize
(derived), water source (hv201), toilet facil-
ity (hv205, hv225), space (hv216), structure
(hv213), cooking fuel (hv226), relationship
(hv101), age (hv105), sex (hv104), education
(hv109), wealth index (hv270) , contracep-
tion (v313), DPT3 vaccinationb(h7)
Census 2011 PUMS (NSA
2013)
admin-3 level indicator (constituency), ur-
ban/rural (urban_rural), hhsize (derived),
water source (H9), toilet facility (H10), space
(H4), structure (H7), cooking fuel (H8a), re-
lationship (B3), age (B5), sex (B4), education
(D3)
2011 Census EA bound-
aries (NSA 2011a)
EA boundaries






(estimated) household point locations
ccilc_dst011_2012 Distance to cultivated terrestrial landsc 2012 ESA CCI annual LC maps v2.0.7
(≈300m)d
ccilc_dst040_2012 Distance to woody areasc ""
ccilc_dst130_2012 Distance to shrub areasc ""
ccilc_dst140_2012 Distance to herbaceous areasc ""
ccilc_dst150_2012 Distance to terrestrial vegetation areasc ""
ccilc_dst190_2012 Distance to urban areac ""
ccilc_dst200_2012 Distance to bare areasc ""
cciwat_dst Distance to water bodiesc ESA CCI, Water bodies v4.0 (≈150m)d
dmsp_2011 Nighttime lights intensityc 2011 inter-calibrated version of the
v4 DMSP-OLS Nighttime Lights Time
Series (≈1km)d
gpw4coast_dst Distance to coastlinec GPWv4 input administrati units
(≈100m)d
osmint_dst Distance to road intersectionsc 2016 OSM highwaysd
osmriv_dst Distance to major waterwaysc 2016 OSM waterwaysd
osmroa_dst Distance to major roadsc 2016 OSM highwaysd
slope Slopec 2000 Viewfinder Panoramas (≈100m)d
topo Elevationc 2000 Viewfinder Panoramas (≈100m)d
tt50k2000 Travel time to populated places (pop more
50k)
2000 EC-JRC Travel time to major
cities (≈1km)d
urbpx_prp_1_2012 Proportion of settlement pixels within 1 cell
radiusc
2012 DLR Global Urban Footpring
(≈12.5m) & 2000 EC-JRC Global Hu-
man Settlement layer; 38md
2010 MODIS (≈1km)
(Running et al. 2014)




2001 health facilities (UN-
OCHA ROSA 2001a)
Distance to health facilitiesc
a The household variables are taken from the household recode file, the women and child variables come from
the individual recode file.
b We only measure DPT3 vaccination coverage for children living with their mother. In Oshikoto 29 children
under 5 (9.9%) are reported to live away from their mother in the DHS. The vaccination coverage of children
living away from their mother is slightly lower than that of children living with there parents, though not
statistically significantly lower (72.41% vs 78.41%, p-value of one-side t-test: 0.2312).
c Unit of measurement: 3 arc seconds (≈ 100m).
d Spatial covariate was processed by the "Global High Resolution Population Denominators" Project.
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Step 1: Predict the spatial distribution of household types.
In order to generate a synthetic population which is realistically distributed
over space, we need to understand which types of households are likely
to live in which areas of our region. We can do this by estimating rela-
tionships between spatial covariates and household types. For this we
rely on the 2013 DHS survey, which not only provides information on
households but also GPS coordinates of the surveyed clusters. To establish
this relationship we need to find out what the typical household looks
like in each surveyed cluster. We start by summarizing the individual
characteristics to the household-level, so that we have a household file
with the following dummy variables: 1[is rural], 1[head has any formal
education], 1[has any children under 5 years old], 1[does not have access
to an improved water source]5, 1[does not have access to improved toilet
facility]6, 1[lives in a non-durable structure]7, 1[lives in house with inade-
quate space]8, 1[cooks on solid fuel]9. The choice for these characteristics
is based on the availability of information in both the DHS and the census
PUMS, which we use in step 2 to generate our synthetic population. Next,
we take the cluster average of these household characteristics, resulting in
one typical household per cluster. Finally, we construct a single variable
5i.e. the water source is labeled as well unprotected, river/dam/stream
in cases of census data and the water source is labeled as unprotected well,
river/dam/lake/ponds/stream/canal/irrigation, unprotected spring, tanker truck, cart
with small tank (hv205), or shared (hv225) in case of DHS data (UN-HSP 2003). For both
the DHS as the census the category other is set to missing.
6i.e. the toilet facility is labeled as uncovered pit latrine without ventilation, bucket
toilet, or no facility in case of census data and the toilet facility is labeled as pit latrine
without slab/open pit, flush to somewhere else, bucket toilet, hanging toilet/latrine, or
no facility/bush/field in case of DHS data (UN-HSP 2003). For both the DHS as the
census the category other is set to missing.
7i.e. the floor material is labeled as sand/earth, cement, mud/clay or wood in case
of census data and the floor material is labeled as earth/sand, dung, mud/clay, wood
planks, palm/bamboo in case of DHS data Fink et al. (2014). For both the DHS as the
census the category other is set to missing.
8i.e. on average more than 3 individuals share one sleeping room. For both the census
as the DHS data this was derived from household size and a variable measuring the
number of sleeping rooms in the house (UN-HSP 2003).
9i.e. cooking fuel is labeled as wood/charcoal from wood, charcoal-coal, or animal
dung in case of census data and cooking fuel is labeled as charcoal, wood, agricultural
crop or animal dung in case of DHS data. For both the DHS as the census the category
other is set to missing.
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Table 5.2: Household types
Type Name Description
1 rural rich educated and high access to facilities
2 rural poor 1 No formal education and low access to facilities, except water
3 urban rich educated, few under fives, and high access to facilities
4 urban average No formal education and average access to facilities
5 rural average 1 few under fives, average to high access to facilities
6 rural poor 2 many under fives and low access to facilities
7 rural average 2 average access to facilities, low access to fuel.
High:= above regional average, Low:= below regional average, Regular:= close to
regional average. Summary statistics of each type are given in Thomson et al. (2018).
that summarizes the information of the different characteristics by means
of k-means clustering. K-means clustering is a form of unsupervised
clustering aiming to partition observations into a pre-defined number
(k) of groups or clusters. The clusters are formed such that the sum of
squares between the points and the cluster centroids (middle points) is
minimized (Hartigan and Wong 1979). We denote the resulting variable
as the ‘household type’. The algorithm results in the 7 types depicted in
table 5.2.
In order to describe the relationship between these household types
and the spatial covariates we fit a Random Forest model predicting the
cluster household type using information related to the location of the
clusters, such as elevation and distance to roads. A Random Forest is
a supervised learning technique that can be used for both classification
as regression (Breiman 2001). It is an ensemble method meaning that
it combines information from multiple fitted models so to obtain better
predictive performance. In the case of a Random Forest these building
blocks are called Decision Trees. A Decision Tree is a classification or
regression model aiming to predict the class or value of a certain outcome
measure by generating splits on the input variables.10 Splits are chosen so
to minimize a cost function, e.g. sum of squares in case of regression.
For sake of anonymity the DHS provides GPS coordinates that are
displaced by up to two kilometer in urban areas, up to five kilometer
10Would we for example have one input variable x and output variable y a decision
tree could hold the following information: if x < 3 then ȳ = 2, if x ≥ 3 then ȳ = 7.
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in rural areas, and up to ten kilometer in a random one percent of the
rural cases (Perez-Heydrich et al. 2013). Therefore, rather than using
the actual value of the spatial covariates at the given GPS locations, we
extract for each cluster the average, minimum, and maximum value of
the spatial covariates within a radius of five kilometers around the cluster
coordinates and use those generated covariates in the Random Forest
model. When applying the k-means method for clustering we selected
only the clusters in Oshikoto to ensure that we only define household
types which are meaningful to our region. When fitting the Random
Forest model however, we use all the information available for Namibia,
to avoid overfitting due to the small sample of clusters in Oshikoto (N=38).
We thus apply the household type definition constructed using Oshikoto
data to all the clusters in the DHS survey before running the model.
Finally, using the estimated Random Forest model, we predict for each
100m grid cell h in Oshikoto the probability phk that the average household
is of household type k, k = 1, . . . , 7. We combine these probabilities in
seven grids, one for each household type, which can be seen as probability
surfaces. Because the spatial covariates give little extra information about
the possible variation within very dense areas (in our case the city Tsumeb),
we inspected satellite imagery of those areas to create an extra probability
layer with subjective probabilities of the presence of rich households in
those areas. This layer is multiplied with the probability surfaces for urban
household types, to force a more realistic assignment of household types
within cities.
Step 2: Generate a realistic synthetic population.
We build a realistic synthetic base population from the Public Use Micro-
data Sample (PUMS) of the 2011 Namibian Census, using the R-package
simPop. We first generate a set of households by sampling household
ids from the Census PUMS file using the provided household weights
recalibrated to the total number of observations per constituency in the
household point location file. The variables age, gender, and relationship
(i.e. head, child etc.) of the household members in the households corre-
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sponding with these household ids are replicated from the Census PUMS.
Next, the household attributes water, toilet, structure, space, and fuel and
the individual attribute education are predicted using multinomial models.
We thus create synthetic households with combinations of characteristics
that are similar to those in the census PUMS, while allowing for combina-
tions of characteristics not present in this sample. In this way anonymity
of the real households is preserved (Templ et al. 2017).
Using the characteristics of our synthetic population and the probability
surfaces we can now assign the synthetic households to a household
location. We start by assigning a household type, as defined in step 1, to
each household in our synthetic population. Next, we want to assign to
each household location j the probability qjk that it holds a household of
household type k, k = 1, . . . , 7. Assuming that within a single grid of 100
m2 there is no clustering of household types11, we can set the probabilities
for the household locations (j) equal to the probabilities of the grid cell (h)
that they fall in. That is,
qjk := phk if j ∈ h, for j = 1, . . . , Nj, h = 1, . . . , Nh, k = 1, . . . , 7.
Now, if household i is of household type k, the probability that it is located








for i, j = 1, . . . , Nj.
Based on this information we iteratively assign individuals to locations by
applying the following steps for each constituency x urban-rural group of
household points/households separately:
0. Let H be a list of household ids and corresponding household types,
and let L be a list of locations and corresponding probabilities qhk.
1. Randomly select a household i from H.
11We should note here that this does not mean that we do not assume any spatial
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2. Select a location j from L by sampling with probability weights rij.
3. Remove household i from H and remove location j from L.
4. Repeat step 1-3 until all households are allocated.
Step 3: Clustered household characteristics
We now have a base synthetic household population representative of
space, but it does not yet contain the characteristics of interest to us,
that is household wealth index, womens use of contraception, DPT3
vaccination coverage. The PUMS does not contain any information on
these variables, so that they could not be added in step 2. However, the
DHS does contain information on these characteristics as well as the base
characteristics of our synthetic population. Therefore, for each variable we
thus fit a multinomial model12 on the DHS using the base characteristics
as dependent variables, and subsequently predict these variables for our
synthetic population.
Degree of realism of the population
For the generated synthetic household populations to be useful for our re-
search it should have realistic population and EA-level properties. We are
confident that this is the case because (1) population means of characteris-
tics in the synthetic populations are equivalent to the population means
of the 20% census PUMS; (2) Constituency-level means of characteristics
in the synthetic population are equivalent to constituency-level means of
the 20% census PUMS; (3) EA-level maps of prevalences show realistic
spatial distributions of characteristics; (4) density plots of EA prevalences
based on the synthetic population look sufficiently similar to plots based
on DHS data; (5) the DHS sample is a potential sample from our synthetic
populations. For the tables and figures supporting these claims we refer
the reader to Thomson et al. (2018).
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Calculating the minimal number of clusters 5.2.2
We will calculate the minimal number of clusters required for one- and
two-stage cluster sampling by means of bootstrapped samples from our
synthetic population. In this section we explain (1) the set-up of our
one- and two-stage sampling procedures, (2) the different scenarios of
within EA clustering, and (3) the algorithm used to search for the minimal
number of clusters for each combination of scenario and sampling method.
Cluster sampling set-ups
We design the two-stage cluster sampling approach such that it corre-
sponds to the approach adopted for the 2013 DHS in Namibia. The
Enumeration Areas from the 2011 Census are used as PSUs, holding on
average 86 households. Since we know the coordinates of the household
locations, we can easily retrieve the accompanying EA using a shapefile
containing the boundaries of the EAs used in the 2011 Census. First a
given number of EAs is randomly selected, after which from each of the
selected EAs 25 households are systematically selected for interviews. That
is, we order households within a given EA first by longitude and then by
latitude. Then we randomly select one of the first n := f loor(EAsize/25)
households on the list and from there on select every nth next household
on the list.13 An example of a two-stage sample is given in Figure 5.1
When we design our one-stage sampling set-up we aim to design PSUs
of approximately 25 households, so that the size of the sample taken
from one cluster is the same in the one- and two-stage cluster sampling
approaches. We will call these groups of 25 households segments, since we
define them by ‘segmenting’ the EAs in blocks of 25 households. That is,
we order the households within a given EA first by longitude and then by
latitude. Then we assign the first m := f loor(EAsize/n) households to one
segment, the next m households to a second segment and so on. As a result
the whole region will be divided into small segments of approximately 25
households. The one-stage cluster sample results from randomly selecting
13We take every nth household on the list rather than a completely random set of
households, with the aim to mimic as close as possible the sampling process in the field.
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Figure 5.1: An example of 2-stage sampling of ordered house-
hold points and selection.
The numbers in the figure represent the ordering of households first by longitude
and then by latitude. The selected households in the two-stage cluster sample
are indicated by a triangle.
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Figure 5.2: An example of 1-stage sampling segments.
For a one-stage cluster sample the given EA would be divided into three
segments, the households indicated with dots would fall in segment 1, those
indicated with triangles in segment 2, and those indicated with squares in
segment 3. This is stressed by the two lines dividing the EA in three parts.
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a given number of these segments. An example of segments for one-stage
sampling are given in Figure 5.2.
Scenarios of spatial clustering
In order to analyze the performance of one- and two-stage cluster samples
under several (extreme) cases of spatial clustering within EAs, we relocate
households within EAs according to several scenarios. We start by ordering
all household locations within one EA first by longitude and then by
latitude. Next, we order the list of households in the same EA according
to one of the scenarios given in table 5.3. For example, for scenario 3 we
order the households from low wealth to high wealth. Then we attach the
ordered list of households to the ordered list of coordinates and define
the one-stage cluster segments as explained above. Figure 5.3 shows an
example of the spatial distribution of wealth within an EA for the baseline
case (scenario 1) and the case where wealth index is perfectly clustered
(scenario 3).
The assumption of perfect clustering by our key outcome variables is
rather extreme. A more moderate assumption would be that households
are clustered by other household variables, such as access to improved
toilet or water facilities, which are related to our outcome variables but do
not necessarily lead to perfect clustering in these variables (scenarios 6-10).
Scenarios 11-13 also represent more moderate configurations of clustering,
by randomly relocating 50% of the households from the extreme scenarios
3-5 within each EA.
Calculating minimal number of clusters
A common way to express the requirements for sample estimates is by
defining a bandwidth of B percentage points from the population mean
in which (100 − α)% of sample means should fall. For example, the
EPI framework was once developed with the aim in mind that it should
provide estimates of immunization coverage which are with 95% certainty
within 10 percentage points from the true value (Bennett et al. 1991). In
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Figure 5.3: An example of the spatial clustering of wealth
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Table 5.3: Within EA clustering scenarios
Scenario Description
1. Baseline Original ordering of households (HHs)
2. Perfectly homogeneous HHs randomly reordered
3. Wealth index perfectly clustered HHs ordered from low to high wealth
4. Contraception perfectly clustered HHs ordered from low to high preva-
lence of contraception, where HHs with-
out women aged 15-64 positioned at ran-
dom
5. DPT3 perfectly clustered HHs ordered from low to high preva-
lence of DPT3 vaccination, where HHs
without children under 5 positioned at
random
6-10. Perfect clustering by underlying
variables
HHs ordered by access to improved toi-
let facility (6), improved water (7), ade-
quate structure (8), adequate space (9),
or non-solid fuel (10).
11-13. Moderate clustering From scenarios 2-4 randomly replace
50% of HHs
that case B = 10 and α = 5. We find the minimal number of clusters
for which this condition holds in an iterative way, by partitioning the
search space. First, we choose the maximum number of clusters to be
included in the sample (nmax), for example nmax could be set to 15% of
all clusters. Then, we calculate a bootstrapped (100 − α)% confidence
interval based on 10.000 samples using the maximum number of clusters
and the relevant cluster sampling approach. If this confidence interval is
wider than the benchmark, we set the sample size requirements equal to
nmax. If it is smaller however, we recalculate the bootstrapped (100 − α)%
confidence interval using 0.5 ∗ nmax clusters. If this confidence interval is
wider than the benchmark, we next evaluate the bootstrapped confidence
interval when using 0.75 ∗ nmax clusters, if it is smaller, we next evaluate
the bootstrapped confidence interval at 0.25 ∗ nmax clusters and so on until
we find a bootstrapped confidence interval that is (almost) equal to the
desired size.
We repeat this process using both cluster sampling approaches and for
each scenario on five realizations of our synthetic population.
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Data description 5.3
We perform the analysis on a set of five synthetic populations. In this
section we show the data description of one of the five synthetic popu-
lations. The tables and figures for the other populations are provided in
Appendix 5.B.
Table 5.4 provides summary statistics for the whole region. Synthetic
population 1 consists of 179,931 individuals living in 37,298 households.
The households are mostly located in rural area’s. A quarter of the
household heads has had no formal education, almost a third has an
incomplete primary degree and only 14.2% has completed secondary or
tertiary schooling. Many are lacking access to improved toilet facilities
(79.9%), adequate structure (61.4%), or non-solid fuel (83.8%). However,
only few lack access to improved water facilities (26.8%) or have a house
with inadequate space (7.5%). Compared to the rest of Namibia, the
area is rather poor, with 62.1% of households falling in the lowest two
wealth quintiles, and only 17.9% in the highest two wealth quintiles. The
individuals are rather young, although compared to the average of Sub-
Saharan African countries there are relatively few children under five
(14.0% compared to 16.4%, UN (2017)) and relatively many individuals
older than fifty (13.6% compared to 9.8%, UN (2017)). The use of modern
contraception under 15-49 year old women is at 43.1% and 80.3% of
children under five have received all three DPT vaccinations.
Figure 5.4 shows a map of the EA-level prevalences as measured in
synthetic population 1 for each of the three key characteristics: individuals
in the poorest wealth quintile, women 15-49 using modern contraception,
and children under 5 who have received three DPT vaccinations.14 All
three maps show substantial spatial variation. The top graph shows the
prevalence of individuals in the poorest wealth category. There is a clear
relationship between the prevalence of poverty measured by asset indexes
and accessibility of areas. The poorest never live in the urban areas and
rarely live in the regions near a large road or in more densely populated
14Note, these maps do not depend on the chosen scenarios, as these scenarios only
result in within EA relocations of households. The EA-level prevalences are thus not
affected by the choice of scenario.
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Table 5.4: Summary statistics - Synthetic population 1
household-level variables individual-level variables
nr households 37298 nr individuals 179931
average household size 4.82 male 47.8%
urban 15.7% age:
education head - 0 - 4 14.0%
- no formal 25.1% - 5 - 14 26.3%
- incomplete primary 30.1% - 15 - 49 46.1%
- complete primary 30.6% - 50 plus 13.6%
- complete secondary 10.7%
- complete tertiary 3.5% nr women 15-49 42785
unimproved water 26.8% modern contraception 43.1%
unimproved toilet 79.9%
inadequate space 7.5% nr children under 5 25249








areas.15 The prevalence of the use of modern contraception shows a less
clear spatial pattern. Prediction models also show that the use of modern
contraception is only weakly related to indicators like education and access
to improved water facilities (which do show a distinct spatial pattern) and
more so to variables such as age (which is more uniformly distributed
over space). The prevalence of DPT3 vaccination seems to be somewhat
higher in more densely populated areas. However, also in the case of
DPT3 vaccination there is substantial variation unrelated to the observed
factors that show distinct spatial patterns.
The different scenarios defined in table 5.3 are likely to lead to fairly
different segment-level ICCs. Figure 5.5 shows the segment-level ICCs
together with boxplots of the segment-level prevalences. We can compare
these to the EA-level ICC and boxplots reported in the same figure. The
most left boxplot shows the spread of EA prevalence and confirms the
image painted in Figure 5.4. There is substantial spread in the prevalence
15Figures of population density and distance to roads can be found in Appendix 5.A.
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of being in the poorest wealth category, with half of EA prevalence levels
falling within about 14 percentage point of the median EA prevalence.
The spread of prevalence of modern contraception and DPT3 vaccination
is more centered, with half of EAs having a prevalence within about 4
percentage point of the median EA prevalence. This is also reflected in the
ICC, which is 0.17 for the poorest wealth category, but respectively 0.01
and 0.001 for use of modern contraception and DPT3 vaccination. The
EA-level will be the basis of our two-stage cluster sampling procedure.
The ICCs found in our synthetic population are close to the observed ICCs
in the DHS 2013 sample, which are 0.23 for the poorest wealth category,
-0.01 for contraception, and 0.02 for DPT3.16
For the one-stage cluster sampling procedure we cut the EAs into
segments holding about 25 households (based on a list ordered by the
(x,y) coordinates of households), relocated within their EA according to
different scenarios. In the baseline case households are kept at their orig-
inal location (scenario 1, second boxplot from the left). The spread of
segment prevalences is somewhat larger than the spread of EA preva-
lences. ICC levels are similar in case of contraception and DPT3 and only
slightly higher for the wealth indicator, such that we do not expect large
increases in sample size requirements when moving from a two-stage
cluster sampling design to a one-stage cluster sampling design.
The next four scenarios depict four possible extreme cases of spatial
clustering within EAs: (2) complete homogeneity, (3) perfect clustering
by wealth, (4) perfect clustering by contraception, (5) perfect clustering by
DPT3 vaccination. The spread and ICC in scenario 2 are almost equivalent
to the baseline scenario. When we assume perfect (within EA) clustering
by wealth index (scenario 3) or contraception (scenario 4) the spread on the
respective variable increases substantially. This is what one would expect,
since within every EA the poorest households, those with high fractions
of women using modern contraception, or those with high fractions of
16These figures are slightly lower than the national-level ICCs for Namibia, which are
respectively 0.41, 0.04, and, 0.09. There is quite some variation in regional-level ICCs for
the different regions in Namibia and Oshikoto represents a rather average regional case
for Namibia. The national-level ICCs and regional-level ICCs for all regions in Namibia
are reported in Appendix 5.D.
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Figure 5.5: ICC () and boxplots of prevalences per
EA/segment - Synthetic population 1
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children with a DPT3 vaccination were placed close together, so that they
end up in the same segment. Segments are thus likely to have either very
high prevalence rates on the respective variables or very low prevalence
rates. In scenario 4, the prevalence of use of modern contraception falls
within 40 percentage point of the median prevalence level for 50% of the
segments. The difference between the minimum and maximum prevalence
of DPT3 also increases under the assumption of perfect clustering (scenario
5). In this case however the bulk of prevalences is centered at the top, as
the median prevalence is equal to 100%. The average prevalence of DPT3
vaccination is quite high, such that clustering and segmenting will likely
lead to many segments with 100% prevalence and only few with slightly
lower prevalences.17 ICC levels increase substantially after clustering, most
extremely for wealth (from 0.19 under the baseline scenario to 0.77 under
scenario 3) and contraception (from 0.01 to 0.49 under scenario 4), and
somewhat more moderately for DPT3 (from 0.00 to 0.36 under scenario
5). Clustering by wealth also slightly affects the spread of prevalences of
contraception and DPT3, though the ICC levels are not affected. Based on
the reported increases in ICC we expect that there may be large differences
in the sample size requirements of one- and two-stage cluster sampling,
under the assumption of perfect clustering.
Clustering by underlying factors (scenarios 6-10) leads to a slight
increase in the spread of the prevalences. The increase is substantially
larger for the wealth indicator when we assume households are perfectly
clustered by structure (scenario 8). This may be because the percentage of
households with an inadequate structure is closer to 50%, so that there is
more potential for clustering or because the wealth and structure are more
closely related. Also when replacing 50% of households from scenarios
3-5 (scenarios 11-13) ICC levels only increase slightly.
17For example suppose we have an EA with 75 households and a household character-
istic with a prevalence rate of 50%. If we would order the households by prevalence and
then segment into three groups, the segments would have prevalence rates of 0%, 50%,
and 100%. However, would the EA prevalence have been equal to 90%, the resulting
segment-level prevalences would equal 70%, 100%, and 100%.
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Results 5.4
Baseline analysis 5.4.1
For each of the five synthetic populations we calculated the minimum
number of clusters necessary to obtain a sample estimate which is with 95%
certainty within 5 percentage points from the population mean. Table 5.5
reports the averages of the minimum number of clusters found in the
five synthetic populations. The results for the five synthetic populations
separately can be found in Appendix 5.C. There is only little variation
between the results for the different synthetic populations.
The minimum number of clusters under a two-stage cluster sample are
given in row 1. In case of a two-stage cluster sample we need to sample
sixty-five clusters to obtain a sufficiently precise estimate of the proportion
of individuals in the poorest wealth quintile (column 2), fifteen clusters
for the proportion of women using modern contraception (column 4), and
also fifteen clusters for the proportion of under five year old children with
a DPT3 vaccination (column 6). The relatively large requirements for the
wealth indicator stem from the fact that this measure has a higher ICC
than the other variables. Moreover, the variable is perfectly correlated
within households, so that each extra household virtually only adds one
extra data point (like in the case of perfectly clustered EAs/segments).
Would we want to estimate all three variables sufficiently precise in one
survey, we would need sixty-five clusters (column 8).
The minimum number of clusters to obtain a precise enough one-stage
cluster sample estimate are given in rows 2 to 14. Under the baseline
scenario (scenario 1) these are slightly higher than the two-stage cluster
sampling requirements. The average required number of clusters increase
by 1.1 times to seventy clusters for the wealth indicator, increases by 1.2
times to eighteen clusters for contraception, and remain fifteen clusters
for DPT3 vaccination status. This is not too different from the results
for the case of perfect homogeneity within EAs (scenario 2), indicating
that our baseline scenario is likely very similar to a perfect homogeneous
within EA setting. In our model we assumed perfect within grid cell
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Table 5.5: Required number of clusters - Baseline
poorest contraception DPT3 all three
nr. rel. nr. rel. nr. rel. nr. rel.
Scenario clusters diff clusters diff clusters diff clusters diff
a. Baseline
two-stage 65 - 15 - 15 - 65 -
1. Baseline 70 1.1 18 1.2 15 1.0 70 1.1
b. Extreme scenario’s
2. Homogeneous 70 1.1 18 1.2 16 1.0 70 1.1
3. Clustered by wealth index 282 4.3 19 1.3 17 1.2 282 4.3
4. Clustered by contraception 70 1.1 188 12.5 16 1.1 188 2.9
5. Clustered by DPT3 75 1.1 19 1.3 99 6.6 99 1.5
c. Clustering on underlying characteristics
6. Clustered by improved toilet 89 1.4 18 1.2 16 1.0 89 1.4
7. Clustered by improved water 75 1.1 18 1.2 16 1.1 75 1.1
8. Clustered by adequate structure 94 1.4 20 1.4 17 1.2 94 1.4
9. Clustered by adequate space 70 1.1 18 1.2 15 1.0 70 1.1
10. Clustered by non-solid fuel 70 1.1 18 1.2 16 1.1 70 1.1
d. Moderate clustering
11. 50% replaced from 3. 141 2.2 18 1.2 17 1.1 141 2.2
12. 50% replaced from 4. 70 1.1 58 3.9 16 1.1 70 1.1
13. 50% replaced from 5. 70 1.1 19 1.3 43 2.8 70 1.1
The minimum number of clusters are based on bootstrapped sample means and based on the
requirement that 95% of sample means should fall within 5 percentage point from the population
mean.
The minimum number of clusters is the average of the minimum number of clusters found in the five
synthetic populations. The results for each of the five synthetic populations seperately can be found
in Appendix 5.C.
homogeneity when assigning households to household locations. Since
an EA usually consists of more than one grid cell this assumption does
not need to lead to perfect within EA homogeneity. However, the different
cells within one EA likely have rather similar spatial characteristics, so
that they also get assigned a similar mix of households. Given this model,
it is thus reasonable to expect moderate within EA homogeneity. However,
households may also be located at certain locations for reasons that cannot
be captured by observables in a model, so that also perfect within EA
clustering is still a reasonable assumption.
Assuming perfect clustering by wealth index (scenario 3) increases the
one-stage sample size requirements to on average 282 clusters. This is
4.3 times higher than the two-stage sample size requirements. Perfect
clustering by contraception (scenario 4) increases the the sample size
requirements to 188 clusters, an increase of 12.5 times the two-stage
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sample size. Perfect clustering by DPT3 vaccination increases the sample
size requirements from 15 to 99. In all cases the sample size requirements
for the other variables are hardly affected. Although the sample size
requirements are the largest for the wealth indicator, the increase in
sample size requirements is starkest for contraception. The EA-level ICC
on this variable is very low, so that clustering and segmenting within the
EA can have large impacts. Also DPT3 vaccination has a low EA-level
ICC, but contrary to contraception it has a high overall prevalence rate,
so that even after within EA clustering and segmenting, the different
EAs look pretty similar.18 Even though perfect clustering leads to large
increases in the sample size requirements for contraception and DPT3, the
number of clusters needed for a complete household survey are affected
only moderately. Clustering makes these variables look more similar
to the wealth index in terms of ICC. Sample size requirements for the
complete survey are at most 4.3 times the requirements for a two-stage
cluster sample.
It may be more reasonable to assume that not wealth, contraception,
and DPT3 are perfectly clustered, but that the underlying characteristics
are perfectly clustered, i.e. if one does not have access to improved water,
his or her neighbor probably does not either. Under that assumption
the differences between one- and two-stage clustering are less extreme.
DPT3 vaccination is hardly correlated with water, toilet, structure, space,
or fuel, so that clustering on these variables is ‘as if’ there is complete
homogeneity for the variable of interest. The wealth index is more strongly
correlated with the underlying variables so that an increase in clusters is
required to estimate the prevalence of poorest sufficiently precise, from 70
to at most 94 clusters. The largest difference is found when clustering by
the adequacy of structure. When we assume that there is only moderate
18For the scenario 4 and 5 we assumed that the households without respectively women
aged 15-49 or children under 5 (those with missing values on use of contraception/DPT3)
were randomly located in between the households ordered by use of modern contracep-
tion/DPT3 vaccination. We could also assume that not only families with vaccinated
children (women using modern contraception) live close together, but also families with
young children (women aged 15-49) in general. When we would apply this assumption,
the sample size requirements for contraception remain at 188 clusters, but the sample
size requirements for DPT3 decrease to 65.
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within EA clustering (scenario 11-13), the number of clusters increase
slightly: a doubling of clusters in case of wealth, almost four times the
amount in case of contraception, and almost tripling for DPT3.
The results for the different populations are comparable, though vari-
ation exist. For example, for the scenario of moderate clustering by
contraception, increases in sample sizes lie between 3.1 and 4.7 times the
sample size of two-stage cluster sampling. But the differences in panel c.
are at most a factor 0.7.
5.4.2 Increasing sample sizes per cluster
The situation described above fits well to the case of multi-topic LMIC
household surveys. However, in case of a topic specific survey focusing on
a specific subsample of the population, for example immunization surveys,
one may be tempted to enroll more households per cluster, because not
every household will have an eligible household member.
Table 5.6 shows the required number of clusters for DPT3 vaccination
under the assumption of (1) a two-stage cluster sample enrolling 25 house-
holds, (2) a one-stage cluster sample enrolling all households per cluster,
(3) a one-stage cluster sample enrolling 50 households per cluster for the
scenario’s as described above, (4) a one-stage cluster sample enrolling 75
households per cluster for the scenario’s as described above. Would one
opt for generating segments of on average 50 households, rather than 25,
eight clusters should be enrolled to achieve an accurate coverage estimate
under the baseline scenario. In case of 75 households per segment this
reduces to six clusters and would we enroll all households per cluster it
reduces further to five clusters. The larger the segments, the less relevant
the different scenario’s become. As we have on average 86 households per
EA, segments of size 75 are as if we are sampling the whole EA in most
cases.
Extreme clustering by DPT3 status still results in a rather large sample
size in the case where segments hold 50 households: 24 segments should
be sampled, which is on average equal to 1200 households, three times
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Table 5.6: Required number of clusters - increasing cluster size
50 households per segment 75 households per segment
nr. rel. diff nr. rel. diff
Scenario clusters clusters HHsa clusters clusters HHsa
a. Baseline
two-stage (25 HHs) 15 - - - - -
one-stage (all HHs) 5 0.4 1.2 - - -
1. Baseline 8 0.5 1.0 6 0.4 1.2
b. Extreme scenario’s
2. Homogeneous 7 0.5 1.0 6 0.4 1.2
3. Clustered by wealth index 7 0.5 0.9 6 0.4 1.2
4. Clustered by contraception 7 0.5 1.0 6 0.4 1.2
5. Clustered by DPT3 24 1.6 3.2 9 0.6 1.8
c. Clustering on underlying characteristics
6. Clustered by improved toilet 8 0.5 1.0 6 0.4 1.2
7. Clustered by improved water 8 0.5 1.1 6 0.4 1.2
8. Clustered by adequate structure 7 0.5 1.0 6 0.4 1.2
9. Clustered by adequate space 7 0.5 0.9 6 0.4 1.2
10. Clustered by non-solid fuel 7 0.5 0.9 6 0.4 1.2
d. Moderate clustering
11. 50% replaced from 3. 6 0.4 0.9 6 0.4 1.2
12. 50% replaced from 4. 6 0.4 0.9 6 0.4 1.2
13. 50% replaced from 5. 12 0.8 1.6 6 0.4 1.2
a Calculated as the number of clusters times 50, 75 households, or the average number of
households per EA (for row 2) divided by the number of clusters under a two-stage design
times 25 households.
The minimum number of clusters are based on bootstrapped sample means and based on
the requirement that 95% of sample means should fall within 5 percentage point from the
population mean.
The minimum number of clusters is the average of the minimum number of clusters found in
the five synthetic populations. The results for each of the five synthetic populations seperately
can be found in Appendix 5.C.
more than in the baseline two-stage sample. The number of households at
most doubles when taking segments of 75 households.
524582-L-sub01-bw-Kools
Processed on: 20-9-2018
206 One-stage versus two-stage cluster sampling Chapter 5
5.5 Discussion
The results provide us with guidelines of the possible requirements of
one-stage cluster sampling under extreme situations. Whereas the variety
within the modeled region (Oshikoto, Namibia) makes it an interesting
case to look at, there are also some limitations to the region, which may
result in more moderate outcomes then we would find elsewhere. First
of all, the EAs in Oshikoto are relatively small, holding on average 86
households. Typical EAs in other countries consist of 200 or even 400/500
households. In larger EAs, the effects of clustering on the sample size
requirements of one-stage cluster sampling could potentially be larger.
Secondly, whereas there are relatively many households in Oshikoto falling
in the poorest wealth category, none of these seem to live in the urban
areas. In many other LMIC settings, you would expect to find the poorest
in cities, possibly leading to more extreme clustering effects.
Another limitation of the analysis is that it does inform us about what
could happen in different extreme situations, but not how likely it is to
encounter such situations. Although literature gives guidance on likely
levels of ICCs and more general spatial patterns, little is written about
how households are located within EAs. Intuitively, the amount of within
EA clustering will depend on the type of EA. One may for example
expect more clustering in an EA that covers a rural village, then in an
EA covering multiple farms or a city block. Similarly, it would not be
unreasonable to assume that wealth levels vary from street to street, due to
the difference in types of houses, whereas contraception and vaccination
levels are less likely to be linked to such specific locations. There does exist
a line of research devoted to the effect of scale on measurements of racial
segregations in large metropolitan cities in industrial countries where there
is a higher availability of geo-coded micro-data. This research indicates
that there is some variation between egocentric measurements based on
a 100m radius versus a 1000m radius around households or individuals
(Petrović et al. 2018), and slight variations in egocentric measurements
including the 50 nearest neighbors compared to 200 nearest neighbors
of households or individuals (Östh et al. 2015). However, it is not clear
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how these results would generalize to (rural) LMIC settings or to socio-
economic and health variables.
Conclusion 5.6
In this chapter we compared the commonly used two-stage cluster sam-
pling approach to the alternative one-stage cluster sampling approach.
We generated a synthetic population of Oshikoto, Namibia to provide as
a testing ground for both sampling approaches. The households in this
population were assigned to realistic (x,y) coordinates, in order to simulate
realistic spatial patterns of the different household characteristics. To
facilitate one-stage cluster sampling we created smaller Primary Sampling
Units by segmenting Enumeration Areas (EAs) under different scenarios
of within EA clustering. We searched for the minimum number of clusters
to obtain an adequate sample in an iterative way based on bootstrapped
confidence intervals of the sample means.
The results show that in most moderate scenario’s the required number
of clusters for one-stage cluster sampling is fewer than twice the required
number of clusters of two-stage sampling, under the assumption that the
same number of households per cluster are sampled with both methods.
Under extreme clustering scenarios, the required number of clusters can
increase by up to thirteen times. Especially when the EA-level intracluster
correlation is moderate and prevalence is close to 50%, extreme assump-
tions about within EA clustering have large impact on the required number
of clusters. When measuring variables focusing on small subsamples of
the population, it can be beneficial to apply one-stage cluster sampling
with larger segment sizes. This can lower the required number of clusters
to visit, while enrolling the same number of households in the survey. By
increasing segment sizes, clustering scenarios also become less relevant.
Whether one-stage or two-stage clustering is more cost-effective will
depend on the type of survey and the regional context. Aspects such
as the length of the survey, the type of survey (does it only include a
questionnaire or also the collection of biomarkers?), and the accessibility
of the regions will determine the relative costs of the two types of sampling
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Maps of Oshikoto 5.A
Figure 5.6: Population density in Oshikoto expressed in people
per pixel (roughly 100m2).
source: www.worldpop.org, Linard et al. (2012)
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Figure 5.7: Distance to major roads (km).
source: Spatial covariate processed by the "Global High Resolution Population
Denominators" Project (original source: 2016 OSM highways).
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Data description for synthetic populations 2-5 5.B
Table 5.7: summary statistics for synthetic populations 2-5
pop 2 pop 3 pop 4 pop 5
nr households 37298 37298 37298 37298
average household size 4.82 4.83 4.83 4.83
urban 15.7% 15.7% 15.7% 15.7%
education head
- no formal 24.9% 25.1% 24.8% 25.0%
- incomplete primary 30.0% 30.5% 30.3% 30.2%
- complete primary 31.2% 30.5% 31.1% 31.1%
- complete secondary 10.2% 10.6% 10.2% 10.5%
- complete tertiary 3.6% 3.4% 3.5% 3.3%
unimproved water 26.8% 27.1% 26.9% 27.3%
unimproved toilet 79.9% 80.1% 80.3% 80.5%
inadequate space 7.8% 7.7% 7.5% 7.7%
inadequate structure 61.3% 61.4% 61.5% 62.1%
solid fuel 83.6% 84.0% 84.0% 84.1%
wealth index
- poorest 33.6% 34.0% 34.1% 34.4%
- poorer 28.7% 28.5% 28.6% 28.4%
- middle 19.6% 19.6% 19.2% 19.3%
- richer 13.4% 13.1% 13.7% 13.4%
- richest 4.7% 4.6% 4.3% 4.4%
nr individuals 179854 180233 180164 180111
male 48.0% 48.1% 48.2% 48.0%
age:
- 0 - 4 14.2% 14.3% 14.0% 14.1%
- 5 - 14 26.2% 26.1% 26.1% 26.3%
- 15 - 49 46.2% 46.1% 46.4% 46.1%
- 50 plus 13.5% 13.5% 13.5% 13.5%
nr women 15-49 43007 42930 42903 42708
modern contraception 0.4350222 0.4329839 0.438967 0.436007
nr children under 5 25466 25742 25258 25463
DPT3 vaccination 80.4% 80.6% 80.2% 80.2%
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Figure 5.12: ICC () and boxplots of prevalences per
EA/segment - Synthetic population 2
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Figure 5.13: ICC () and boxplots of prevalences per
EA/segment -Synthetic population 3
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Figure 5.14: ICC () and boxplots of prevalences per
EA/segment - Synthetic population 4
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Figure 5.15: ICC () and boxplots of prevalences per
EA/segment - Synthetic population 5
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5.C Results for each of the 5 synthetic populations
5.C.1 Baseline results
Table 5.8: Required number of clusters - Baseline - Population 1
poorest contraception DPT3 all three
nr. rel. nr. rel. nr. rel. nr. rel.
Scenario clusters diff clusters diff clusters diff clusters diff
a. Baseline
two-stage 70 - 15 - 15 - 70 -
1. Baseline 70 1.0 18 1.2 12 0.8 70 1.0
b. Extreme scenario’s
2. Homogeneous 70 1.0 18 1.2 18 1.2 70 1.0
3. Clustered by wealth index 282 4.0 18 1.2 18 1.2 282 4.0
4. Clustered by contraception 70 1.0 188 12.5 15 1.0 188 2.7
5. Clustered by DPT3 94 1.3 18 1.2 94 6.3 94 1.3
c. Clustering on underlying characteristics
6. Clustered by improved toilet 94 1.3 18 1.2 18 1.2 94 1.3
7. Clustered by improved water 94 1.3 18 1.2 15 1.0 94 1.3
8. Clustered by adequate structure 94 1.3 24 1.6 18 1.2 94 1.3
9. Clustered by adequate space 70 1.0 18 1.2 18 1.2 70 1.0
10. Clustered by non-solid fuel 70 1.0 18 1.2 15 1.0 70 1.0
d. Moderate clustering
11. 50% replaced from 3. 141 2.0 18 1.2 18 1.2 141 2.0
12. 50% replaced from 4. 70 1.0 58 3.9 18 1.2 70 1.0
13. 50% replaced from 5. 70 1.0 18 1.2 36 2.4 70 1.0
The minimum number of clusters are based on bootstrapped sample means and based on the




One-stage versus two-stage cluster sampling Chapter 5 221
Table 5.9: Required number of clusters - Baseline - Population 2
poorest contraception DPT3 all three
nr. rel. nr. rel. nr. rel. nr. rel.
Scenario clusters diff clusters diff clusters diff clusters diff
a. Baseline
two-stage 70 - 15 - 15 - 70 -
1. Baseline 70 1.0 18 1.2 18 1.2 70 1.0
b. Extreme scenario’s
2. Homogeneous 70 1.0 18 1.2 12 0.8 70 1.0
3. Clustered by wealth index 282 4.0 18 1.2 18 1.2 282 4.0
4. Clustered by contraception 70 1.0 188 12.5 18 1.2 188 2.7
5. Clustered by DPT3 70 1.0 18 1.2 94 6.3 94 1.3
c. Clustering on underlying characteristics
6. Clustered by improved toilet 94 1.3 18 1.2 18 1.2 94 1.3
7. Clustered by improved water 70 1.0 18 1.2 18 1.2 70 1.0
8. Clustered by adequate structure 94 1.3 18 1.2 18 1.2 94 1.3
9. Clustered by adequate space 70 1.0 18 1.2 15 1.0 70 1.0
10. Clustered by non-solid fuel 70 1.0 18 1.2 15 1.0 70 1.0
d. Moderate clustering
11. 50% replaced from 3. 141 2.0 18 1.2 15 1.0 141 2.0
12. 50% replaced from 4. 70 1.0 70 4.7 15 1.0 70 1.0
13. 50% replaced from 5. 70 1.0 18 1.2 47 3.1 70 1.0
The minimum number of clusters are based on bootstrapped sample means and based on the
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Table 5.10: Required number of clusters - Baseline - Population 3
poorest contraception DPT3 all three
nr. rel. nr. rel. nr. rel. nr. rel.
Scenario clusters diff clusters diff clusters diff clusters diff
a. Baseline
two-stage 47 - 15 - 15 - 47 -
1. Baseline 70 1.5 18 1.2 12 0.8 70 1.5
b. Extreme scenario’s
2. Homogeneous 70 1.5 18 1.2 12 0.8 70 1.5
3. Clustered by wealth index 282 6.0 18 1.2 15 1.0 282 6.0
4. Clustered by contraception 70 1.5 188 12.5 12 0.8 188 4.0
5. Clustered by DPT3 70 1.5 18 1.2 94 6.3 94 2.0
c. Clustering on underlying characteristics
6. Clustered by improved toilet 94 2.0 18 1.2 12 0.8 94 2.0
7. Clustered by improved water 70 1.5 18 1.2 12 0.8 70 1.5
8. Clustered by adequate structure 94 2.0 24 1.6 18 1.2 94 2.0
9. Clustered by adequate space 70 1.5 18 1.2 12 0.8 70 1.5
10. Clustered by non-solid fuel 70 1.5 18 1.2 15 1.0 70 1.5
d. Moderate clustering
11. 50% replaced from 3. 141 3.0 18 1.2 15 1.0 141 3.0
12. 50% replaced from 4. 70 1.5 47 3.1 12 0.8 70 1.5
13. 50% replaced from 5. 70 1.5 18 1.2 47 3.1 70 1.5
The minimum number of clusters are based on bootstrapped sample means and based on the
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Table 5.11: Required number of clusters - Baseline - Population 4
poorest contraception DPT3 all three
nr. rel. nr. rel. nr. rel. nr. rel.
Scenario clusters diff clusters diff clusters diff clusters diff
a. Baseline
two-stage 70 - 15 - 15 - 70 -
1. Baseline 70 1.0 18 1.2 15 1.0 70 1.0
b. Extreme scenario’s
2. Homogeneous 70 1.0 18 1.2 18 1.2 70 1.0
3. Clustered by wealth index 282 4.0 18 1.2 18 1.2 282 4.0
4. Clustered by contraception 70 1.0 188 12.5 18 1.2 188 2.7
5. Clustered by DPT3 70 1.0 18 1.2 94 6.3 94 1.3
c. Clustering on underlying characteristics
6. Clustered by improved toilet 94 1.3 18 1.2 18 1.2 94 1.3
7. Clustered by improved water 70 1.0 18 1.2 18 1.2 70 1.0
8. Clustered by adequate structure 94 1.3 18 1.2 18 1.2 94 1.3
9. Clustered by adequate space 70 1.0 18 1.2 12 0.8 70 1.0
10. Clustered by non-solid fuel 70 1.0 18 1.2 18 1.2 70 1.0
d. Moderate clustering
11. 50% replaced from 3. 141 2.0 18 1.2 18 1.2 141 2.0
12. 50% replaced from 4. 70 1.0 70 4.7 18 1.2 70 1.0
13. 50% replaced from 5. 70 1.0 24 1.6 47 3.1 70 1.0
The minimum number of clusters are based on bootstrapped sample means and based on the
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Table 5.12: Required number of clusters - Baseline - Population 5
poorest contraception DPT3 all three
nr. rel. nr. rel. nr. rel. nr. rel.
Scenario clusters diff clusters diff clusters diff clusters diff
a. Baseline
two-stage 70 - 15 - 15 - 70 -
1. Baseline 70 1.0 18 1.2 18 1.2 70 1.0
b. Extreme scenario’s
2. Homogeneous 70 1.0 18 1.2 18 1.2 70 1.0
3. Clustered by wealth index 282 4.0 24 1.6 18 1.2 282 4.0
4. Clustered by contraception 70 1.0 188 12.5 18 1.2 188 2.7
5. Clustered by DPT3 70 1.0 24 1.6 118 7.9 118 1.7
c. Clustering on underlying characteristics
6. Clustered by improved toilet 70 1.0 18 1.2 12 0.8 70 1.0
7. Clustered by improved water 70 1.0 18 1.2 18 1.2 70 1.0
8. Clustered by adequate structure 94 1.3 18 1.2 15 1.0 94 1.3
9. Clustered by adequate space 70 1.0 18 1.2 18 1.2 70 1.0
10. Clustered by non-solid fuel 70 1.0 18 1.2 18 1.2 70 1.0
d. Moderate clustering
11. 50% replaced from 3. 141 2.0 18 1.2 18 1.2 141 2.0
12. 50% replaced from 4. 70 1.0 47 3.1 18 1.2 70 1.0
13. 50% replaced from 5. 70 1.0 18 1.2 36 2.4 70 1.0
The minimum number of clusters are based on bootstrapped sample means and based on the




One-stage versus two-stage cluster sampling Chapter 5 225
Additional results 5.C.2
Table 5.13: Required number of clusters - Increasing cluster size - Population 1
50 households per segment 75 households per segment
rel. diff rel. diff
Scenario nr. clusters clusters householdsa nr. clusters clusters householdsa
a. Baseline
two-stage (25 HHs) 15 - - - - -
one-stage (all HHs) 4 0.3 0.9 - - -
1. Baseline 9 0.6 1.2 6 0.4 1.2
b. Extreme scenario’s
2. Homogeneous 6 0.4 0.8 6 0.4 1.2
3. Clustered by wealth index 8 0.5 1.1 5 0.3 1.0
4. Clustered by contraception 6 0.4 0.8 6 0.4 1.2
5. Clustered by DPT3 24 1.6 3.2 9 0.6 1.8
c. Clustering on underlying characteristics
6. Clustered by improved toilet 8 0.5 1.1 6 0.4 1.2
7. Clustered by improved water 6 0.4 0.8 6 0.4 1.2
8. Clustered by adequate structure 6 0.4 0.8 6 0.4 1.2
9. Clustered by adequate space 6 0.4 0.8 6 0.4 1.2
10. Clustered by non-solid fuel 6 0.4 0.8 6 0.4 1.2
d. Moderate clustering
11. 50% replaced from 3. 6 0.4 0.8 6 0.4 1.2
12. 50% replaced from 4. 6 0.4 0.8 6 0.4 1.2
13. 50% replaced from 5. 12 0.8 1.6 6 0.4 1.2
a Calculated as the number of clusters times 50, 75 households, or the average number of households per EA (for
row 2) divided by the number of clusters under a two-stage design times 25 households.
The minimum number of clusters are based on bootstrapped sample means and based on the requirement that
95% of sample means should fall within 5 percentage point from the population mean.
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Table 5.14: Required number of clusters - Increasing cluster size - Population 2
50 households per segment 75 households per segment
nr. rel. diff nr. rel. diff
Scenario clusters clusters HHsa clusters clusters HHsa
a. Baseline
two-stage (25 HHs) 15 - - - - -
one-stage (all HHs) 5 0.3 1.1 - - -
1. Baseline 9 0.6 1.2 6 0.4 1.2
b. Extreme scenario’s
2. Homogeneous 9 0.6 1.2 6 0.4 1.2
3. Clustered by wealth index 9 0.6 1.2 6 0.4 1.2
4. Clustered by contraception 6 0.4 0.8 6 0.4 1.2
5. Clustered by DPT3 24 1.6 3.2 9 0.6 1.8
c. Clustering on underlying characteristics
6. Clustered by improved toilet 9 0.6 1.2 6 0.4 1.2
7. Clustered by improved water 9 0.6 1.2 6 0.4 1.2
8. Clustered by adequate structure 8 0.5 1.1 6 0.4 1.2
9. Clustered by adequate space 8 0.5 1.1 6 0.4 1.2
10. Clustered by non-solid fuel 6 0.4 0.8 5 0.3 1.0
d. Moderate clustering
11. 50% replaced from 3. 6 0.4 0.8 6 0.4 1.2
12. 50% replaced from 4. 8 0.5 1.1 6 0.4 1.2
13. 50% replaced from 5. 12 0.8 1.6 6 0.4 1.2
a Calculated as the number of clusters times 50, 75 households, or the average number of
households per EA (for row 2) divided by the number of clusters under a two-stage design
times 25 households.
The minimum number of clusters are based on bootstrapped sample means and based on
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Table 5.15: Required number of clusters - Increasing cluster size - Population 3
50 households per segment 75 households per segment
nr. rel. diff nr. rel. diff
Scenario clusters clusters HHsa clusters clusters HHsa
a. Baseline
two-stage (25 HHs) 15 - - - - -
one-stage (all HHs) 6 0.4 1.3 - - -
1. Baseline 6 0.4 0.8 6 0.4 1.2
b. Extreme scenario’s
2. Homogeneous 6 0.4 0.8 6 0.4 1.2
3. Clustered by wealth index 6 0.4 0.8 6 0.4 1.2
4. Clustered by contraception 9 0.6 1.2 6 0.4 1.2
5. Clustered by DPT3 24 1.6 3.2 9 0.6 1.8
c. Clustering on underlying characteristics
6. Clustered by improved toilet 6 0.4 0.8 6 0.4 1.2
7. Clustered by improved water 8 0.5 1.1 6 0.4 1.2
8. Clustered by adequate structure 8 0.5 1.1 6 0.4 1.2
9. Clustered by adequate space 6 0.4 0.8 5 0.3 1.0
10. Clustered by non-solid fuel 8 0.5 1.1 6 0.4 1.2
d. Moderate clustering
11. 50% replaced from 3. 8 0.5 1.1 6 0.4 1.2
12. 50% replaced from 4. 6 0.4 0.8 6 0.4 1.2
13. 50% replaced from 5. 12 0.8 1.6 6 0.4 1.2
a Calculated as the number of clusters times 50, 75 households, or the average number of
households per EA (for row 2) divided by the number of clusters under a two-stage design
times 25 households.
The minimum number of clusters are based on bootstrapped sample means and based on
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Table 5.16: Required number of clusters - Increasing cluster size - Population 4
50 households per segment 75 households per segment
nr. rel. diff nr. rel. diff
Scenario clusters clusters HHsa clusters clusters HHsa
a. Baseline
two-stage (25 HHs) 15 - - - - -
one-stage (all HHs) 6 0.4 1.3 - - -
1. Baseline 9 0.6 1.2 6 0.4 1.2
b. Extreme scenario’s
2. Homogeneous 9 0.6 1.2 6 0.4 1.2
3. Clustered by wealth index 6 0.4 0.8 6 0.4 1.2
4. Clustered by contraception 9 0.6 1.2 6 0.4 1.2
5. Clustered by DPT3 24 1.6 3.2 9 0.6 1.8
c. Clustering on underlying characteristics
6. Clustered by improved toilet 9 0.6 1.2 6 0.4 1.2
7. Clustered by improved water 9 0.6 1.2 6 0.4 1.2
8. Clustered by adequate structure 9 0.6 1.2 6 0.4 1.2
9. Clustered by adequate space 9 0.6 1.2 6 0.4 1.2
10. Clustered by non-solid fuel 9 0.6 1.2 6 0.4 1.2
d. Moderate clustering
11. 50% replaced from 3. 6 0.4 0.8 6 0.4 1.2
12. 50% replaced from 4. 6 0.4 0.8 6 0.4 1.2
13. 50% replaced from 5. 12 0.8 1.6 6 0.4 1.2
a Calculated as the number of clusters times 50, 75 households, or the average number of
households per EA (for row 2) divided by the number of clusters under a two-stage design
times 25 households.
The minimum number of clusters are based on bootstrapped sample means and based on
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Table 5.17: Required number of clusters - Increasing cluster size - Population 5
50 households per segment 75 households per segment
nr. rel. diff nr. rel. diff
Scenario clusters clusters HHsa clusters clusters HHsa
a. Baseline
two-stage (25 HHs) 15 - - - - -
one-stage (all HHs) 6 0.4 1.3 - - -
1. Baseline 6 0.4 0.8 6 0.4 1.2
b. Extreme scenario’s
2. Homogeneous 6 0.4 0.8 6 0.4 1.2
3. Clustered by wealth index 6 0.4 0.8 6 0.4 1.2
4. Clustered by contraception 7 0.5 0.9 5 0.3 1.0
5. Clustered by DPT3 24 1.6 3.2 9 0.6 1.8
c. Clustering on underlying characteristics
6. Clustered by improved toilet 6 0.4 0.8 6 0.4 1.2
7. Clustered by improved water 8 0.5 1.1 6 0.4 1.2
8. Clustered by adequate structure 6 0.4 0.8 6 0.4 1.2
9. Clustered by adequate space 6 0.4 0.8 6 0.4 1.2
10. Clustered by non-solid fuel 6 0.4 0.8 6 0.4 1.2
d. Moderate clustering
11. 50% replaced from 3. 6 0.4 0.8 6 0.4 1.2
12. 50% replaced from 4. 6 0.4 0.8 6 0.4 1.2
13. 50% replaced from 5. 12 0.8 1.6 6 0.4 1.2
a Calculated as the number of clusters times 50, 75 households, or the average number of
households per EA (for row 2) divided by the number of clusters under a two-stage design
times 25 households.
The minimum number of clusters are based on bootstrapped sample means and based on
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5.D Additional statistics
Table 5.18: Observed ICCs in DHS Namibia
2013
Poorest Contraception DPT3
Namibia 0.4142 0.0396 0.0885
Caprivi 0.4015 0.0008 0.0221
Erongo 0.0302 0.0380 0.0959
Hardap 0.2799 0.0194 0.0030
Karas 0.3624 0.0191 0.1197
Kavango 0.3842 0.0379 0.0724
Khomas 0.1324 0.0053 0.0486
Kunene 0.3179 0.0683 0.2407
Ohangwena 0.2694 0.0371 0.0677
Omaheke 0.1394 -0.0055 0.0504
Omusati 0.1487 0.0457 0.0116
Oshana 0.1772 0.0541 -0.0460
Oshikoto 0.2314 -0.0062 0.0237
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Onderzoek naar vermogen, gezondheid en dataverzameling.
Sociale verzekeringen hebben als doel om individuen een financieel
vangnet te bieden wanneer ze met tegenslag geconfronteerd worden. Ech-
ter, bij het vormgeven van een systeem van sociale verzekeringen wordt
vaak niet alleen gekeken naar de bescherming die het systeem biedt, maar
ook hoe met behulp van het systeem het welvaartsniveau kan worden
verhoogd. Hiervoor is kennis nodig over zowel de individuele reacties op
tegenslag, zoals ziekte of een vermogensschok, als de individuele reacties
op het systeem dat men moet beschermen tegen die tegenslag. Als ie-
mand bijvoorbeeld de hoogte van bijdragen aan sociale verzekeringen wil
bepalen, zal diegene eerst moeten begrijpen hoe individuen bij voorkeur
hun financiële middelen verdelen over verschillende mogelijke levensuit-
komsten en hoe consumptiepatronen beïnvloed worden door negatieve
schokken zoals ziekte. Daarnaast zal diegene moeten begrijpen welke
negatieve effecten sociale verzekeringen met zich mee kunnen brengen in
de vorm van moral hazard en of deze teniet gedaan kunnen worden met
behulp van complementaire interventies. Om zulke gedragseffecten te
kunnen onderzoeken is toegang tot data op individueel niveau, die van
hoge kwaliteit is en representatief voor de onderzoekspopulatie, essentieel.
Verbeteringen in dataverzamelingsmethoden is dus van groot belang voor




Dit proefschrift bevat vier papers die betrekking hebben op de hier-
boven beschreven problematiek. In het eerste paper geven we antwoord
op de vraag: "Wat is het effect van de dalingen in Nederlandse pensioen- en
woningvermogens gedurende de periode 2008-2014 op de minimale uitgaven na
pensionering?" In de laatste jaren is het pensioensysteem in Nederland on-
derhevig geweest aan verschillende veranderingen. Naar aanleiding van
de toenemende grijze druk is de fiscaal gefaciliteerde pensioenopbouw ver-
soberd en de AOW-leeftijd verhoogd. Daarnaast kwamen pensioenfondsen
in de problemen. De levensverwachting, en daarmee de verplichtingen,
nam sneller toe dan verwacht en de rente was gedaald. Ook waren de
mogelijkheden om tegenvallende beleggingsresultaten te compenseren
met premieverhogingen beperkt door de toenemende grijze druk. Tijdens
de financiële crisis zagen pensioenfondsen geen andere mogelijkheid dan
indexaties achterwege laten en in sommige gevallen moesten de pensioen-
uitkeringen zelfs in nominale termen gekort worden. Tegelijkertijd was er
een scherpe daling in de huizenprijzen. Deze ontwikkelingen leidden tot
ongerustheid: hebben huishoudens nog wel voldoende middelen om hun
oude dag te financieren?
Een pensioen wordt toereikend bevonden als het de individu in staat
stelt zijn levensstandaard van voor pensionering voort te zetten. Dit
wordt doorgaans op een nogal pragmatische manier beoordeeld: het bruto
inkomen na pensionering wordt voldoende bevonden als het tenminste
gelijk is aan 70% van het gemiddelde bruto inkomen voor pensionering.
Het idee achter deze 70%-maatstaf is dat individuen na pensionering niet
langer hoeven te sparen, geen werk gerelateerde uitgaven meer hebben
en meer tijd hebben om zelf klusjes in en om het huis te doen om zo hun
uitgaven te verlagen. Als door de veranderingen in het pensioenstelsel
het pensioeninkomen van iemand onder deze 70% duikt zouden we ons
volgens deze maatstaf dus zorgen moeten gaan maken. Echter, optimale
vervangingsratio’s kunnen door de tijd heen veranderen. Het optimale
levenscyclusmodel voorspelt dat individuen die tegen een onverwachte
daling van het vermogen aanlopen, zowel vandaag als in de toekomst hun




vangnet door schokken in toekomstig pensioeninkomen te spreiden over
een langere periode, met lagere optimale vervangingsratio’s als gevolg.
Om een inschatting te maken van de omvang van deze individuele
gedragsreacties maken wij gebruik van een enquête waarin mensen zowel
voor als na de crisis gevraagd zijn naar hun minimale uitgaven na pensio-
nering. We koppelen deze informatie aan administratieve gegevens over
(pensioen)vermogen. Aan de hand van deze data schatten we wat het
effect is van een schok in het pensioenvermogen op de minimale uitgaven
na pensionering. Dankzij het verplichte karakter van de Nederlandse
pensioenen kunnen we het effect van de individuele vermogensschok
onderscheiden van meer algemene effecten zoals pessimisme. Daarnaast
kijken we aan de hand van simulaties hoe de toereikendheid van pensioe-
nen is veranderd tussen 2008 en 2014, en wat de rol van veranderingen in
minimale uitgaven hierbij is geweest.
De resultaten laten zien dat een daling van 100 euro in pensioenannui-
teiten zich vertaalt in een daling van 23-33 euro in minimale uitgaven na
pensionering. Echter hebben meer algemene veranderingen in sentiment
ook tot dalingen in gewenste uitgaven geleid. Jongeren reageren vooral
op dalingen in het woonvermogen, waar ouderen sterker reageren op da-
lingen in het pensioenvermogen. Daarnaast lijken individuen met hogere
inkomens hun toekomstige uitgaven meer aan te passen dan individuen
met lagere inkomens. De simulaties laten zien dat het percentage mensen
met te weinig pensioen, gedefinieerd als een netto pensioenannuiteit die
kleiner is dan de gewenste uitgaven, licht gestegen is tijdens de crisisjaren.
Echter, als mensen hun gewenste uitgaven niet hadden aangepast, was dit
percentage bijna verdubbeld.
In het tweede paper keren we terug naar het optimale levenscyclus-
model, maar verschuiven we onze aandacht naar de rol van gezondheid
in het vormen van consumptievoorkeuren. Het levenscyclusmodel is een
nuttig middel om welvaartseffecten van bijvoorbeeld ziektekostenverze-
keringen of het pensioenstelsel te evalueren. Volgens dit model is het
totale nut tijdens iemands leven het hoogst als het verwachte marginale




met factoren zoals ongeduld en risico-aversie. Het verwachte marginale
nut hangt af van de kans op gebeurtenissen zoals het verliezen van een
baan of het vormen van een gezin, welke óf het toekomstig inkomen
beïnvloeden (in het geval van baanverlies) óf het nut dat ontleend wordt
aan een extra euro consumptie (in het geval van gezinsformatie). In beide
gevallen wordt het optimale niveau van bijdragen en uitkeringen beïn-
vloed. Ook gezondheid zou een rol in dit model kunnen spelen en niet
alleen omdat een verslechtering van de gezondheid iemands potentiële
verdiencapaciteit kan beïnvloeden. Hoe gezond iemand is kan namelijk
ook invloed hebben op het marginale nut van consumptie, bijvoorbeeld
omdat iemand minder plezier ontleent aan een avontuurlijke vakantie in
tijden van slechte gezondheid, maar bijvoorbeeld meer nut ontleent aan de
uitgaven aan een schoonmaker. Het empirisch onderzoek gericht op het
meten van het effect van gezondheid op het marginale nut van consumptie
geeft gemengde resultaten en is voornamelijk gebaseerd op data uit de
Verenigde Staten. Daarom proberen we in dit paper de volgende vraag
te beantwoorden: "Wat is het effect van gezondheid op het marginale nut van
consumptie in Europa?"
Om deze vraag te beantwoorden ontwikkelen we een methodologisch
kader waarbinnen een relatie wordt gelegd tussen subjectieve uitspraken
over inkomenstevredenheid en het levenscyclusmodel. Het voordeel van
dit methodologisch kader ten opzichte van andere methodes is dat er
gebruik gemaakt wordt van een vraag die in veel verschillende repre-
sentatieve nationale enquêtes gesteld wordt en dat met deze methode
ook precieze resultaten geschat kunnen worden als de panel data maar
relatief weinig jaargangen bevat. Dit is in het bijzonder relevant binnen
de Europese context, waar geharmoniseerde panel data pas relatief recent
zijn geïntroduceerd. Wij passen de methode toe op data van SHARE, een
enquête gericht op 50+’ers in verschillende Europese landen.
De resultaten laten zien dat een verslechtering van de gezondheid leidt
tot een stijging van het marginale nut van consumptie voor de gemid-
delde Europeaan. Dit betekent dat de welvaart verhoogd kan worden
door inkomen te verschuiven van periodes van goede gezondheid, naar




ringen). Echter, een verslechtering van de cognitieve gezondheid leidt tot
een daling van het marginale nut van consumptie, waarschijnlijk omdat
het moeilijker wordt om te plannen en initiatief te tonen.
Ook in het derde paper kijken we naar economisch gedrag na ziekte.
Tot 2004 waren alle werknemers in Nederland verzekerd tegen arbeidson-
geschiktheid onder de Wet op Arbeidsongeschiktheidsverzekering (WAO).
Via deze verzekering had men recht op een uitkering ter hoogte van 70%
van hun inkomen wanneer zij arbeidsongeschikt werden. Dat dit type
verzekering ook negatieve effecten met zich mee kan brengen, bleek uit de
hoge instroom in dit programma tijdens de jaren tachtig en negentig van
de vorige eeuw, ook wel bekend als ‘the Dutch disease’. Het systeem bleek
een aantrekkelijk alternatief te bieden voor regulier ontslag, zodat veel
van de uitkeringsgerechtigden eigenlijk niet langdurig arbeidsongeschikt
waren. Om het stijgende verzuim terug te dringen, is onder meer de Wet
verbetering Poortwachter aangenomen, met een sterkere controle voor
instroom en grotere verantwoordelijkheden voor de werkgever. Mocht een
werknemer ziek worden, dan is de werkgever nu verplicht het loon twee
jaar door te betalen. Tegelijkertijd moeten zowel werkgever als werknemer
zich actief inzetten voor de re-integratie van de zieke werknemer. Pas als
de werknemer na twee jaar nog steeds niet aan het werk kan, komt de
verzekering tegen inkomensverlies door langdurige arbeidsongeschiktheid
in beeld.
Een voorbeeld van hoe werkgevers en werknemers actief re-integratie
kunnen bevorderen, is het werken onder aangepaste omstandigheden
tijdens het ziekteverlof. Zo zou iemand eerst slechts een aantal uren kun-
nen werken en dat elke week een klein beetje op kunnen bouwen, graded
return-to-work. Deelnemen aan (aangepast) werk tijdens het ziekteverlof
zou kunnen helpen het verlies van menselijk kapitaal tegen te gaan en in
sommige gevallen kan het zelfs helpen bij een sneller herstel van fysieke
klachten. Echter, er bestaat het risico dat wanneer men te snel opbouwt
het lichaam overbelast wordt zodat het herstelproces juist langzamer zal
verlopen. De huidige academische literatuur laat zien dat deeltijd en/of




duur van afwezigheid door ziekte te verkorten en de kans op permanente
arbeidsongeschiktheid te verminderen. Echter, er is nog maar weinig
bekend over hoe zulke trajecten het best opgezet kunnen worden. In het
vierde paper beantwoorden we daarom de vraag "Hangt de effectiviteit
van deeltijd werkhervatting tijdens het ziekteverlof af van (1) het moment dat
het traject is gestart; (2) het aantal uren dat iemand werkt bij de start; (3) het
ziektebeeld?"
We beantwoorden deze vraag op basis van het cliëntenbestand van
een private onderneming die casemanagement verzorgt bij ziektegevallen.
Deze partij helpt bij het uitvoeren van de verplichtingen van de Wet
Verbetering Poortwachter en bij het opstellen van een plan van aanpak
voor re-integratie. Of een zieke werknemer aan deeltijd werkhervatting
deelneemt hangt samen met de verwachte herstelkans van de werknemer,
zodat een simpel regressiemodel onjuiste schattingen zal geven. Dit lossen
we op door een instrumentele variabele te genereren die weergeeft welke
voorkeuren de casemanager van de cliënt heeft met betrekking tot het
starten van een deeltijd werkhervattingstraject. De ene casemanager zal
geneigd zijn dit type traject vaker, vroeger of met een grotere deeltijdfactor
in te starten dan een andere casemanager, wat invloed kan hebben op het
traject dat de individuele cliënt zal ondergaan.
De resultaten laten zien dat deeltijd werkhervatting tijdens het ziekte-
verlof nog effectiever is als het snel en intensief gestart wordt. Waarschijn-
lijk biedt dit type start iemand meer kans om als volwaardige werknemer
deel te nemen aan werkprocessen. Dit geldt echter niet voor werknemers
die last hebben psychologische of psychiatrische problemen. In die geval-
len kan er beter wat langer gewacht worden tot het traject gestart wordt.
In tegenstelling tot eerdere literatuur, laten de resultaten zien dat ondanks
dat de deeltijd werkhervatting wel leidt tot kortere ziekteduren, het geen
invloed heeft op de kans dat iemand langdurig arbeidsongeschikt raakt.
Dit verschil kan verklaard worden door de omstandigheden waaronder
de individuen in de ‘controle groep’ in Nederland verkeren. Ondanks
dat zij niet deelnemen aan het traject van deeltijd werkhervatting tijdens
het ziekteverlof, blijven zij via de Wet verbetering Poortwachter wel in




terugkeer werken. Als er ook maar een kleine kans is dat iemand herstelt,
zal dit waarschijnlijk ook bereikt worden zonder de inzet van deeltijd
werkhervatting.
Het laatste paper heeft betrekking op dataverzamelingsmethodes. Om
de sociaal-economische bescherming van huishoudens te vergelijken tus-
sen landen en over de tijd heen, is vergelijkbare en nauwkeurige informatie
nodig over zaken als armoede, inkomensongelijkheid en ziekte. Bij voor-
keur wordt deze informatie regelmatig geactualiseerd. Binnen Nederland
kunnen we gebruik maken van een grote hoeveelheid administratieve data
en jaarlijkse grootschalige enquêtes, maar het is een stuk lastiger om deze
informatie te vergaren in veel landen met een laag- of middeninkomen.
Daar is men afhankelijk van enquêtes die eens in de zoveel jaar bij huishou-
dens thuis worden afgenomen. Het uitzetten van deze enquêtes kost veel
tijd en geld. Onderzoek naar efficiëntere en makkelijkere manieren om
enquêtes uit te zetten zijn dus belangrijk om (internationaal) onderzoek
naar sociale zekerheid te bevorderen.
De meest gangbare methode om huishoudens te selecteren voor dit
type enquêtes is two-stage cluster sampling. Deze methode houdt in dat
men eerst op willekeurige basis een aantal kleine regio’s selecteert, om
vervolgens een willekeurige selectie van huishoudens binnen deze regio’s
te maken. De tweede stap is noodzakelijk, omdat de regio’s vaak te
groot zijn om in een dag alle huishoudens te kunnen interviewen. Met
behulp van deze methode kan het veldwerk geconcentreerd worden in
slechts enkele regio’s, maar deze regio’s moeten wel in ieder geval twee
keer bezocht worden. Dit herhaaldelijk bezoeken leidt tot hoge kosten
en het risico dat mobiele huishoudens, bijvoorbeeld huishoudens met
seizoenswerkers, uitgesloten worden van de enquête. Nieuwe methodes
om huishoudens te selecteren zoals gridded sampling geven de mogelijkheid
om kleinere regio’s te definiëren, zodat het mogelijk is om alle huishoudens
binnen die regio te enquêteren. Deze methode, ook wel one-stage cluster
sampling genoemd, zou tot substantieel lagere kosten kunnen leiden omdat
de identificatie- en interviewfase gecombineerd kunnen worden op een




huishoudens meegenomen worden groter. Echter, als huishoudens die erg
op elkaar lijken ook de neiging hebben dicht bij elkaar in de buurt wonen,
zal het met deze methode nodig zijn om meer huishoudens te interviewen,
wat weer leidt tot hogere kosten.
Daarom gaan wij in dit paper op zoek naar het antwoord op de vraag:
"Hoeveel extra clusters moeten er getrokken worden onder one-stage cluster sam-
pling om steekproefschattingen te krijgen met de precisie van een two-stage clus-
ter sample?" Dit doen we door eerst een synthetische geo-gecodeerde
microdataset te genereren die alle huishoudens in Oshikoto (Namibië)
bevat. Hiervoor maken we gebruik van informatie uit recente enquêtes,
een census en ruimtelijke covariaten. Deze informatie combineren we
met behulp van verschillende voorspel- en clusteringsmethodes. De re-
sulterende data hebben dezelfde statistische eigenschappen als de echte
populatie. Echter, een vergelijkbare dataset van de echte populatie zou
niet publiek beschikbaar kunnen worden gemaakt vanwege de privacy-
gevoeligheid van de informatie. Op basis van gesimuleerde uitkomsten
van de twee sampling methodes toegepast op de synthetische populatie,
stellen wij het aantal clusters vast dat nodig is om een accurate schatting
van populatiegemiddeldes te verkrijgen. Hierbij nemen we verschillende
scenario’s van clustering van huishoudenstypes aan.
De resultaten laten zien dat een one-stage cluster sample niet perse tot
grotere steekproeven hoeft te leiden, tenzij er perfecte socio-economische
segregatie is op basis van een van de karakteristieken die de survey meet.
In zo’n extreme situatie kan de ideale steekproefgrootte bijna dertien keer
groter zijn dan in het geval van een two-stage cluster sample. Echter, in bijna
alle andere situaties, stijgt de ideale steekproefgrootte met hoogstens 30%,
zodat one-stage cluster sampling in de praktijk een haalbaar alternatief kan
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One of the aims of social insurance programs is to provide a financial safety 
net to households when encountering adverse circumstances. However, 
apart from offering mere protection, a system of social insurance can also 
be designed with the aim to increase overall welfare. In order to make the 
appropriate design decisions one needs to understand how individuals react 
to both negative shocks, such as health and wealth shocks, and the system 
put in place to protect them from these shocks. For example, in order to 
determine appropriate levels of contributions and benefits in social insurance 
contracts, one needs to understand how individuals prefer to move resources 
between different potential life outcomes and how consumption patterns 
are affected by negative shocks such as illness. Moreover, one needs to 
understand which (negative) behavior can be provoked by income protection 
and how such moral hazard can be counteracted by complementary efforts to 
income support. To gain understanding on such behavioral effects, access to 
high quality microdata is crucial.
This thesis contains four essays aiming to generate empirical insights to 
facilitate the design of social insurance program. It focusses on changes in 
consumption preferences in reaction to health and wealth shocks, the 
effectivity of complementary efforts to sickness benefits programs, and 
methods to construct the surveys needed to gain these empirical insights.
This is a volume in the series of the Meijers Research Institute and Graduate 
School of the Leiden Law School of Leiden University. This study is part of 
the Law School’s research program on ‘Reform of Social Legislation’.
L. KOOLS
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